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Summary
This thesis analyses the causes and consequences of access to credit by small-
scale enterprises in developing countries and the design of optimal financial systems.
The first essay explores the link between informality and access to external finance
by Small and Microenterprises (MSEs). A probit model is estimated using data on
MSEs from Ethiopia. The results show that informality plays an important role in
a firm’s access to credit. Specifically, informal firms are about sixteen percentage
points more likely to be credit constrained than their formal counterparts. The
second essay examines the consequence of credit constraints on a firm’s innovation
using the same data on MSEs from Ethiopia. We construct a measure of innovation
exploiting a question in the survey that asks whether a firm has engaged in some
form of innovation or not. Employing various estimation methods to deal with the
possible endogeneity of access to credit, the results show that access to credit has a
significant and positive effect on a firm’s propensity to engage in innovative activi-
ties. The third essay examines whether opening a stock exchange boosts per capita
income growth in Sub-saharan Africa countries (SSA). Employing a semi-parametric
Difference-in-Difference (DiD), i.e., a DiD on a set of matched countries, we show
that opening a stock exchange does not appear to have a significant impact on eco-
nomic growth in SSA as well as in other developing countries in other regions. The
fourth essay studies whether the structure of the economy determines the evolution
of the optimal structure of the financial system. Employing a measure of economic
structure constructed based on a country’s comparative advantage and using an in-
novative instrumentation strategy to deal with the possible endogeneity of economic
structure, the essay shows that the structure of the economy exerts a first-order
causal effect on the evolution of the structure of a country’s financial system.
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1Introduction
By 1980, the median per capita income of countries in the top ten income percentiles
was about one hundred times that of countries in the bottom ten percentiles. By
2007, the figure stood at about 150. This large and growing income gap among
countries has perplexed economists for a long time. A compelling, but rather opti-
mistic, view is that developing countries are no less well endowed with individuals
with a potential talent and enthusiasm than developed countries. Underlying this
huge difference, however, is that, in developing countries, only a few individuals
achieve their potential as compared to those in developed countries. Although by
no means the only factor, access to finance is one of the key causes of the differential
propensity among countries in tapping into the potential talents of their people. A
well developed financial system makes sure that innovative ideas do not die for a
lack of finance. It ensures that individuals from humble socioeconomic background
but with novel ideas will have the chance to implement their ideas. It also implies
that individuals with limited wealth but with the required intellectual talent will
go on to pursue education and training, thus changing their fate, and potentially of
their countries. In fact, most of the innovations that brought about the industrial
revolution in what are now the developed countries of Europe were around well
before the start of the revolution, but their full utilization had to wait until these
2countries had undergone a form of financial revolution.
Developing countries fare badly in terms of their financial development, a ma-
nifestation of which is the pervasive presence of credit constraints and rationing
confronting firms and individuals. This problem is particularly acute among small-
scale firms, despite the fact that these firms constitute a significant share of output
and provide a source of livelihood for many individuals in these countries. Although
there is a debate as to whether these firms can serve as a reliable engine for econo-
mic growth, there is less disagreement regarding the fact that these firms are the
key sources of livelihood for many poor households of these countries and, therefore,
may potentially play an integral role in the process of poverty reduction. Indeed,
in many countries, the sheer proportion of individuals engaged in these activities
makes it compellingly hard not to view these firms as a potential industrial bedrock.
A lack of access to external finance is among the primary bottlenecks faced by these
firms. A clear understanding of the key causes and consequences of access to exter-
nal finance by these firms, therefore, may help in justifying and guiding the design
of the right policy instruments to ease their access to external finance. A crucial
question is how to put in place a well-functioning financial system. A large number
of countries, in particular those in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), have opened stock
exchanges as a means of facilitating financial development. Some argue that stock
market formation can play an important role in the region’s financial development
and hence in easing access to external finance for economic agents in the region
(Senbet and Octchere, 2008). However, there are some who are sceptical of whether
it is worthwhile for SSA countries to promote stock market formation and develop-
ment (Singh, 1999). As per this view, given the current state of institutional and
3economic development in the region, stock markets are less likely to boost access to
finance, and, at worse, their side-effects may outweigh their benefits. From a po-
licy perspective, however, an important question is whether opening a stock market
improves economic performance. It is important to see if opening a stock exchange
and, in general, active engineering of the structure of the financial system can help
ease access to credit and hence boost economic growth. This thesis contributes to
some of these themes. It consists of four independent essays. The first two essays
explore the cause and consequences of access to external finance for Small and Micro
Enterprises (SMEs) in Ethiopia. The third and fourth essays explore a broader issue
relating to the design of appropriate financial structures.
The first essay explores the key determinants of access to external finance by
Small and Microenterprises (MSEs) in Ethiopia. In particular, the essay examines
the role of informality in a firm’s access to external financing. Informal firms may
a priori appear to be credit constrained, in view of the fact that they have limited
access to the formal financial sector. However, it is not clear if this is the case in
practice, since they can have access to alternative sources of finance. Hence, it is
interesting to examine the role of firm informality in their access to credit. This is
important in view of the fact that a substantial fraction of MSEs are informal. The
essay analyses this theme using a unique dataset on about 1000 SMEs in Ethiopia,
collected by the Ethiopian Development Research Institute (EDRI) in 2003. The
data contain detailed information on various aspects of MSEs. In particular, the
questionnaire contains a detailed section on finance, designed to elicit information
on access to formal as well as informal sources of financing investment, and the avai-
lability and extent of trade credit, etc. We exploit this to construct a measure of a
4firm’s demand for and access to external finance. The data also contain information
on various characteristics of a firm. In particular, it asks whether a firm is formally
registered or not, and we exploit this to construct a measure of informality. Given
the nature of the dependent variable, we estimate a probit model. The results show
that informality plays an important role in a firm’s credit constraint. Specifically,
informal firms are about sixteen percentage points more likely to be credit constrai-
ned as compared to their formal counterparts. We try to deal with the possible
endogeneity of informality and also conduct additional robustness checks. The key
empirical findings of the essay remain essentially unaffected. In addition to infor-
mality, we show that the gender and education of the owner, and membership of a
business association are significantly associated with a firm’s access to credit.
The second essay takes the issue of access to external finance a bit further and ex-
plores the consequence of credit constraints on a firm’s innovation behaviour. This is
an important question given that innovation plays a key role in the growth and sur-
vival of these firms (Gebreyesus, 2009). Hence, so long as access to credit increases
a firm’s propensity to engage in innovation, easing access to credit can, therefore, be
one possible mechanism through which policies can assist growth and the survival of
these firms. We use the same data on SMEs in Ethiopia, noted above, to explore this
issue. In addition to the rich information about firm characteristics, the survey also
contains information on whether a firm has engaged in some form of innovation or
not. We exploit this and construct a measure of innovation. As for access to credit,
we use the same measure used in essay one. We employ various estimation methods,
primarily to deal with the possible endogeneity of access to credit in the innovation
equation. The results reveal that access to credit has a significant and positive effect
5on a firm’s propensity to engage in innovative activities. Besides access to credit,
the result also shows that firms whose owners have vocational training and those
owned by male owners are more likely to engage in some form of innovation.
The third essay explores the consequences of opening a stock exchange in the
poorer developing economies. In particular, it examines whether opening a stock
exchange boosts per capita income growth in SSA countries and how its growth
impact in SSA compares to a set of developing countries in other regions of the
world. Employing a semi-parametric Difference-in-Difference (DiD), i.e., a DiD on
a set of matched countries, we show that opening a stock exchange does not appear
to have a significant impact on economic growth in SSA countries. We also show
that this is not an issue specific to SSA, as stock market formation does not appear
to have a significant effect on per capita income growth in our sample of developing
countries in other regions. The key finding of the essay, therefore, lends support
to the view that, given the current state of economic development, opening a stock
exchange may not assist in easing access to finance and boosting economic growth
in the region. The results, on the other hand, contrast with the findings of the
limited existing studies on this issue, that show that opening of a stock exchange
has a positive, albeit weak, effect on economic growth (Minier, 2009; Baier et al.,
2003).
The fourth essay deals with the evolution of the financial structure and the role
of economic structure in this. In particular, it examines whether the structure of
the economy determines the optimal structure of the financial system. Lin et al.
(2009) have recently argued that the structure of the economy guides that of the
financial system. We employ a measure of economic structure constructed based on a
6country’s comparative advantage. Specifically, we rely on the following assumptions
to get a proxy for this. First, the structure of a country’s economy at a given point
in time is determined by its comparative advantage. Following Heckscher-Ohiln
theory, countries specialize in and export goods and services in which they have a
comparative advantage. Hence, all else the same, a country’s comparative advantage
can be inferred from its export structure. Secondly, economic sectors and activities
have differing needs for different mixes of finance. For instance, economic activities
that engage in high risk and high return projects are better served by a market-
based financial system (Allen and Gale, 1997). In effect, the measure of economic
structure we use is based on a country’s comparative advantages weighted by the
implied equity dependence. Employing an innovative instrumentation strategy to
deal with the possible endogeneity of economic structure, the results show that the
structure of the economy exerts a first-order causal effect on the evolution of the
structure of a country’s financial system. The finding of the essay, therefore, lends
support to the view that economic structure guides the structure of the financial
sector, thus cautioning against active engineering of the structure of the financial
system (Lin et al., 2009).
7Chapter 1
Access to Credit and Informality
among Micro and Small
Enterprises (MSEs) in Ethiopia
Joint work with Barry Reilly. This chapter is published on International Re-
view of Applied Economics, Vol. 25, No. 3, May 2011, 313-329
1.1 Introduction
Micro and small enterprises (MSEs) constitute a large fraction of total firms and ge-
nerate substantial employment and output in many developing countries. In Ethio-
pia, for instance, a survey by the country’s Central Statistical Agency(CSA) in 2002
revealed that there were about 974,679 micro enterprises, generating a means of li-
velihood for about 1.3 million people (CSA, 2002). The number of small enterprises
is also sizeable. A study by the same institution in 2003 estimated it at 31,863, em-
ploying about 97,782 individuals(CSA, 2003). For countries like Ethiopia that are
highly dependent on the agricultural sector, MSEs constitute an important chan-
8nel for economic diversification. Not surprisingly, the country’s Poverty Reduction
Strategy Paper (PRSP) underscores the role of MSEs “...as seedbeds for the deve-
lopment of medium and large enterprises (vertical integration)”, and to “... absorb
agriculturally under-employed labor, and diversify the sources of income for farming
families.”(MOFED, 2006, p.155). A separate agency, The Federal Micro and Small
Enterprise Development Agency (FeMSEDA), was established in 1998 to facilitate
the development of MSEs in Ethiopia.
Effective policy intervention, however, requires understanding the main constraints
facing these firms. One important determinant of a firm’s productivity and growth
is access to external credit. However, it has been well documented that most firms,
especially small ones and those in developing countries with less developed financial
systems, face substantial credit constraints (Banerjee and Dulfo, 2008; Hubbard,
1998a). This is not surprising given that the financial sector is beset by information
imperfections and incentive problems, rendering intermediaries reluctant to lend to
firms, especially to MSEs. Therefore, one area of policy intervention necessary to
stimulate the growth of MSEs is in improving access to external finance.
An effective intervention, however, requires a clear understanding of which firms
are likely to suffer from a problem of access to credit. This will help in guiding a
tailored and more effective policy intervention to address the issue. A growing litera-
ture (see, for instance, Honorati and Gatti (2008); Dabla-Norris and Koeda (2008)),
although mainly focused on large and medium sized firms, explores the importance
of informality with regard to access to formal finance. Informality of a firm can
be a crucial determinant of its access to credit for various reasons. While screening
borrowers, lenders require extensive information, including proper documentation of
registration and an operating license, tax-compliance and externally audited finan-
cial statements. The informal firms are less likely to possess all of these documents,
and almost certainly not to the standard required by formal financial institutions.
Therefore, such firms are likely to be denied access to credit. Further, financial
contracts are highly sensitive to the availability and enforcement of contract. And
9given that informal firms are usually beyond the purview of the formal legal system,
it is almost impossible for formal financial institutions to enter into contracts with
such firms. Thus, informality is a priori an important determinant of a firm’s access
to external finance.
Apart from informality, theory also identifies a variety of other determinants of
a firm’s access to credit. This paper attempts to identify the factors that determine
access to credit for MSEs in Ethiopia, with a particular emphasis on the role of
informality. To this end, the paper uses a unique dataset on Ethiopia’s micro and
small enterprises collected in 2003.
The remaining part of the essay is organised as follows. Section 1.3 discusses the
conceptual framework that underpins the prevalence of credit market imperfections,
and the determinants of credit constraints facing firms. Section 1.4 details the
dataset used, while section 1.5 discusses the econometric methodology. Section
1.6 provides the econometric results and some robustness tests for the preferred
econometric specification. Section 1.7 concludes, provides some policy implications
and offers some recommendations.
1.2 A brief Background on Ethiopian Economy
This and the next essays are on the Ethiopian economy. Therefore, it is worthwhile
to provide a brief overview of some of the key features of the Ethiopian economy.
We present a brief discussion of some key economic indicators, such as income level
and the poverty ratio, and some indicators of the structure of the economy. We also
provide a brief discussion of the country’s financial system.
Ethiopia is one of the poorest countries in the world. Per capita income as of
2009, in Purchasing Power Parity (PPP), stood at 850 USD, almost half the figure
for Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA). About 41%1 of the country’s population live below
the one dollar a day poverty-line, while about 78% live below the two dollar a day
1Figure is for the year 2005.
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poverty-line. Life expectancy at birth is 58, compared to 80 for developed countries,
69 for the world average and 54 for the Sub-Sahara African. The under-five mortality
rate is still very high; of 1000 births, 106 die before their fifth year. Only about 30%
of the country’s population can read and write (as of 2005).2
The structure of the economy is predominantly agrarian. Over the period 1980
to 2009, agriculture, on average, accounted for about 54% of the total value added
of the country, almost three times (twice) the figure for low income countries (Sub-
Saharan Africa). Over the same years, the contribution of the agricultural sector to
GDP has declined by about 10 percentage points. The service sector is the second
largest sector of the economy, constituting about 35% of the total value added in
the economy over the period under discussion, not far off the 45% for low income
countries. Interestingly, the decline in the share of agriculture in total value added
over these years is entirely off-set by the increase in the service sector. Industry,
on average, accounted for about 11% of the country’s total value added over those
years, half the average for low income countries and almost a third of the figure
for SSA. Its share remained virtually unchanged over this same period. Employing
about 85% of the country’s population, agriculture is the main source of livelihood
and virtually the whole agricultural sector is subsistence.3
As is characteristic of a relatively poor economy, the country has a poorly deve-
loped financial system. Over the period 1980 to 2009, private credit by banks as a
share of GDP was on average about 11%, compared to 71% for high income countries,
although close to the 15% for SSA (World Bank, 2010). Over the same year, bank
deposits as a fraction of GDP was about 25%, higher than the comparable value for
SSA countries, but just about a third of the value for high income countries (World
Bank, 2010). The country’s formal financial system includes banks, insurance and
micro-finance institutions. Although there is a growing equity market, the country
does not have an official stock exchange as of yet. In practice, however, the country’s
2All data is based on World Bank’s World Development Indicator (WDI) 2011.
3All data is based on World Bank’s World Development Indicator 2011.
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financial system is essentially synonymous with the commercial banking sector. The
country is served by about 14 commercial banks, three of which are state owned. In
terms of intermediation, state owned banks have a strong presence. For instance,
during the fiscal year 2008/09, about 50% of the total credit disbursed was by the
three state owned banks (National Bank of Ethiopia, 2009, p.58). Similarly, 50%
of the total deposits was by these three state owned banks (pp. 50). In terms of
capital, state owned banks constitute about 67% of the total asset of the country’s
banking system, while they account for about 43% of the total branch network (pp.
45).
1.3 Access to credit and its determinants: a concep-
tual framework
The credit market is prone to imperfections, particularly in developing countries like
Ethiopia. Two prominent factors underlie these imperfections: asymmetric informa-
tion and weak contract enforcement. These two features have important implications
for the behavior of lenders and on the effectiveness of the price mechanism to clear
the market. This section briefly reviews asymmetric information and contract enfor-
cement as sources of credit market imperfections, with the aim of identifying some
of the key determinants of a firm’s access to credit.
Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) demonstrate that adverse selection, when coupled with
moral hazard, results in equilibrium credit rationing. As the risk type of a potential
borrower is its private information, lenders can not charge each borrower an interest
rate commensurate with its risk. Instead, they are forced to charge some average
interest rate. This, however, forces a low-risk potential borrower to exit the market,
thus reducing the quality of the borrowers’ pool faced by lenders– the adverse selec-
tion effect. Further, a high interest rate reduces the owner’s stake in the business
and may encourage it to invest in high-risk high-return projects and even to shirk–
the moral hazard problem. Hence, lenders can not rely solely on the interest rate
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to allocate credit under asymmetric information. The second major source of credit
market imperfection is contract enforcement. A crucial feature of the credit market
is that it is a market for trade in promises. However, promises can be broken and
the temptation is high for a borrower to voluntarily default on their loan.
The above snapshot of the main features of a credit market indicates how the
interest rate is a fairly ineffective instrument in allocating credit.4 Under such
circumstance, lenders rely strongly on other measures to extend credit, the common
method being to directly screen borrowers for their creditworthiness. To that end,
lenders use various observable attributes of a borrower. Firm level studies of access
to credit, therefore, try to identify observable attributes of a firm (as well as other
factors) that determine its credit constraints.
Among the attributes of a firm that lenders may use as an indicator of the
repayment probability is the size and age of potential borrowing firms. The size
of a firm may give an indication of its strength5 since this may be the result of
cumulative past growth, and may also be an indicator of potential future growth of
the firm. Further, large firms are more likely to have greater transparency in terms
of their operation and performance, for instance, in the form of having an audited
financial statement. Hence, lenders are more willing to lend to large firms, and such
firms are less likely to be credit constrained. The explanation is equally relevant
for the age of the firm (Winker, 1999).6 Therefore, MSEs are likely to be credit
constrained, particularly younger and smaller ones.
The attributes of the owners of the firm are also viewed among the determinants
of its access to credit. Various studies show that the gender of the owner plays
4Ethiopia has consistently maintained a low interest rate. For instance, the nominal lending
rate by commercial banks remained at around 10% between 2001 and 2005, while the real interest
rate has been considerably lower particularly since 2003, (National Bank of Ethiopia, 2004). In
spite of this, the overall credit to the private sector as a proportion of GDP remains low by the
standards of developing countries with an average of 24% over the period 2000 to 2005 (World
Bank, 2010)
5Various studies reveal that older and larger firms have higher rates of survival (see, for instance,
Farinas and Moreno (2004))
6Winker (1999) provides a formal model showing that the age of a firm may reduce the proba-
bility of being credit rationed.
13
an important role in access to credit with, in particular, female-owned enterprises
more credit constrained than male-owned ones (de Mel et al., 2008a). The skill and
education of the manager/owner can also exert a direct impact on a firm’s likelihood
of getting external funding for various reasons. First, the skill and education of
the owner/manager plays a key role in preparing convincing loan applications and
in successful negotiations with lenders. Second, banks may also use the skill and
education of a firm’s management team to infer its quality. Hence, firms with highly
educated owners/managers are more likely to get external funding.
Another important attribute of the owner, albeit difficult to measure, is perso-
nal motivation. Various studies indicate that differences in motivation can explain
differences in performances in specific tasks among individuals with similar ability
(Shane et al., 2003). One manifestation of motivation is self-efficacy, an individual’s
belief in his/her ‘ability to muster and implement the necessary personal resources,
skills, and competencies to attain a certain level of achievement in a given task
(Shane et al., 2003, p.11). This attribute is crucial for a firm’s ability to secure the
necessary loans. 7 Thus, firms owned by motivated individuals are less likely to be
credit constrained than those owned by less motivated individuals.
The location of the firm could also be another important factor in determining its
access to credit. In particular, the density of potential borrowers can be important.
In a less dense market where there are relatively few potential borrowers, banks
may have prior information about the potential borrower, such as the operation and
performance of the firm and the history and background of its owners (Banerjee and
Newman, 1998; Stiglitz, 1990). Hence, firms in areas that are densely populated
with potential borrowers are more likely to face credit constraints than those in
less densely populated ones. Furthermore, location may capture the unequal spatial
distribution of financial institutions.
Trade and supplier credits can play an important role in easing access to credit
7For instance, in view of the general opaqueness of MSEs, one way that banks can identify
creditworthy borrowers is to subject them to lengthy screening, which only persistent potential
borrowers are willing to go through.
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(Fafchamps, 1997). This is particularly so if it is between larger firms with relatively
easy access to credit from formal financial institution and small firms that are usually
excluded by such lenders. However, this type of transaction crucially depends on
the existence of understanding and trust between firms. Membership of a business
association can play an important role here as it increases acquaintances, the flow
of information and trust among member firms. Thus, MSEs that are members of
a formal business association, which usually have large firms as their members, are
more likely to benefit from trade and supplier credits and hence are less likely to be
credit constrained than those that are not members of such associations.
As for incentive issues, a lender can use various mechanisms to entice borrowers
to act in line with its own interest. One mechanism is the use of collateral (Bester,
1987). Firms that have resources as collateral (or resources likely to be treated as
collateral) are more likely to gain access to credit. In view of the general lack of such
resources, MSEs are at a disadvantage here. The sector of the firm can also be an
important factor in access to credit. For instance, lenders may infer the growth or
riskiness of a firm from the growth and the general riskiness of the sector in which
it operates.
Another important firm attribute that determines access to credit is its forma-
lity. This is so for a number of reasons. First, while screening borrowers, lenders
require extensive information. Among this is appropriate documentation of regis-
tration and/or an operating license, tax-compliance and externally audited financial
statements. Informal firms are less likely to have all of these documents. Therefore,
such firms are likely to be denied access to credit. Secondly, as noted above, collate-
ral plays an important role in a firm’s access to credit from formal sources. However,
in an attempt to be flexible and effectively hide from regulatory agencies, informal
firms are less likely to invest in fixed assets that are usually considered by formal
financial institutions as appropriate collateral. By virtue of this, informal firms are
more likely to be credit constrained than their formal counterparts. Finally, financial
contracts are highly sensitive to the availability and enforcement of contracts. And
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given that informal firms are usually beyond the scrutiny of the formal legal system,
it is almost impossible for formal financial institutions to enter into contracts with
such firms. Therefore, informality is a priori an important determinant of a firm’s
access to external finance. However, it needs to be noted that the nature of the
relationship could be reversed, where a firm that is credit constrained may opt to
operate informally. This is so because by operating informally and avoiding tax, it
may be able to conserve resources that can be used for investment purpose. Thus,
informality may be endogenous to credit access and this creates an econometric
problem when empirically modelling access to credit.
1.4 Data and Description
1.4.1 Data and sampling method
The paper utilizes data on microenterprises in Ethiopia collected by the Ethiopian
Development Research Institute (EDRI) in 2003. Almost 1000 small scale enterprises
with employees of 10 or less, selected from six major towns spread over the various
regions of the country, were interviewed. A multi-stage sampling procedure was used
in selecting the sample of firms. In the first stage, the sample size and number of
towns to be covered was fixed. Owing to resource constraints, the sample size was
restricted to 1000 firms selected from six towns. In the second stage, the towns were
selected based on three characteristics – their population density, their population
of microenterprises and their regional representation. Accordingly, Addis Ababa,
Awassa, Bahirdar, Jimma, Mekele and Nazreth were selected. In the third stage,
the total sample size was allocated among the towns in proportion to the number
of microenterprises located there. Finally, a random sample of firms were selected
from each sector in each town from a sample frame generated for each town. Data
were collected on 974 firms, distributed across each town as follows: Addis Ababa
(240), Jimma (147), Awassa (141), Bahirdar (145), Mekelle (150), Nazreth (151).
The main objective of the survey was to identify the characteristics and opera-
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tions of microenterprises in the country. As such the data contain detailed infor-
mation on various aspects of MSEs, such as the background of the owner(s) (i.e.,
gender, education, etc.); characteristics of the firm (e.g., age, location, whether it
was started from scratch or inherited, whether it is formal or informal, etc.); bu-
siness environment (e.g., the legal and regulatory framework, taxation, availability
and access to public services, infrastructure, etc.). In particular, the questionnaire
contains a detailed section on finance, designed to elicit information on access to
formal as well as informal sources of financing investment, the availability and extent
of trade credit etc. Therefore, we believe the data are sufficiently rich to enable a
study of the key determinants of an MSE’s access to credit in Ethiopia.
1.4.2 Definition of variables and summary statistics
Measuring access to credit is problematic, as access has many dimensions. In this
paper, we primarily use one measure which is constructed as follows. A survey ques-
tion asked firms whether they had ever received credit from banks or Microfinance
Institutions (MFI). For those firms that replied ‘yes’ to this question, there was a
follow-up question that asked whether the loan secured was of the requested size,
was disbursed on time, and was of the requested type of maturity. If the loan obtai-
ned by the firm fails in regard to any of these three criteria, the firm is treated as
credit constrained and the variable takes a value of 0. For those that never received
a loan from either of these institutions, there is a follow-up question that asked
whether they have ever applied for one. Those that have applied for a loan but did
not get one were treated as if their loan application was rejected and are considered
as credit constrained. This leaves those firms that neither applied for a loan nor
ever received one. For these, there is a further question that asked why they did
not apply. Among the replies to this question is: ‘because the firm did not need
a loan’, or ‘because it had better source of financing’.8 This sub-group are treated
8For example, from informal financial institutions such as Rotating Saving and Credit As-
sociations(ROSCAs), relatives and friends, loan from other governmental and non-governmental
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as having no problem in their access to credit and the variable assumes a value of
1. The remaining respondents, those who said they did not apply for a loan be-
cause they thought they would not get it or because they did not have the collateral
required or because the application process was deemed cumbersome, are treated
as credit constrained and hence assigned a value of 0. This measure is defined as
‘credit 1’ in the subsequent analysis.9 The nature of the question, therefore, enables
the construction of a measure that provides in our view a good approximation to
the way in which access to credit is conceptualised in the literature (see Claessens
(2006) for a detailed review).10
Table 1.1 provides a description of the variables included in the regression ana-
lysis alongside summary descriptive statistics. The measures constructed here are
strongly motivated by the findings in the existing literature on access to credit as
reviewed in section 1.3. As can be seen, using the more restrictive measure of access
to credit (i.e., whether a firm obtains a loan from either a bank or microfinance
institution, (‘credit 2’)) only 15% of the firms have actually access to credit. In
view of the construction of the variable, this implies that about a sixth of sampled
firms have ever received a loan from either banks or microfinance institutions. In
contrast, using our preferred measure of access to credit constructed for this paper
(‘credit 1’), about 42% of the firms reported having access to credit.
Various explanatory variables designed to capture firm as well as owner(s) at-
tributes are used in this paper. Among the attributes of the owner(s) are gender,
organisations.
9We have also used another measure of access to credit, ‘credit 2’, a binary variable that takes
a value of 1 if the firm has ever received a loan from banks or MFIs and zero otherwise.
10Nevertheless, the main weakness of the measure is that it does not specify the year in which
the loan was actually secured. This makes it problematic, for instance, to determine whether
some of the explanatory variables actually predate the outcome of interest. This has forced us to
exclude some additional explanatory variables from the regression models reported here. There
is no further information in our data to enable us construct alternative and comparable measure
of access to credit. Although there is limited information on firms’ use of trade credit, since our
preferred measure of credit constraint is broad enough to include a firm’s access to credit from
any source (including, but not limited to, informal sources, trade credit, etc.), we believe that
there is limited information to shed (as far as the importance of informality to credit constraint is
concerned) by using a measure of access to trade credit.
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education level and some measure of entrepreneurial motivation. About 6% of the
sample of firms are owned by more than one individual. Hence, the gender variable
used in this paper (‘male’) is constructed such that it takes a value of 1 if the firm is
exclusively male owned and zero otherwise. As noted in table 1.1, 74% of the firms
are exclusively male owned. The variable, ‘Vocational’, is a measure used to capture
the owner’s level of education. Given the fact that a firm can have more than one
owner, this variable takes a value of 1 if one of the firm’s owners had vocational
level training before joining the business and 0 otherwise. About 13% of the firms
have at least one owner with vocational level training. As noted in section 1.3, a
potential determinant of a firm’s credit constraint, and in general firm performance,
is the motivation of the entrepreneur. Understandably, this is hard to measure em-
pirically. We utilize a question in the survey that asks why the owner (at least one
of the owners in case of multiple owners) is in this business. One manifestation of
motivation is the perception the person has about his/her capability in achieving
their objectives. If the respondent says s/he is in the business because s/he has the
skill required to run the firm or because s/he was confident it would be profitable,
then this variable takes a value of 1, and zero otherwise. Using this measure, 57%
of the firms are owned by motivated entrepreneurs as defined in this way.
Apart from the attributes of the owner(s), the set of explanatory variables also
includes firm attributes. As noted earlier, informality is potentially an important
determinant of a firm’s credit constraint. The variable ‘license’, one of the key ex-
planatory variables in the analysis, captures this status. It is constructed such that
it takes a value of 1 if the firm has an operating license (i.e., the firm is classified as
a formal sector firm) and 0 otherwise. Having an operating license entitles a firm
to the rights and privileges of being a legally recognized entity, the basic privilege
being that the firm can engage in its main activity without worries of being pro-
secuted for doing so. Unlike an unlicensed firm, it can enter into formal contracts
with other economic agents, including with the government. More pertinent to our
discussion, it means that a licensed firm can apply for credits from formal sources,
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thereby potentially easing its credit constraints. Having a license also means that
the firm is required to abide by government regulations relating, for instance, to
labour and product standards. It may also involve paying the applicable taxes. Our
definition of informality corresponds to the main conceptualization used in the in-
formal economy literature, that informality does not necessarily means producing
goods and rendering services that are illegal but that the firm is out of the purview
of government regulations (Perry et al., 2007). As can be seen from table 1.1, about
75% of firms report they have an operating license for their business, indicating
the majority of sampled firms operate within a formal framework. Age and size of
the firms are other potential determinants of a firm’s access to credit. The variable
‘age’, captures the age of the firm, while, ‘employment’, which is the total number of
both paid and unpaid individuals employed by the firm at the start of its activity11,
captures the size of the firm. With an average age of about nine years, most of
the firms are relatively young. The firms are small in terms of employment, with
an average of three individuals working in a firm at its start time. Indeed, 90% of
them had actually five or less employees at the start of their operation. In terms
of the location, about 30% are located in Oromia regional state, 25% in the capital
city (Addis Ababa) and half of the sample are distributed over the other three re-
gional states, (viz., Tigray, Amhara and Southern Nation Nationalities and People
(SNNP)). The firms in the sample are classified into three broad activity sectors
(viz., services, trading and manufacturing) depending on their main type of busi-
ness. As can be seen from the table, the sample of firms appear evenly distributed
across the manufacturing (36%), services (38%) and trading (26%) sectors.
Possessing an asset that can be posted as collateral and maintaining an accoun-
ting record are other potentially important determinants of a firm’s access to external
credit. We construct the variable ‘collateral’ to proxy for collateral, which takes a
value of 1 if the firm has a title deed over any property that financial institutions
11This may not be a very good measure of size, especially if the initial firm size does not predict
its current size. However, given the nature of the dependant variable as noted in footnote 10,
initial employment is the best measure of size we have available in the dataset.
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consider as collateral, and 0 otherwise. About 60% of the firms own such assets. As
regards the accounting record, 44% of the firms report they maintain some form of
accounting information. Finally, we also use membership of a business association
to capture the network and potential for information sharing among similar firms
on their access to credit. About 8% of firms are members of at least one formal
business association.
1.5 Methodology
The dependent variable in this application assumes either a value of 1 or 0 depending
on whether a firm has access to credit or not. A probit model is used in estimation
given the binary nature of the dependent variable. The binary probit is generally
motivated by reference to a latent (or unobservable) dependent variable (y?i ) and
usually expressed as a linear function of a set of explanatory variables as follows:
y?i = x
′
iβ + εi (1.1)
where εi ∼ N(0, σ2) i = 1, ....n, xi is a column vector of realizations on k explanatory
variables including a constant for firm i and β is a column vector of k unknown
parameters. The values of the latent dependant variable are measured on the real
line and in this case reflect the underlying propensity of a firm to have access to
credit. The error term is assumed normally distributed with a mean of zero and a
constant variance σ2. A threshold (assumed zero in this case) is used to delineate
whether the firm has access to credit or not. The probability of the event occurring
can be linked to the latent dependant variable as follows:
P [y? > 0] = P [yi = 1] = Φ(zi) (1.2)
where yi is the dichotomous realization of the latent dependent variable (and is
either ‘credit 1’ or ‘credit 2’ in this study), Φ() denotes the cumulative distribution
function operator for the standard normal, and zi =
x
′
iβ
σ
. For identification purposes
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it is conventional to normalize σ = 1.
The log-likeihood function is defined as:
L =
n∑
i=1
yiln(Φ(x
′
iβ)) + (1− yi)ln(1− Φ(x
′
iβ)) (1.3)
The parameters are estimated using conventional non-linear optimization algo-
rithms. The efficient score tests suggested by Chesher and Irish (1987) are under-
taken to assess the reported specifications in terms of homoscedastic errors, and a
normal distribution of the generalized residuals. In addition, appropriate functional
form and/or omitted variables are tested using the RESET framework.12
The estimated probit coefficients can be interpreted by reference to their effect on
the standardized probit index but it is generally more convenient to translate them
into marginal and impact effects. The marginal effects are denoted for a continuous
variables as φ(z¯) ∗ βk, where φ() denotes the probability distribution (or density)
function for the standard normal, βk is the estimated probit coefficient for the cor-
responding kth continuous variable, and z¯ is the standardized probit index computed
at the sample mean values of the characteristics. The impact effects are computed as
Φ(z¯+ δj)−Φ(z¯), where δj is the corresponding probit coefficient for the jth dummy
variable, and the remainder is as defined above. The asymptotic sampling variances
for the marginal and impact effects are computed using the delta method.
1.6 Empirical Results
Table 1.2 provides the result of the probit estimation for both our measures of ac-
cess to credit. Both models satisfy the econometric assumptions inherent in the
12The omitted variables or misspecified functional form are proxied by the predicted standardised
probit indices from the original probit regression model raised to the powers of two, three and four.
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probit model, thus providing confidence in the regression model estimates. Column
2 provides the results for our preferred measure of access to credit (credit 1), while
column 4 reports estimates for access to credit measured by whether the firm has
ever received a loan from a bank and/or MFI. We concentrate on the discussion of
estimates using the former dependent variable as we believe this more accurately
captures the access to credit concept. As can be seen, formality positively and si-
gnificantly affects a firm’s access to credit. Moving from being informal to formal
(i.e., obtaining an operating license in this case) raises the standardized probit index
by about 0.44 of a standard deviation. In terms of the impact effect, as given in
column 3 of the table, having an operating license increases a firm’s access to credit
by about 17 percentage points, on average and ceteris paribus. Clearly, formality
has an important effect on a firm’s access to credit.
The gender of the owner is another important determinant of access to credit.
Firms that are exclusively male-owned are found to have a lower access to credit
than those that are owned by women. Male-owned firms are about 10 percentage
points less likely to have access to credit than female owned firms. This may be
attributable to the fact that MFIs usually target lending to female-owned enterprises.
A closer look at the gender composition of those who have ever borrowed from
formal financial institution indicates that female owned firms are more represented
in borrowing from MFI. For instance, of the firms that report that they have ever
received a loan from a bank, 75% are exclusively male owned while 22% exclusively
female owned. For borrowing from MFI, however, exclusively male-owned firms
constitute 55% while female owned ones constitute 36%, placing the latter gender
group as more implicated in MFI borrowing than in the sample overall. Hence,
MFIs seem to target their loans to female owned enterprises, thus making them
less credit constrained than the largely male-owned ones. However, another possible
explanation could perhaps be that female owned enterprises have limited demand for
loans as compared to their male counterparts, perhaps reflecting a gender difference
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Table 1.2: Results of Probit Estimation
This table provides the results of probit estimation for the two measures of access to credit.
credit 1 is dummy variable constructed based on series of questions asked to firms to elicit their
access to credit. It takes a value of 1 if the firm is not credit constrained and zero otherwise.
credit 2 is a dummy variable that takes a va-
lue of 1 if the firm received a loan from either banks or microfinance institutions, and zero otherwise.
Credit 1 Credit 2
Variable Probit ME Probit ME
License .444***a .166*** .414*** .073***
(0.108)b (0.038) (0.152) (0.023)
Male -.272*** -.107*** -.139 -.029
(.102) (.040) (.123) (.026)
Mixed ownership -.239 -.090 -.023 -.004
(.281) (.101) (.314) (.061)
Southern Region .366*** .145*** .504*** .122***
(.165) (.065) (.187) (.053)
Tigray Region .663*** .259*** .297 .067
(.164) (.062) (.193) (.048)
Oromia Region .528*** .207*** -0.194 -0.037
(0.144) (0.056) (0.178) (0.032)
Addis Ababa .317** .125** -.388** -.069***
(0.148) (0.058) (0.192) (0.030)
Motivation .241*** .093*** 0.089 0.018
(0.089) (0.034) (0.111) (0.022)
Collateral .344*** .132*** .335*** .065***
(0.095) (0.036) (0.125) (0.023)
Employment 0.021 0.008 .040** .008**
(0.020) (0.008) (0.021) (0.004)
Age -0.003 -0.001 .018 *** .004***
(0.005) (0.002) (0.006) (0.001)
Manufacturing 0.068 0.026 0.117 0.024
(0.101) (0.040) (0.122) (0.025)
Trading 0.133 0.052 -0.189 -0.036
(0.108) (0.043) (0.142) (0.025)
Accounting .163** .064** -.190* -.037*
(0.090) (0.035) (0.114) (0.022)
Vocational -.221* -.084** 0.025 0.005
(0.126) (0.047) (0.160) (0.032)
Business association .467*** .185*** .458*** .112**
(0.159) (0.062) (0.169) (0.049)
constant -1.268*** -1.883***
(0.191) (0.237)
Pseudo-R2 0.0973 0.1253
Loglikelihood- -598.96 -361.51
Sample Size 974 974
Diagnostic Score Tests
Normality χ2(2)=3.436[0.179]
c χ2(2)=3.447[0.178]
Functional Form χ2(3)=4.076[0.25] χ
2
(3)=3.479[0.324]
Homoscedasticity χ2(16)=20.065[0.217] χ
2
(16)=17.564[0.350]
a ***, **, * = significant, respectively, at 1% ,5% and 10%.
b values in parenthesis are standard errors.
c Values in square bracket are Prob-values for the diagnostics.
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in risk aversion (Bluffstone and Yesuf, 2007; Borghans et al., 2009).
Firms located in Oromia, Addis Ababa, Tigray and SNNP regions have better
access to credit than firms located in the Amhara regional state. For instance, a
firm located in Tigray regional state is 26 percentage points less likely to be credit
constrained than a similar firm located in the Amhara regional state. Hence, MSEs
in this region are more credit constrained than their counterparts located in the
rest of the country. This may be a reflection of the unequal regional distribution of
the country’s financial system. In line with the existing literature, having collateral
assets raises a firm’s access to credit. Hence, a firm that has some asset that can
be used for collateral purposes is 13 percentage points more likely to have access to
credit than a firm that does not possess such an asset. As discussed earlier, for firms
like MSEs, collateral is the best available device to screen borrowers and align their
interest with that of lenders.
Firms owned by more motivated entrepreneurs are more likely to have better
access to credit than those owned by less motivated ones, indicating perhaps that
motivated entrepreneurs are likely to develop mechanisms to circumvent the problem
of access to credit (Buera, 2008). Access to finance does not appear to be affected by
firm size, as captured by initial employment size, and the age of a firm.13 Similarly,
there is no systematic relationship between the sector in which the firm operates
and its access to credit.
Membership of a business association appears to be an important determinant
of access to finance for MSEs in Ethiopia. A firm that is a member of a business
association is 18 percentage points more likely to have access to credit than firms that
are not members of such organisations. This may be because membership of such
associations facilitates information sharing and networking among firms. As such it
13The choice of initial, as opposed to current, employment level is motivated by the objective
to reduce the endogeniety issue of the variable. However, employing current value of employment
does not qualitatively change the results of the essay. For firm age, we tried different specification.
For instance, we included a quadratic term and neither the coefficient of age nor that of our key
variable – license – changes. The coefficient of age, however, becomes significant at 10% when used
in log than in levels. Nevertheless, this does not change the results of other variables.
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may increase the trust among firms, an important factor for the extension of supply
and trade credits. And as firms have more trade credit and other arrangements, they
are less likely to be credit constrained. This is particularly important for smaller
firms that generally have less access to credit from formal financial institutions as
it allows them to get supply and trade credit from larger firms that have better
access to bank credit. Having accounting information significantly increases a firm’s
access to credit. Hence a firm that maintains an accounting record is six percentage
points more likely to have access to credit as compared to those who do not have
such a record, on average and ceteris paribus. This is to be anticipated given that
maintaining such information increases a firm’s transparency to lenders.
Another important variable is whether the owner had a vocational training back-
ground when starting the business. Those whose owners had vocational training are
eight percentage point less likely to have access to credit than those who do not have
such training. This is potentially problematic finding given that various studies on
MSE growth reveal firms whose owners have vocational training are more likely to
grow better than those whose owners lack such training (Nichter and Goldmark,
2009). The fact that they are more credit constrained casts doubt on the role of the
country’s financial systems in targeting MSEs that have high growth potential.
A brief examination of the estimates using the other measure of access to credit
(‘credit 2’) are reported in column 4 and reveal a broadly similar pattern of results.
In particular, formality increases the probability of obtaining a loan from a bank or
MFIs. Unlike the first measure of access to finance, the gender of the owner is not
a statistically significant determinant here. This may indicate that for these types
of firms, the gender of the owner is perhaps not important for access to credit from
banks and MFI, but is important for access to credit from other sources. This may
be because female owned enterprises have better access to credit form, for instance,
informal sources as compared to their male owned counterparts. The estimated
effects for age and size of the firm are significant in the second measure of access to
credit and insignificant in our preferred measure of access to credit. The estimated
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result for membership of a business association remains significant and exerts a
positive effect on a firm’s access to credit, although having an accounting record
yields a negative effect, albeit one that is only marginally significant.
A key assumption in the analysis conducted here is that informality is exogenous
to a firm’s access to finance. However, as noted in section 1.3, there are various
reasons why this may not be the case. For instance, it may be that firms that
can not get credit opt to operate informally so as to save money for investment
through avoiding tax. As such, there can be a causation running from access to
credit to informality. If that is the case, the regression model estimates above will
be potentially biased and hence the results misleading. Another possible problem
would be if there was an unobservable attribute, for instance the entrepreneurial
talent of the owner (s), that affects both access to credit and informality. In such
circumstances a correlation between ‘license’ and the latent dependant variable’s
error term exists, yielding a potential bias in the estimated ‘license’ coefficient.
In order to address the potential endogeneity of ‘license’ and assess whether the
findings from table 1.2 are robust, we use instrumental variables(IV). Given that the
‘license’ variable is binary in nature (see table 1.1), it is tempting to use a probit (or
even a logit) model to generate first stage predictions. However, this is unnecessary
and may actually prove harmful if such a non-linear first-stage model is mis-specified
(see Angrist and Krueger (2001, p.80)). Thus, we use a linear probability model
(LPM) in the first stage regression. However, given that the LPM is inherently
heteroscedastic, a correction to the estimated regression model’s variance-covariance
matrix for heteroscedasticity of unknown form is required.14 In order to determine
whether the selected set of instruments is relevant in the first stage equation we are
guided by both the rough ‘rule-of-thumb’ that the transformed F-test for the joint
significance of the identifying instruments in the first stage regression exceeds the
value 10 and by reference to a set of critical values provided by Stock and Yogo
14Using the Cook-Weisberg test for heteroscedasticity, the null hypothesis of homoscedastic errors
was decisively rejected for the reduced form LPM. The value of the estimated χ21 is computed at
41.0.
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(2005). It is also important to determine whether the instruments are exogenous
and this requires their independence from the error structure in the key equation
being modeled (i.e., access to credit). Hansen’s J-statistic is used for this purpose as
it is a consistent test when adjustments are made to the variance-covariance matrix
for heteroscedasticity of unknown form. A test for under-identification suggested by
Kleibergen and Paap (2006) is also used to assess the identification of the regression
model’s parameters.
In order to do this in the current application, we also estimate the second stage
equation as a linear probability model to facilitate this aspect of robustness testing.
Once we are satisfied that the set of instruments are relevant and orthogonal to the
error process in the equation of interest, we then use the ‘C’ statistic15 to determine
whether the ‘license’ variable is exogenous or not. Finally, in order to comple-
ment the finding related to ‘C’ statistic we also estimate an IV probit to test for the
exogeneity of the ‘license’ variable using the set of valid instruments obtained above.
Table 1.3: Testing the Exogeneity of the ‘license’ Variable
credit 1 credit 2
F-test for instrument relevance F( 3, 955) = 61.46 61.46
Prob-value=0.000 Prob-value=0.000
Kleibergen-Paap transformed F statistic 56.124d 56.124
Hansen J Statistic for Over-identifying Restrictions χ22 = 0.559 5.689
Prob-value=0.7560 Prob-value=0.0582
Kleibergen-Paap LM Statistic for Under-identifying Restrictions χ23 = 99 99.715
Prob-value=0.000 Prob-value=0.000
‘C’ test for exogeneity χ21 = 0.504 0.006
Prob-value=0.4775 Prob-value=0.9390
IV Probit Exogeneity Test χ21 = 0.68 χ
2
1 = 0.01
Prob-value=0.409 Prob-value=0.930
d The critical value for the 5% maximal IV relative bias is 13.91 using the Stock and Yogo (2005) critical values.
There are three dummy variables that we use as identifying variables in the
current application. These are ‘price setter’ (whether the firm sets its own price
or not), ‘produced by formal’ (whether the firm’s product is provided by other
large formal enterprises or not), and ‘business type’ (whether the firm’s ownership
structure is sole proprietorship or not). On the basis of table 1.3 it is clear that these
three variables are jointly relevant in the reduced form first-stage ‘license’ equation
as the resultant F-test comfortably exceeds the required ‘rule-of-thumb’ value and
15See Baum et al. (2003) for discussion of the C-statistic.
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the transformed F-test decisively rejects the null of weak instruments using the
critical values reported in Stock and Yogo (2005). In addition, the three variables
are also found to be orthogonal to the error process for both measures of access
to credit used here on the basis of both the Hansen J statistic for over-identifying
restrictions as well as the Kleibergen-Paap under-identifications LM test. Thus, the
instrument set is deemed valid for the purpose of the current exercise. Given these
findings we can now test for whether the ‘license’ variable is exogenous or not. In
using the linear probability model, the ‘C’ test fails to reject the null hypothesis
of exogeneity and this is also confirmed by the use of the IV probit model. Thus,
for both credit access measures, we can conclude that the formality status of the
firm is exogenous to the determination of access to credit. Therefore, on the basis
of the findings in table 3 and the diagnostic test values reported at the bottom of
table 2, we have some confidence that the probit model estimated is reasonably well
specified and that our econometric findings are reasonably robust.16
1.7 Summary and Conclusions
The role of MSEs in development is controversial (de Mel et al., 2008b). The large
size of MSEs in most developing countries is usually viewed in two different ways.
To some, it is an indication of a healthy process, as it signifies the creation of
new jobs and possibly lays the ground for the future diversification of the economy.
16We also construct a proxy for informality at the firm level using the average informality of the
sub-sector instead of the ‘license’ variable itself. This type of variable has been used by various
authors. For instance, Svensson and Fisman (2007) uses a sector-region average measure of bribery
incidence to proxy for a firm level payment for corruption. The survey allows the classification of
firms into 38 sub-sectors, and we use the average informality in each of these sub-sectors and assign
these values to each of the firms in its respective sub-sector. This is defined as the proportion of
firms in a given sub-sector who do not have a ‘license’. Even if there is a possibility of causation
from lack of access to credit to operating informally at firm level, it is less plausible for a firm’s lack
of access to credit to cause informality at sub-sector level. Informality of the sub-sector is mainly
driven by sector-specific factors such as the ease with which firms operating in one sector can avoid
being caught by regulatory agencies as compared to firms operating in another sector. Hence, we
use sub-sectoral average informality as a proxy for firm informality. The variable enters with a
negative and significant coefficient, confirming the results reported in table 1.2. This strengthens
our finding in regard to the effect of formality (or conversely informality) on access to credit.
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To others, it indicates the failure of an economy in providing gainful employment,
forcing people to opt for an ‘inefficient’ and ‘transient’ sector.
However, various studies indicate that there are high as well as low growth MSEs
(Nichter and Goldmark, 2009). Nevertheless, in view of their size, lack of assets for
collateral and general opaqueness, both high as well as low growth MSEs are likely to
be credit constrained. This paper identified factors that are important determinants
of MSE access to finance in Ethiopia. For instance, informal firms are more likely to
be credit constrained than their formal counterparts. Facilitating formalization of
such firms can be a potentially beneficial policy. It increases their access to finance
and therefore their growth and contribution to the overall economy and broadens the
tax base (Perry et al., 2007). Further, informality is believed to constrain the process
of industrialization by undermining the process of creative destruction (Perry et al.,
2007). Hence, there is a need for detailed analysis to understand better the factors
behind informality of MSEs in Ethiopia, an issue beyond the scope of the current
paper given the limited nature of the data available to us.
Maintaining accounting information increases a firm’s access to credit. Assisting
firms to maintain better accounting information, therefore, helps both in improving
their access to finance as well as assisting better tax assessments and collections. We
have also found that there is a gender dimension to credit access, as MSEs owned
by males are found to be more credit constrained than those owned by females.
Location matters as well, indicating firms in the Amhara regional state have less
access to credit than those in other regions. The fact that firms whose owners
have vocational training prior to starting a business are more credit constrained
is particularly worthy of comment. This may be an indication of the fact that
vocational training may be enough to enable owners to spot good potential projects,
but is insufficient to equip them with the skills required to go through the borrowing
process with a financial institution. One area where intervention can help such
firms is by equipping them with loan application and negotiation skills, through, for
instance further training.
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Another predictably significant effect is a firm’s collateral. Collateral is parti-
cularly important for lending to less transparent firms like MSEs. However, MSEs
generally do not have such assets. A policy intervention may be of assistance here.
One option would be a partial credit guarantee for a loan to MSEs. Although desi-
gning credit guarantee schemes that do not undermine the incentive effect of lenders
as well as borrowers is generally hard, there are encouraging schemes already in place
elsewhere. The often cited example is the Chilean Fodo de Grantia para Pequenos
Empresarios (FOGAPE), which is a public funded credit guarantee scheme for loans
to micro and small enterprises (Benavente et al., 2006). Apart from some evidence
of substitution of public for private guarantees, the scheme is generally interpreted
as a successful one (Benavente et al., 2006). It is important to use the findings of
such successful schemes and adapt or improve them for use in Ethiopia.
Although the regression models used in the paper pass various diagnostic tests
and arguably yield fairly robust and reliable results, future research can improve on
the analysis in a number of ways. A limitation of the dependant variable is that
it is defined on the basis of demand-side responses alone in that it reflects only
the view of firms and not that of lenders. An improved measure could exploit a
firm’s return on capital (for instance, generated as in de Mel et al. (2008b)) with
a firm’s reported credit constraint.17 Secondly, some of the explanatory variables,
such as that aimed at capturing entrepreneurial motivation, are crude proxies and
can be improved on by using superior measures of entrepreneurial ability (see for
instance those also used by de Mel et al. (2008b)). Thirdly, there is a potential for
measurement error in the first constructed measure of access to credit. As noted,
our key measure of access to credit is generated based on response to series of
questions. One key drawback with such approach is that the classification of our
dependent variable depends, among others, on the accuracy of the answers given
17Nevertheless, the return to capital is generally higher among MSEs. For instance, de Mel et al.
(2008b) finds it to be 20-30% per annum, and can be as high as 80% for credit constrained MSEs
in Sri Lanka; Kremer et al. (2011) finds a per annum return to capital of 113% for retail firms in
rural Kenya.
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to each of the series of questions used to generate the variable. A recall error in
one of the questions, for instance, would result in the dependent variable to wrongly
classified. In conventional linear regression, this is essentially a measurement error of
the dependent variable and hence does not affect the consistency of the parameter
estimated, but just its efficiency. With non-linear estimation techniques such as
one used in this paper, however, the consequences of misclassification error can
be serious (Hausman et al., 1998). In particular, they show that parameters maybe
biased and inconsistent as well as in efficient under this scenario, with the size of bias
and inconsistency depending on the size of the misclassification error. Employing a
Monte Carlo simulation, they show that for a small probability of misclassification,
say 2%, the estimates can be biased by as high as 25% (pp.245). Various options
have been suggested to deal with such issue. However, our efforts to model theses
effects proved difficult as the likelihood function failed to converge. This is clearly
an issue requiring further investigation, but is currently beyond the scope of this
thesis.
33
Chapter 2
Access to Credit and Innovation
among Micro and Small
Enterprises (MSEs) in Ethiopia
2.1 Introduction
The question of how to kick-start and sustain economic growth is no where as impor-
tant as in Africa. An important insight from modern theories of economic growth is
that the key to this process is technological progress, itself primarily determined by
innovation. An important consensus is also that technological progress is the result
of deliberate undertakings by firms to adopt and adapt existing technologies and/or
innovate new ones (Acemoglu, 2009). Therefore, it is not a surprise that explo-
ring factors behind the differences in the level of innovation attracts huge research
attention.
For developing regions like Africa that are located far-off the technological fron-
tier, technological progress is largely determined by adoption and adaptation of
existing technologies. In view of the dominance of small and medium scale firms,
innovation in these regions is synonymous with adopting and adapting technologies
developed in highly industrialized nations. Such incremental innovation is central
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to the growth and survival of these firms and hence in their role in the process of
industrialization of the region.
Various empirical studies have explored firm level determinants of innovation
and technology adoption. The overwhelming proportion of these studies, however,
have been on large firms in developed countries. There are few studies on less
developed countries. This is particularly so for micro and small enterprises (MSEs),
despite the fact that these firms constitute a large fraction of business enterprises in
most developing countries. In Ethiopia, for instance, as noted in essay one, MSEs
are estimated to generate a means of livelihood for about 2.3 million people (CSA,
2002, 2003).1
The limited emphasis on innovation by MSEs is understandable given that major
innovation is undertaken by large firms and that innovation is usually construed as
the introduction of products, methods of production or marketing that are new to
the country and usually to the world. However, this view of innovation misses large
innovative activities by medium scale and smaller firms. The notion of innovation
need not be restricted to radical innovations. As is emphasized by the Oslo manual
(OECD, 2005), innovation ought to be viewed from various points - the world,
country, region and the firm. For an activity to be regarded as innovation, at the
minimum, it needs to be new to the firm, not necessarily to the country or world.
SMEs do engage in these types of innovation, and such innovation may play a critical
role in their survival and growth (Gebreyesus, 2009). It is, therefore, important to
know the factors that determine innovation among such firms.
A well developed financial systems plays key role in facilitating innovation, both
by directing resources to promising new ideas and by diversifying risk faced by po-
tential innovators. Therefore, given the rudimentary state of the country’s financial
development and the resultant pervasiveness of credit rationing, access to credit
is potentially a key determinant of firm innovation and hence growth. This essay
aims at exploring the firm level link between access to finance and innovation. Such
1Figure relates to estimate for 2002
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information may help in designing better mechanisms to encourage innovation by
these firms. Besides its policy importance, information provided by this study also
contributes to the finance growth literature. An important finding is that financial
development plays a key role in the process of economic growth. However, little is
known about the empirical channels through which this works. And one possible
channel would be through its effect on innovation and hence productivity growth
(Levine and King, 1993). Therefore, a study of the impact of access to credit on
innovation may shed some light on this theme.
This essay provides an empirical study of the effect of access to credit on firm
innovation using a firm level data on SMEs in Ethiopia. Employing various estima-
tion methods, we show that access to credit has a positive and significant effect on
innovation by SMEs in Ethiopia. We use a simple probit model of innovation and
access to credit, where access to credit does not appear to have a significant effect
on innovation. This is likely to be the result of possible endogeneity of access to
credit in innovation equation. As a result, we employ various estimation techniques
aimed to correct for possible endogeneity of access to credit. We use single equation
instrumental variable estimation methods and show that access to credit has, in fact,
a positive and statistically significant effect on firm innovation. In order to make
sure that our result is not driven by weak instruments, we employ various estimation
methods to correct for this, and show that our result, by and large, holds. Finally,
we provide estimation result based on recursive bivariate probit model and Linear
Probability Model(LPM) simultaneous equations model. The results remain robust
and access to credit has a significant and positive effect on innovation.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2.2 provides the conceptual
framework, wherein the concept of innovation and technology adoption is detailed.
The section also provides key determinants of innovation, with emphasis on the
role of access to credit. Section 2.3 provides the description of data used and some
descriptive statistics. Section 2.4 discusses the econometric methods used in the
paper. Besides discussing the probit model and recursive bivariate probit model,
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this section provides an in detail discussion of some of the estimation problems
associated with simultaneous probit models, in particular the issue of coherency.
Section 2.5 provides the analysis of the results. We provide the result of simple probit
model, followed by result of instrumental variable probit model with and without
correcting for possibly weak instruments. This section ends with the discussion of
estimation result based on recursive bivariate probit model and LPM simultaneous
equation. Section 2.6 concludes and provides some policy implications. The section
also provides possible limitations of the study, suggesting future works to remedy
them.
2.2 Innovation and Access to Credit: Conceptual
Framework
2.2.1 The concept of Innovation
Although innovation is an old concept, there is some vagueness around its usage in
the literature. Hence, it is useful to start with some conceptual ground clearing. A
good starting point would be the distinction between invention, which refers to the
creation of something new, and innovation, which relates to the introduction to the
market of new good or services. Innovation and invention can coincide in certain
circumstances. Often, however, there are lags between invention to innovation.
Further, although invention can take place anywhere (such as research institutions,
universities, business enterprises, etc.,) innovation is usually carried out by business
enterprises (Fagerberg, 2004).
Innovation has different dimensions and is better understood by the various dis-
tinctions made. One such is along Schumpeterian line of distinction, where five
different types of innovation are identified. These are, the introduction of new pro-
duct, new ways of producing goods, new sources of supply of factors of production,
exploration of new market sources, and introduction of new organisation structures.
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The second distinction is made between radical and incremental innovation. The
former relates to the introduction of totally new product or process, while the latter
relates to a continuous improvement of existing products, processes, etc. A third
distinction is based around the context of the innovation itself. We noted that one
dimension of innovation is that it is the introduction of new product or process.
This begs the question: new to whom? Should it be new to the world, a country,
region or just to the firm?
In effect, there is some element of subjectivity in what constitutes innovation.
The conventional view, particularly in the economics literature, is that innovation
ought to be something radical and new to the world. Hence, it is usually un-
derstood in the context of large firms with large research and development (R&D)
expenditures. Much of the theoretical and empirical studies, therefore, are devoted
to understanding determinants of firm R&D investments. As any economic activity,
it is guided, by and large, by incentives, and the ability of firms to appropriate
the return is central. These studies shed important light on factors that underlie
technological progress in highly industrialised nations.
Innovation and technological progress in developing countries, however, is largely
determined by their ability to absorb the existing world stock of technological capital,
mainly through adopting readily available technologies or by tweaking them to fit
into their particular circumstance. Hence, incremental innovation is the dominant
and important type of innovation to firms in most developing countries. In view of
this, the conventional characterisation of innovation misses most of the innovative
activities in developing countries. Such an omission can be serious in view of the
importance of incremental innovation in setting the stage for radical innovation,
as is evidenced by experience of the newly industrialised Asian economies, where
firms first started as passive imitators, then progressed to incremental innovation,
finally leapfrogging the original innovators. To the extent that key determinants of
incremental innovation differ from that of radical innovation, the almost exclusive
emphasis on the study of radical innovation leaves an information gap of policy
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importance to many developing countries.
In this paper, therefore, we adopt the concept of innovation as outlined in an
OECD document for innovation, also called the Oslo Manual 2005 (OECD, 2005).
According to this document, innovation is “...the implementation of a new or signifi-
cantly improved product (good or service), or process, a new marketing method, or
a new organisational method in business practices, workplace organisation or exter-
nal relations.”(OECD, 2005, p.46). The manual distinguishes between four different
kinds of innovations.2 One is product innovation, which relates to the introduction
of a new or substantially improved product. Second is process innovation which
relates to the introduction to the firm of new or significantly improved method of
production or delivery of existing or a new product. The third and the fourth types
of innovations are marketing and orgnisational innovations, relating respectively to
the introduction of new marketing practices and organsational methods to the firm.
An important departure from the conventional characterisation of innovation is that
innovation does not have to necessarily be novel to the world. It is sufficient that it
be new to the firm.
2.2.2 Innovation and Access to Credit
Theory
In a world of perfect financial markets with no asymmetric information, transaction
costs and taxes, capital structure is not important for firm investment (and inno-
vation) (Modigliani and Miller, 1958). Known as the ‘irrelevance theorem’ in the
finance literature, this implies that what matters for firm investment (including in
innovation) and hence growth is its ability to spot promising projects. That is, a
promising idea never dies due to a lack of finance. Subsequent research, however,
questioned most of the crucial assumptions of the theory, both stated and implicit
ones. First, different types of financing are subject to differing level of taxes, thus
2The boundaries between the different types of innovation is not always clear.
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making capital structure important. For instance, in some countries internal finan-
cing is subject to higher tax than external equity financing which in turn is subject
to higher tax than debt financing.
Second and importantly, financial transactions are mainly trade in promises,
where a borrower obtains finance today on the promise that the lender will be
paid back in the future. The lender, therefore, should be able to know that the
borrower is able and willing to pay when the loan is due. Among other things,
this require that the lender knows, as much as the borrower does, about the risk
and return of the project and of the effort exerted by the borrower toward the
realisation of the project. Hence, the distribution of information between the two
market participants is central. However, information asymmetry, (i.e., the unequal
distribution of information between the market participants) is the fact of life in
financial markets. In particular, borrowers are generally more informed about the
risk and return of their project than creditors.
Akerlof (1970), using a market for used cars, shows how information asymmetry
can lead in the extreme to the collapse of a market. Unable to distinguish between
better quality and ‘lemons’, a buyer of used cars is forced to offer an average price,
which is inevitably lower than the reservation price of sellers of better quality cars,
forcing these types of sellers to withdraw from the market. As a result, the market
is populated by sellers of ‘lemons’, and buyers are therefore forced to once more
reduce the price they offer. This again forces better quality car sellers out of the
market. This vicious cycle can lead to the collapse of the market in the extremes.
Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) study the implications of asymmetric information in the
credit market. In view of the fact that borrowers are generally more informed than
lenders, creditors face similar problem as a car buyer above. Lenders therefore ask
for an average interest rate, and this certainly is higher than the reservation interest
rate of investors with low risk projects. As a result, these category of investors drop
out of the market, worsening the pool of borrowers lenders face. In response, lenders
revise their interest rates up once more. Besides further reducing the quality of the
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pool of potential borrowers, this gives a perverse incentive to actual borrowers. In
particular, it increases the financing cost and hence reduces the borrower’s/owner’s
stake in the firm/project. Owners therefore exert less effort towards the success of
the project. Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) show that in order to avoid these problems,
lenders resort to rationing credit, a circumstance where firms are unable to borrow
the amount they want at the prevailing interest rate and/or where firms can not
borrow even if they are willing to pay above the prevailing interest rate. Therefore,
credit rationing is an equilibrium outcome in credit markets owing to asymmetric
information.
Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) analysis is not specifically about credit constraints
faced by innovating firms, but by ordinary firms. If firms are credit constrained for
ordinary investment such as expansion of existing plant and production, the problem
would potentially be more serious for innovating firms. To fully appreciate this, it is
important to look at the output of innovation– that it is a production of some thing
that is less known. Hence, the outcome is much more uncertain even to the firm
undertaking the project, and the uncertainty is likely to be worse for creditors. The
information asymmetry between the innovating firm and creditors is compounded by
the fact that the former has a strong incentive not to share the limited information
about the project out of concern that the idea may be copied by other firms. This
uncertainty makes potential creditors less interested in the project, or force them to
ask for a high cost of capital.
The problem of moral hazard, arising from the fact that firms may use the fund
for something else than is originally intended (e.g. for innovative activities with
high risks) and that they may exert less effort toward the success of the project,
worsens the uncertainty faced by creditors. This problem, however, can potentially
be reduced through collateral (Bester, 1987). The problem is that lenders generally
prefer assets that are tangible and easy to re-deploy, the opposite of the assets of
innovating firms. Therefore, be it from the point of view of adverse selection or moral
hazard, the credit market imperfections and hence credit constraints are worse for
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innovating firms than for an average firm. The problem is all the more magnified for
small firms, who anyways face substantial credit constraint owing to their general
opaqueness.
Compounding the problem, innovating firms are also more likely to require ex-
ternal financing than an average firm. First, exploiting technological opportunities
may require large investment, and firms, specially smaller ones, may not have the
required resources to implement these technologies unless they have access to some
form of external finance. Even if the firm has sufficient internal funding, in view of
the fact that the outcome of the project is much more uncertain than an ordinary
investment, investing one’s resource in the project can be a quite risky underta-
king. As a result, firms need some form of risk-sharing to engage in the project, one
mechanism being through diversifying the source of financing of the project.
Empirical Studies
The theoretical studies on the implications of credit market imperfection inspired
the empirical study of the effect of credit constraints on firm behavior. Fazzari
et al. (1988) pioneered the debate in their study on the impact of access to credit
on firm investment. They exploit the argument that if markets are frictionless, in-
vestment is determined solely by its expected profitability, and, therefore, a firm’s
financial variables will have no effect. Therefore, one approach to see whether credit
constraints matter is to regress firm investment on the return to the project3 and
some measure of financial constraint. The problem, however, is that the measures of
both the return to investment and credit constraint are not easy to obtain. Fazzari
et al. (1988) argue that if one can categorize firms based on their level of financial
constraint, information about the sensitivity of investment to cash flow can be used
to infer something about the impact of credit constraint on investment. If a credit
constraint is an important determinant of a firm’s investment, the cash-flow sensiti-
vity of investment is higher for a financially constrained firm than for unconstrained
3Return to project is often proxied by Tobin’s Q.
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one. On the assumption that credit constrained firms payout less or no dividend as
compared to less constrained ones, they use a dividend payment to categorize firms
as financially constrained or not. Running a separate regression for the two cate-
gories, they find cash-flow sensitivity of investment is higher for credit constrained
firms, indicating the importance of financial constraints for firm investment. Studies
for various countries reveal broadly similar results.4
A similar methodology has largely been followed to explore the impact of credit
constraints on innovation, mainly on research and development (R&D). Most of
the empirical studies find that financial constraints have a significant effect on firm
investment in R&D.5 Hall (1992) uses panel data of a sample of publicly traded
US firms during 1973 to 1987 and finds that R&D is sensitive to firm liquidity,
although not as much as ordinary investment. Bougheas et al. (2003) finds similar
results for Irish firms. Similarly, but using a non-random sample of manufacturing
firms from Germany, Harhoff (1998) finds that cash flow sensitivity is higher for
ordinary investment than it is for R&D investment. He also reports that the cash-
flow sensitivity, both for investment and R&D expenditures, is driven largely by
smaller firms. On the other hand, using data for German firms, (Czarnitzki and
Hottenrott, 2011) find higher cash-flow sensitivity for R&D investment than for
capital investment.
Brown et al. (2009) uses a panel data of large US firms to study the impact of
financial development on boom and bust of R&D investment over the period 1990 to
2004. They find that R&D investment by younger, and hence plausibly more credit
constrained firms account for the larger share of the boom in aggregate research
and development investment. They further find that R&D investment is sensitive
both to internal cash flow and external equity issues for these firms while the effect is
insignificant for older firms, suggesting access to finance plays a key role in innovation
for younger firms. In a related study, Brown and Peterson (2009) provide the trend
4Hubbard (1998b) provides an excellent summary of the debate following the themes of this
paper.
5Hall and Lerner (2010) provides a stock of the existing literature.
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in cash flow sensitivity for both R&D expenditure and ordinary investment. They
find a substantial decline in cash flow sensitivity of ordinary investment over the
years, ascribing this to the decline in its share in the aggregate investment. On
the other hand, cash flow sensitivity of R&D investment remained fairly constant.
In view of the rise in this investment in aggregate capital expenditure during the
period, one would have expected its cash flow sensitivity to have increased. They
attributed this to the shift in the supply of external sources of finance during the
period, driven by a boom in stock market investment. In general, the overwhelming
proportion of studies investigating this theme confirm the importance of financial
constraints for innovation.6
However, inferring the impact of a credit constraint from cash-flow sensitivity has
been criticized on various grounds (Hubbard, 1998b; Kaplan and Zingales, 1997).
As firms are a priori divided based on the degree of credit constraint, it is impor-
tant that the classification reflects the inherent degree of asymmetric information
associated with the firms. However, the classification may just capture the inherent
degree of riskiness of these firms and not necessarily their degree of credit constraint.
It may also be that the change in net-worth (cash flow) is related to investment op-
portunities, in which case cash flow sensitivity does not imply the impact of credit
market imperfection but the role of the demand side factors. Further, it is pos-
sible that cash-flow sensitivity of investment is due to the non-value maximization
behavior of the managers and not necessarily due to information friction.
These methodological problems render the results less persuasive. Much of the
current research on the finance-innovation relationship tries to rectify these pro-
blems. The growing interest to understand the impact of credit market imperfec-
tions and the flaws of studies based on cash-flow sensitivity necessitated the need
to directly capture the extent of credit constraints from firm level surveys (Claes-
sens, 2006). Therefore, if available, one approach is to use a direct measure of
6Nevertheless, there are some studies (see, for instance, Blass and Yosha (2003)) that indicate
lack of cash flow sensitivity among R&D intensive firms.
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credit constraint and see its impact on innovation. Savignac (2008) follows this ap-
proach. Using data on French firms, the paper finds that the presence of a credit
constraint has a significant and negative effect on firm innovation, with an impact
effect of about 20 percentage points. The paper shows that firm size and technolo-
gical opportunity have significant and positive effects on innovation.7 In a similar
study using data for Sri Lankan MSEs, de Mel et al. (2009) finds that firms that have
bank loan are more likely to innovate than those without.8 Gebreyesus (2009), using
the same dataset as used in the current paper, shows some important determinant
of innovation by MSEs in Ethiopia. 9 Similarly, Gorodnichenkoy and Schnitzerz
(2009) uses a direct measure of access to credit to study its impact on innovation
and R&D investment. They find that access to credit has a significant positive effect
on innovation.
2.3 Data and Description
2.3.1 Data and Sampling Method
The paper utilizes the same dataset used in essay one. The data contains detailed
information on about 1000 micro and small scale enterprises with employees of
less than or equal to 10, selected from six major towns spread over the various
regions of the country. As noted in essay one, a multi-stage sampling procedure was
followed in selecting the sample of firms, where in the first stage, the sample size and
number of towns to be covered was fixed. The second stage involved selecting towns
based on three considerations, viz., their population density, their population of
7Further, Savignac (2008) and Hajivassiliou and Savignac (2008) discuss possible methodological
issues arising in studies that use direct measures of innovation and access to credit. In particular,
they show that simultanety is an important issue that needs to be addressed. We return to this in
section 2.4 of the paper
8Nevertheless, endogeneity is likely to be an issue as the paper does not control for this.
9As noted in section 2.4, although Gebreyesus (2009) employs the same dataset as in this paper,
our paper differs in that his emphasis is on the traditional determinants of firm innovation and the
impact of innovation on firm growth while our main interest is in the role of access to credit on
innovation.
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microenterprises and in order to achieve a fair regional representation. Accordingly,
Addis Ababa, Awassa, Bahirdar, Jimma, Mekele and Nazreth were selected. In
the third stage, the total sample size is partitioned among the towns based on the
number of microenterprises located there. A random sample of firms were selected
from each sector in each town from a sample frame generated for each town. Data
were collected on 974 firms, distributed over each town as follows: Addis Ababa
(240), Jimma (147), Awassa (141), Bahirdar (145), Mekelle (150), Nazreth (151).
The data contains detailed information on various aspects of MSEs, including
the background of the owner (s) (gender, education, entrepreneurial motivations,
etc.,); firm attributes (e.g., age, location, whether it was started from scratch or
inherited, whether it is formal or informal, etc.,); business environment (e.g., the
legal and regulatory framework, taxation, availability and access to public services,
infrastructure, etc.,). The questionnaire also contains information on key variables
of interest to us, innovation and access to credit. In particular, firms are asked
whether they have made an important improvements/changes to their products or
services in the last fiscal year of the survey year. As such, the question essentially
captures whether a firm has made a product innovation in the last fiscal year. The
questionnaire also contains a detailed section on finance, our central explanatory
variable, aimed to elicit information on access to formal as well as informal finance
sources for investment, the availability and extent of supply credit, etc. Therefore,
the data are rich enough to enable a study of the determinants of MSEs’ innovation
in Ethiopia and the role of credit constraint in this process.
2.3.2 Definition of Variables and Summary Statistics
A measure of innovation is constructed based on a question in the survey that asks a
firm whether it ‘made important improvement/change to its product/service in the
last one year [i.e., in the fiscal year 2001/2002]’. Based on this, a dummy variable
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is constructed that takes a value 1 if the firm responds yes and 0 otherwise.10 A
subsequent question asks firms the types of improvements they made. Most of
them cite an improvement that can be regarded as incremental innovation per our
definition, such improving the quality of existing products, starting to produce new
products, introducing modern machinery, etc. A very small fraction of them report
improvements that may be regarded as expansions, such as hiring additional or
training existing workers, extending working hours, etc.
A comprehensive measure of our key explanatory variable, access to credit, is
in general hard to come by. In this chapter, we use the same measure of access to
credit discussed in essay one, i.e., ‘credit 1’. To recap, the survey question asked
firms whether they had ever received credit from banks or Microfinance Institutions
(MFI). For firms that replied ‘yes’ to this question, a follow-up question was asked
as to whether the loan secured was of the requested size, was disbursed on time,
and was of the requested type of maturity. If the loan obtained by the firm fails in
regard to any of these three criteria, the firm is treated as credit constrained and
‘credit 1’ takes a value of 0. For those that never received a loan from either of these
institutions, there is again a follow-up question that asked whether they have ever
applied for one. Those that have applied for a loan but did not get one were treated
as if their loan application was rejected and hence ‘credit 1’ takes a value of 0. This
leaves those firms that neither applied for a loan nor ever received one. For these,
there is a further question that asked why they did not apply. Among the replies
to this question is: ‘because the firm did not need a loan’, or ‘because it had better
source of financing’. This sub-group are treated as having no problem in their access
to credit and the variable assumes a value of 1. The remaining respondents, those
who said they did not apply for a loan because they thought they would not get it or
because they did not have the collateral required or because the application process
10It is important to note in passing that although the question appears to be asking firms whether
they have made a product innovation or not, the answer list in the questionnaire and hence the
response of the firms has all the four types of innovation discussed in section 2.2.1 above. Hence,
the innovation refers to overall innovation, and not just product innovation.
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was deemed cumbersome, are treated as credit constrained and hence assigned a
value of 0.
Table 2.1 provides a description of the variables included in the regression ana-
lysis alongside summary descriptive statistics. The measures constructed here are
strongly motivated by the findings in the existing literature on innovation as revie-
wed in section 2.2. As can be seen, about 34% of the firms have engaged in product
innovation.11 Regarding our key explanatory variable on credit constraint, about
42% of the firms reported having access to credit.
In addition to our key variable, we control for various explanatory variables, de-
signed to capture firm as well as owner(s) attributes believed to affect innovation.
Among the attributes of the owner(s) are gender, education and a measure of en-
trepreneurial motivation. About 6% of the sample of firms are owned by more than
one individual. Hence, the gender variable used in this paper (‘Male’) takes a value
of 1 if the firm is exclusively male owned and zero otherwise. As can be seen, 74%
of the firms are exclusively male owned. The variable, ‘vocational’, is a measure
used to capture the owner’s level of education. Since a firm can have more than
one owner, this variable takes a value of 1 if one of the firm’s owners had vocational
level training before joining the business and 0 otherwise. About 13% of the firms
have at least one of the owners with vocational level training.
A proxy for entrepreneurial motivation is also included among the explanatory
variables. In particular, we utilize a question in the survey that asks why the owner
(at least one of the owners in the case of multiple owners) is in this business. One
manifestation of motivation is the perception of the person about his/her capability
in achieving their objectives. If the respondent says s/he is in the business because
s/he has the skill required to run the firm or because s/he was confident it would
be profitable, then this variable takes a value of 1, and zero otherwise. Using this
measure, 57% of the firms are owned by motivated entrepreneurs as defined in this
way.
11But essentially overall innovation, in view of the issue noted in footnote 10.
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We also control for set of firm attributes. Age and size of the firms are other
potential determinants of a firm’s innovation. The variable ‘ln(age)’, which is the
natural log the firm’s age, captures the age of the firm, while ‘ln(age) squared’
is the square of ‘ln(age)’. The variable ‘employment’ is the natural log the total
number of both paid and unpaid individuals employed by the firm at the start of
its activity12 captures the size of the firm. With an average age of about nine years,
most of the firms are relatively young. The firms are small in terms of employment,
with an average of three individuals working in a firm at its start time. Indeed,
90% of them had actually five or less employees at the start of their operation. In
terms of the location, about 30% are located in Oromia regional state, 25% in the
capital city (Addis Ababa) and the remaining firms distributed over the other three
regional states, (viz., Tigray, Amhara and Southern Nation Nationalities and People
(SNNP)). The firms in the sample are classified into three broad activity sectors (viz.,
services, trading and manufacturing) depending on their main type of business. As
can be seen from the table, the sample of firms appear evenly distributed across the
manufacturing (36%), services (38%) and trading (26%) sectors.
The survey also asks firms about their main source of information for their overall
business. The variable ‘information from customer’ takes a value of 1 if the firm’s
main source of information is customers and zero otherwise. As can be seen, about
58% of our firms cite customers as their main source of information. The variable
‘produced by formal’ captures competition between MSEs and large enterprises. It
takes a value of 1 if the firm’s product is produced/provided by large enterprises,
and zero otherwise. As can be seen about 84% of the MSEs face competition from
large formal enterprises.
Informality is potentially an important determinant of a firm’s innovation as well
as a credit constraint. The variable ‘license’ captures this status. It is constructed
such that it takes a value of 1 if the firm has an operating license (i.e., the firm is
classified as a formal sector firm) and 0 otherwise. As table 2.1 reveals, about 75%
12As noted in footnote 11 of essay one, this just a proxy and not an ideal measure of firm size.
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of the firms report they have an operating license for their business, indicating the
majority of sampled firms operate within a formal framework. We also use mem-
bership of a business association to capture the network and degree of information
sharing among similar firms on their innovation. About 8% of firms are members of
at least one formal business association.
Apart from covariates that feature in the innovation equation, three variables
are also included to act as identifying instruments for access to credit. As discussed
in chapter one, possessing an asset that can be posted as collateral is another po-
tentially important determinants of a firm’s access to external credit. We construct
the variable ‘collateral’ to proxy for collateral, which takes a value of 1 if the firm’s
current state of machinery or equipment is modern to advanced and zero otherwise.
About 20% of the firms own such machinery and equipments. Another important
determinant of access to external credit is the firm’s outstanding debt. We cap-
ture this by ‘accounts payable’, which is the percentage of a firm’s total credit from
supplier that is overdue. About 10% of an average firm’s credit from supplies is
an overdue. Whether a firm has specific name posted outside is also included as
another determinant of access to credit. Accordingly, about 54% of the firms report
that they have a name of their company posted somewhere.
2.4 Econometric Method
The main dependent variable in this application assumes either a value of one or zero
depending on whether or not a firm has ‘made important improvement/change to
its product/service in the last year’. Assume the latent (or unobservable) propensity
to innovate (y?i ) is expressed as a linear function of a set of explanatory variables as
follows:
y?i = βx
′
1i + εi (2.1)
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where i = 1, ...n, xi is a column vector of realizations on k explanatory variables
for firm i and β is a column vector of k unknown parameters. The values of the
latent variable are measured on the real line and in this case reflect the underlying
propensity of a firm to innovate. The error term, εi, is assumed normally distributed
with a mean of zero and a constant variance σ2 = 1. A threshold (assumed zero
in this case) is used to delineate whether the firm has undertaken some form of
innovation or not.
The probability can be linked to the latent variable as follows:
P [y? > 0] = P [yi = 1] = Φ(βx
′
1i) (2.2)
Among these explanatory variables is our key variable, access to credit, which
is also a binary. However, access to credit is likely to be endogenous with respect
to the innovation equation for various reasons (Hajivassiliou and Savignac, 2008).
First, both the firm’s access to credit and its decision to engage in innovation may
be determined by common firm-specific unobservables. For instance, the level of
uncertainty about the outcome of the innovation activity may affect the firm’s deci-
sion to undertake the innovation while at the same time affecting the willingness of
external creditors to finance the project. Similarly, the time it takes for the project
to start bearing fruit, which may again be firm specific, determines the decision of
the firm to engage in the innovation activity while at the same time affecting the
willingness of lenders to extend credit for the project. Secondly, the decision to en-
gage in innovation and the financing constraint may be simultaneously determined
(Gorodnichenkoy and Schnitzerz, 2009). Therefore, it is plausible that the latent
variables of innovation and credit constraint are correlated. As is well known, un-
der this scenario, a simple probit estimation of the innovation equation produces a
biased and inconsistent estimate of the effect of a credit constraint on innovation.
The general approach of dealing with the problem of endogeneity is to use the
instrumental variable (IV) method. As discussed in chapter one, the idea is to use
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variables that are important determinants of credit constraint but do not influence
the innovation equation to identify the causal effect of access to credit on innovation.
We use three variables to instrument access to credit. One is ‘collateral’, a dummy
variable designed to capture whether a firm has asset that can be used as a guarantee
for a loan. Having such an asset, all things remaining the same, raises a firm’s
probability of being able to secure a loan. However, there is no reason why having
collateral increases the propensity of a firm to innovate. Hence, we believe this
variable a priori meets the two requirements of a valid instrument, i.e., relevance
and the exclusion restriction. The second among the sets of instruments is ‘specific
name’. As defined in section 2.3.2, this variable is meant to capture the extent to
which the firm is known to the wider public including potential lenders. So long as
posting a specific name somewhere in the area increases the popularity and consumer
awareness of the company, it may improve its access to credit. However, it is not
clear why it raises the propensity of the firm to engage in innovation directly. The
third variable in the set of potential identifying instruments is ‘accounts payable’. In
line with the debt-overhung theory, we expect that lenders are less likely to extend
credit to already leveraged firms. Hence, all else the same, firms that have an
outstanding debt are likely to be credit constrained. As for the issue of excludability,
it is not clear how having an accounts payable affects the propensity to engage in
innovation. Similarly, we use three variables to instrument for innovation. These
are, ‘information from customer’, meant to capture a firm’s main source of business
information; ‘started’, whether the firm is started from scratch or not, and ‘produced
by formal’, whether the firm’s products are produced by large business enterprises
at the same time.
Once we have determined the right set of identifying instruments, estimation
can be done in two different ways. One approach is to estimate a single equation
using the instrumental variable method. Although not prone to the problem of
misspecification, this involves loss of information. A systems equation estimation
on the other hand makes use of the possible correlation between the error terms
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of the two variables, but requires careful specification as estimation is prone to
specification bias.
As a single equation approach, we use instrumental variable probit (IV probit)
model, as well as a simple IV using the Linear Probability Model. A system equation
based estimate where both the variables are binary is not straight forward. Assuming
the error terms follow a joint normal distribution, potentially we have the following
simultaneous probit model to estimate:
yi =
 1, if y
?
i ≡ βx′1i + γFi + εi > 0;
0, otherwise.
(2.3)
Fi =
 1, if F
?
i ≡ ϕx′2i + λyi + νi > 0;
0, otherwise.
(2.4)
where yi and F are the dichotomous realizations of the latent dependent variable of
innovation and access to credit, respectively.
Estimating these types of equations, however, poses a ‘coherency problem’ (Ta-
mer, 2003). Gourieroux et al. (1980) categorises an econometric model as coherent
if it predicts a unique value of the dependant variable for various values of the ex-
planatory variables, parameters and the error terms. In effect, a coherent model
will have a well-defined reduced form. It needs to be noted that this is distinct from
identification, which deals with recovering structural parameters from the parame-
ters of reduced form equation. As such, coherency is a pre-requisite for a model to
have a well defined likelihood function and ipso facto a key issue to be settled before
the question of identification is even taken up.
To have a clear idea of the coherency issue, revisit the simultaneous probit model
given in equations 2.3 and 2.4, which, with a bit of modification, can be given by:
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F ?i = ϕx
′
2i + λyi + νi
y?i = βx
′
1i + γFi + εi
As per our definition of innovation and access to credit in the text, we assume λ
to be negative and γ to be positive. With this and using the notions of Dagenais
(1997), define the following:
U1i = −ϕx′2i
L1i = −ϕx′2i − λ
U2i = −βx′1i + γ
L2i = −βx′1i
We know that the probability that both innovation and access to credit take a
value of 1 is given by,
Pr(F = 1, y = 1|..),=
∫ ∞
L1i
∫ ∞
U2i
φ12(.)dεdν
, where φ12 is the bivariate normal distribution. From figure 2.1, this corresponds to
the upper right of the diagram shaded in gray. Similarly, the probability that both
innovation and access to credit take a value of 0 is given by,
Pr(F = 0, y = 0|..),=
∫ −∞
U1i
∫ −∞
L2i
φ12(.)dεdν
. This corresponds to the bottom left, shaded in a horizontal stripe, of the diagram
given in figure 2.1. The probability that innovation takes a value of 1 while access
to credit takes a value of 0 is given by,
Pr(F = 0, y = 1|..) =
∫ L1i
−∞
∫ ∞
L2i
φ12(.)dεdν
, and this corresponds to the blue shaded area in the upper left of figure 2.1. Finally,
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the probability that innovation takes a value of zero and and access to credit take
values of one is given by,
Pr(F = 1, y = 0|..),=
∫ ∞
U1i
∫ U2i
−∞
φ12(.)dεdν
, and is given by the area shaded in brown, located at the bottom right of the
diagram.
One normally expects these four joint probabilities to sum to 1, i.e.,
Pr(F = 1, y = 1|..)+Pr(F = 1, y = 0|..)+Pr(F = 0, y = 1|..)+Pr(F = 0, y = 0|..) = 1
. However, this is not the case in our case, as there are observations (i.e., those for
which the values of ν and ε fall in the unshaded square in the middle of the diagram)
where the model predicts neither 0 nor 1 for both Ft and yt. In this particular case,
the sum of the probabilities of the four events is less than 1. Hence, the model does
not provide a unique value of the dependant variables for these observations and is,
therefore, incoherent. Put it other, the model does not have a distribution function
of the dependant variables given the observable variables and the parameters. As a
result, the likelihood function is not well behaved as there are discontinuities due to
those observations.
One common approach to deal with these types of problem is to put a zero
product restriction on the parameters (i.e., γ ∗ λ = 0) by either setting γ = 0,
in which case one is assuming that innovation is exogenous, or λ = 0 in which
case one is assuming that access to credit is exogenous. With this assumption, the
above model becomes a recursive bivariate probit model and the parameters can be
estimated by maximum likelihood method and the marginal effects easily computed.
This approach has however been criticized on various grounds. First, it is ad hoc as
it is not always possible to find intuitive justification for such assumptions. Second
and importantly, by imposing either of these assumptions the model is devoid of its
interesting aspect – simultaneity.
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Figure 2.1: Coherency of Simultaneous Probit models
The diagram depicts the predictions of a simultaneous probit model where the two key va-
riables are negatively related. The unshaded area corresponds to where the model fails
to predict neither 0 nor 1 values for the dependent variable. Consequently, the shaded
areas do not sum (as they should) to one, indicating that such models are incoherent.
Various approaches have been suggested to render the model coherent without
imposing this stringent requirement. For instance, Dagenais (1997) and Tamer
(2003) imposes a sign restriction on λ and γ and show how the parameters can be
estimated using a quasi-maximum likelihood method. Similarly Hajivassiliou (2008)
and (in a study more related to the current one) Hajivassiliou and Savignac (2008)
use a sign restriction and show that parameters can be estimated by conditional
maximum-likelihood method. In the particular case discussed in this essay, the
coherency problem lies in the fact that there are observations for which the model
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fails to predict unique values of the dependent variable, i.e., observations in the
unshaded area of the above diagram. One option is to estimate the equation by
excluding these observations, i.e., by using maximum likelihood and restricting the
estimation to the four shaded areas in figure 2.1. However, as the sum of the
probabilities is less than one, one needs to adjust the likelihood function such that
the predicted probabilities sum to one. That is the gist of an approach proposed by
Dagenais (1997). However, to our knowledge, there is no software that implements
this procedure and our attempt to implement it in Stata proved unsuccessful due to
non-convergence of the likelihood function. Therefore, we estimate a simultaneous
equation model using a three stage least square method and situate the analysis
within a linear probability model (LPM) framework. We also employ a recursive
bivariate probit model, by imposing the ‘zero-product’ restriction on the coefficients.
The likelihood equation for recursive bivariate probit model has four cells, given
as follows:
P1 = P (yi = 1, Fi = 1) = Φ2i(βx1i + γ;ϕx2i, ρ)
P2 = P (yi = 1, Fi = 0) = Φ2i(βx1i;−ϕx2i,−ρ)
P3 = P (yi = 0, Fi = 1) = Φ2i(−βx1i − γ;ϕx2i,−ρ)
P4 = P (yi = 0, Fi = 0) = Φ2i(−βx1i;−ϕx2i, ρ)
Φ2i() is the bivariate normal distribution of the two error terms and ρ is the corre-
lation between them.
The log-likelihood equation then is given by:
l(β, γ, ϕ, ρ) =
n∑
i=1
{z11 lnP1 + z10 lnP2 + z01 lnP3 + z00 lnP4} (2.5)
where z11 = (y1i)(F1i), z10 = (y1i)(1 − F1i), z01 = (1 − y1i)(F1i), and z00 = (1 −
y1i)(1− F1i).
Maximizing equation 2.5 using appropriate simulation method gives the estima-
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ted parameters of the model. Various marginal and impact effects can be computed
for these types of models (Greene, 1996). Our main interest is in the marginal effect
based on the partial probability, i.e., the effect of a variable on the probability of
innovation. The computation of this type of marginal effect depends on whether
the variable enters both the innovation and access to finance equation or not. For
variables that are in both equations, the total marginal effect is composed of the
direct effect of the variable on innovation and the indirect effect through its effect
on access to credit.13
Consider a continuous variable that enters both equations. Our main interest is
the effect of a variable on the conditional mean of innovation, the latter being given
as follows:
E(yi|FiX) = Prob(Fi = 1) ∗ E(yi|Fi = 1, X) + Prob(Fi = 0) ∗ E(yi|Fi = 0, X)
Prob(yi = 1, Fi = 1)+Prob(yi = 1, Fi = 0) = Φ2i(βx1i+γ;ϕx2i, ρ)+Φ2i(βx1i;−ϕx2i,−ρ)
The marginal effect of this variable, say z, is given by the following equation.14
dE(yi|Fi, X)
dz
=
[
φ(βx1i + γ)Φ
(
ϕx2i − ρ(βx1i + γ)√
1− ρ2
)
+ φ(βx1i)Φ
(
ρ(βx1i)− ϕx2i√
1− ρ2
)]
∗ βz(2.6)
+
[
φ(ϕx2i)Φ
(
βx1i + γ − ρ(ϕx2i)√
1− ρ2
)
− φ(−ϕx2i)Φ
(
βx1i − ρ(ϕx2i)√
1− ρ2
)]
∗ ϕz
The first line of equation 2.6 gives the direct effect of z on innovation. The
second line of the equation, on the other hand, provides the indirect effect of z on
innovation through its effect on access to credit.
For a discrete variable, D, that enters both the innovation and access to finance
13We are interested in the overall effect and hence do not report the components of the effects.
14See Dong et al. (2008) for the detailed derivation.
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equations, the impact effect is given by the following equation:
dE(yi|Fi, X)
dD
= [Φ2i(βx1i + γ;ϕx2i, ρ) + Φ2i(βx1i;−ϕx2i,−ρ)]
∣∣∣∣
D=1
(2.7)
− [Φ2i(βx1i + γ;ϕx2i, ρ) + Φ2i(βx1i;−ϕx2i,−ρ)]
∣∣∣∣
D=0
Finally, the impact effect of access to credit on innovation can be computed as
follows:
dE(yi|Fi, X)
dFi
=
Φ2i(βx1i + γ;ϕx2i, ρ)
Φ(ϕx2i)
− Φ2i(βx1i;−ϕx2i,−ρ)
Φ(−ϕx2i) (2.8)
For all the marginal and impact effects, the standard error can easily be computed
using the delta method.
2.5 Result and Discussion
2.5.1 Baseline results
Table 2.2 provides the result of a simple probit estimation for the innovation equa-
tion. The second column of the table gives the probit estimate while the third co-
lumn provides the estimates of the marginal/impact effects. As can be seen, access
to credit does not have a significant effect on innovation.15 However, as discussed in
section 2.4, access to credit is possibly endogenous in this regression. And ordinary
least square(OLS)/probit estimate with endogenous explanatory variable is biased
and inconsistent. Hence, this result should be taken with a grain of salt.16
Most of the other control variables are, however, estimated with the expected
sign and are in line with the findings in other studies. For instance, firms that
15The presence of heteroscesdasticity poses problems for the consistency and efficiency of the
probit estimates. Therefore, we use the robust standard errors to address the efficiency problem,
though acknowledging that this does little to address this issue of potential inconsistency. However,
we take some comfort in the fact that the rejection of homoscedasticity in this case is not decisive.
16Gorodnichenkoy and Schnitzerz (2009), in a similar study using cross-country firm level data,
finds that access to credit does not have significant effect on innovation without controlling for the
endogeneity of the regressor.
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are exclusively male owned are about ten percentage points more likely to innovate
than those that are either exclusively female owned or are jointly owned by male
and female owners. Gebreyesus (2009) reports similar results using the same data
used in this paper. The intuition for this result is not immediately apparent. One
explanation, however, could be risk-aversion. Various studies document that females
are generally more risk averse than male (Borghans et al., 2009; Bluffstone and Yesuf,
2007). And risk taking is a key in determining the propensity to engage in innovative
activities. Since we did not control for a measure of risk aversion, the positive effect
for male ownership potentially captures this particular effect.
Similarly, firms that are started from scratch are about fourteen percentage
points more likely to innovate than those that are inherited. In a study of MSEs
in Sri Lanka, de Mel et al. (2009) find that owner’s attributes play more important
role than other factors for innovation by such firms. They find that firms owned by
able entrepreneurs are more likely to engage in innovation than those owned by less
able ones, and that once entrepreneurial ability is controlled for the estimated effect
for many of the other explanatory variables become insignificant. In view of the
importance of an owner’s attribute, the fact that firms started from scratch have a
higher propensity to innovate than those that are inherited is perhaps an indication
of a limited intergenerational transfer of entrepreneurial skill among owners of MSEs
in Ethiopia. This corroborates the casual observation that, even for the medium si-
zed enterprises, firms often die with their founders. In a way, this maybe positive
in that it indicates some sort of entrepreneurial dynamics is in operation and that
wealth maybe less intergenerationally persistent. A measure meant to capture en-
trepreneurial motivation, ‘motivation’, however, is not significant. However, this is
just a crude measure of motivation and as such would suffer from the problem of
measurement error, with the usual consequence of attenuation bias in the estimate.
In line with human capital theory, firms whose owners have vocational training
are about 18 percentage points more likely to innovate than those whose owners do
not have such training. Perhaps as a further indication of the importance of human
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Table 2.2: Estimates of Simple Probit Model of Innovation
The table provides estimates of simple probit regression of the dummy of innovation on access to
credit and host of other explanatory variables. The dependent variable is dummy taking a value
of one if a firm undertook some form of innovation and zero otherwise.
Probit estimate Marginal Effect
Cedit 1 0.0551 0.0197
(0.59) (0.59)
Motivation 0.0736 0.0262
(0.78) (0.79)
Started 0.419*** 0.137***
(2.98) (3.32)
Male 0.269** 0.0928***
(2.49) (2.59)
Mixed ownership 0.0123 0.00441
(0.04) (0.04)
Business association 0.149 0.0545
(0.92) (0.90)
Vocational 0.468*** 0.177***
(3.64) (3.52)
License 0.207* 0.0718*
(1.75) (1.80)
Employment 0.224** 0.0798**
(2.22) (2.22)
ln(age) 0.436** 0.156**
(2.40) (2.41)
ln(age) squared -0.0766* -0.0273*
(-1.65) (-1.65)
Manufacturing -0.178* -0.0629*
(-1.65) (-1.68)
Trading 0.107 0.0385
(0.96) (0.95)
Addis Ababa -0.296** -0.102**
(-2.04) (-2.14)
Southern Region 0.619*** 0.236***
(3.88) (3.79)
Amhara Region -0.964*** -0.274***
(-4.92) (-7.06)
Oromia Region 0.171 0.0620
(1.25) (1.23)
Produced by formal -0.394*** -0.147***
(-3.02) (-2.94)
Information from customer 0.319*** 0.112***
(3.38) (3.45)
N 974 974
Pseudo−R2 0.127
Normality χ2(2)=4.288[0.117]
a
Functional form χ2(3)=4.469 [0.215]
b
Homoscedasticity χ2(19)=31.03[0.04]
c
Marginal effects; t statistics in parentheses
(d) for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
b p-value under the null of normality.
a p-value under the null of proper functional form.
c p-value under the null of homoscedasticity.
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capital, the experience of a firm, captured by its age, has a positive and significant
effect on innovation. However, the negative coefficient of the quadratic term reveals
that the positive effect of age diminishes as the firm grows older. The estimate of
the turning point for the age variable reveals that the propensity to innovate starts
to decline at 15 years of age.
The size of the firm is another important determinants of innovation as a small
increase in size increases its probability of engaging in innovation by about eight
percentage points. The sector of the firm is also an important determinant of in-
novation. Firms in the manufacturing sector are about seven percentage points less
likely to innovate than those in the service sector. Since we are dealing mainly with
product innovation, this finding may not be a surprise as starting to produce a new
product is much harder than starting, for instance, to trade a new or significantly
improved product. Producing a new product may require fixed investment in ma-
chineries and equipment, increasing the need for some form of external financing.
On the other hand, product innovation in the service sector, which, for the types
of firms in our sample, is mainly starting to sell a product or services a firm has
not been selling before, may not always require such investment. For instance, new
product could be sold on the same shelf as the old ones. It may be that the firm
replaces retailing old by new product, which means the firm probably may not need
extra capital to do so.
Location of the firm is found to be an important variable. Firms located in Tigray
regional state are more likely to engage in innovation than those located in Amhara
and Addis Ababa regional states. Nevertheless, there is no significant difference
between firms located in Oromia regional state and those located in Tigray in their
propensity to innovate. Location may capture various factors that are important to
firm innovation, such as demand for the product, better infrastructure and better
access to technological opportunities. In view of the fact that we have not controlled
for these variable, the regional differences could be a reflection of this. It could
possibly be due to differing level of demand, which, again, we could not capture
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given lack of data.
Whether the product is produced/provided by large enterprises has an important
effect on SMEs innovation. Firms whose goods/services are produced/renderred by
large formal enterprises are about 15 percentage points less likely to innovate than
those who do not have to compete with large firms. It may be that MSEs that
operate alongside large firms believe that they do not have long-term competitive
advantage relative to the large established ones. Hence they may be wary of com-
mitting resource to an activity that they are probably into it for the short-term. Or,
it could also be that they are informally operating alongside these large firms and
engaging in innovation may raise the probability of them being noticed by regula-
tory institution. However, since we have controlled for license that may not be the
factor in the current case. In fact as can be seen, having an operating license does
appear to be important determinant of innovation by a firm in our sample at 10%.
Similarly, membership of a business association does not appear to be an important
determinant of firm innovation.
Information plays a key role in facilitating innovation. Among others, a firm may
need information about the future market of the product, or relating to the existence
and possibility of producing such a product. Such information can be acquired from
various sources. For instance, producers may learn from their customers about
the adjustment needed to the existing product, or existence of new product that
has a potential market. They may also learn about this from their suppliers. We
try to capture these using a firm’s identified source of information. As can be
seen, firms that cite customers as their main sources of information are about ten
percentage points more likely to innovate than those who cite some other source.
Hence, innovation by firms in our sample appears demand driven, partly at least.
2.5.2 Instrumental Variable Estimation Results
As noted above, in view of the possible endogeneity of access to credit the probit
estimate of its effect reported above is unlikely to be reliable. We now discuss a
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number of estimates obtained using instrumental variable methods. As discussed
in section 2.4, three variables are used to instrument for access to credit. Table 2.4
gives diagnostic tests of the three instruments (and another three variables used to
instrument innovation, as we need this when we report the result of simultaneous
equation model in the last part of this section).
The second column of the table gives IV test for access to credit while the third
one gives results of instruments for innovation. As can be seen from the table, the
resultant F-test for access to credit, although slightly lower, is close to the required
‘rule-of-thumb’ value of 10 as suggested by Stock and Yogo (2005). Similarly, the
Kleibergen-Paap transformed F-test rejects the null of weak instruments at 10%
using the critical values reported in Stock and Yogo (2005). Although not decisively,
the null of weak instrument can be rejected. In addition, the three variables are also
found to be orthogonal to the error process of innovation on the basis of the Hansen
J statistic for over-identifying restrictions. The under-identification is also rejected
using the Kleibergen-Paap under-identifications LM test. Thus, the instrument set
is again deemed valid for the purpose of the current exercise. Nevertheless, one
should be cautious of the possible weakness of the instruments as can be noted from
the relevance test reported above. Given these findings, we can now test for whether
the ‘credit 1’ variable is exogenous or not. In using the linear probability model,
the ‘C’ test rejects the null hypothesis of exogeneity at 10 percent and this is also
confirmed by the use of the IV probit model. Thus, including access to credit in the
innovation equation without controlling for endogeneity is problematic.
Although the test results are again marginal, instruments of innovation too are
relevant as well as exogenous. As can be seen, innovation is itself not endogenous,
which means that it can be included in the regression of access to credit without
concern of it being correlated with the error term.
Table 2.3 provides estimates of single equation instrumental variable method.
Column 2 of the table gives the IV probit estimate while column 3 gives the cor-
responding marginal effect. Column 4 gives instrumental variable estimate based
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on a linear probability model. Looking at the marginal/impact effect, access to
credit is significant determinant of innovation. Furthermore, the magnitude is much
larger than that obtained using the simple probit estimation. A firm with access
to credit is about 34 percentage points more likely to innovate than one without,
on average and ceteris paribus. In a similar study, Gorodnichenkoy and Schnitzerz
(2009) reports a marginal effect of 18 percentage points for product innovation and
24 percentage points for process innovation. Savignac (2008) reports a marginal
effect of 20 percentage points.
Interestingly, the IV probit as well as LPM based IV estimates of other control
variables is generally similar to the probit estimates. The coefficient of access to cre-
dit, however, increased substantially using the IV method, indicating that a simple
probit estimate heavily underestimates the impact of access to credit on innovation.
This result could possibly be due to a combination of various factors. As noted
in chapter one, one of the main weakness of the measure of access to credit used
in the paper is that it is based mainly on a demand side conceptualisation, while
a better measure would combine both demand and supply side factors. As such,
measurement error is a potential issue, and we know that simple probit estimate
with measurement error results in attenuation bias. It could also be due to omitted
variables that are correlated with access to credit. For instance, a variable that has
a negative effect on innovation but with positive correlation with access to credit
may be excluded from the regression. Similar effect would result if a variable that
has a positive effect on innovation but with negative covariance with access to cre-
dit is excluded from the regression equation. The consequence of this would be to
underestimate the effect of access to credit just like the measurement error. 17
17However, it is hard to ascribe the result to simultaneity bias. Recall a simple simultaneous
equation bias given by:
plim(βˆ) = β +
1
1− β
(
σ2
σ2credit
)
(2.9)
where βˆ is the OLS estimate of the impact of access to credit, β is the true population parameter,
σ2 is the error term of the innovation equation and σ2credit is the error term of the access to credit
equation. For OLS estimate to underestimate the true effect of the coefficient, one would expect
the β > 0. However, in our case that is less plausible.
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Table 2.3: Estimate of Single Equation IV Method for Innovation
The table provide estimates of instrumental variable probit model of innovation on host of
explanatory variables. Access to credit is instrumented by three variables, a measure of whether
the firm has asset to be posted as a collateral, a proportion of a firm’s debt that is overdue, and a
measure of the extent to which a firm is known to the public. The dependent variable is a
dummy taking a value of one if a firm undertook some form of innovation, and zero otherwise.
Probit Estimate Marginal Effect LPM
Credit 1 0.947** 0.343** 0.320*
(1.95) (1.97) (1.62)
Motivation -0.0167 -0.00608 -0.00494
(-0.16) (-0.16) (-0.14)
Started 0.444*** 0.148*** 0.135***
(3.37) (3.80) (3.30)
Male 0.322*** 0.113*** 0.112***
(3.10) (3.18) (2.81)
Mixed ownership 0.0342 0.0125 0.0185
(0.13) (0.13) (0.19)
Business association -0.0348 -0.0126 -0.00188
(-0.18) (-0.18) (-0.03)
Vocational 0.486*** 0.186*** 0.179***
(3.87) (3.80) (3.64)
License 0.00328 0.00119 -0.00606
(0.02) (0.02) (-0.11)
Employment 0.168 0.0613* 0.0589*
(1.58) (1.61) (1.64)
ln(age) 0.514*** 0.187*** 0.165***
(2.92) (2.90) (2.76)
ln(age) squared -0.0949** -0.0346** -0.0306*
(-2.08) (-2.07) (-1.95)
Manufacturing -0.193* -0.0695* -0.0619*
(-1.88) (-1.91) (-1.73)
Trading 0.0532 0.0195 0.0228
(0.48) (0.48) (0.58)
Addis Ababa -0.110 -0.0394 -0.0444
(-0.59) (-0.60) (-0.70)
Southern Region 0.661*** 0.254*** 0.254***
(4.32) (4.28) (3.99)
Amhara Region -0.615** -0.198*** -0.170**
(-2.05) (-2.59) (-2.22)
Oromia Region 0.194 0.0717 0.0698
(1.50) (1.48) (1.37)
Produced by formal -0.330** -0.125** -0.113**
(-2.42) (-2.40) (-2.55)
Information from customer 0.316*** 0.113*** 0.113***
(3.43) (3.53) (3.50)
N 974 974 974
Pseudo−R2 0.129
Normality χ2(2)=4.566[0.102]
a
Functional form χ2(3)=4.579[0.205]
b
Homoscedasticity χ2(19)=32.893[0.025]
c
WaldChi2[P > Chi2] 167.11[0.00]
F − val[P > F − val] 10.3[0.00]
Marginal effects; t statistics in parentheses
(d) for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
b p-value under the null of normality.
a p-value under the null of proper functional form.
c p-value under the null of homoscedasticity.
67
Table 2.4: Testing the Exogeneity of the access to Credit and Innovation
Credit 1 innovation
Instrument Relevance F(3,955) = 8.5 F(3,955) = 9.86
Prob-value=0.000 Prob-value=0.000
Kleibergen-Paap transformed F statistic 9.3a 9.86b
Hansen J Statistic for Over-identifying Restrictions χ22=2.33 χ
2
1= 2.24
Prob-value=0.312 Prob-value=0.33
Kleibergen-Paap LM Statistic for Under-identifying Restrictions χ23=26.18 χ
2= 29.64
Prob-value=0.0000 Prob-value=0.0000
‘C’ test for exogeneity χ21=2.61 χ
2
1=1.04
Prob-value=0.10 Prob-value=0.30
IV Probit Exogeneity Test χ21 =2.64 χ
2
1 = .95
Prob-value=0.10 Prob-value=0.33
aThe critical value for the 10% maximal IV relative bias is 9.08 using the Stock and Yogo (2005)
critical values.
bThe critical value for the 10% maximal IV relative bias is 9.08 using the Stock and Yogo (2005)
critical values.
As noted above, our instrument may be weak in view of the fact that the first-
stage F-test falls short of the conventionally used rule of thumb. However, weak
instruments pose two key challenges, finite sample bias of the estimate and difficulty
of applying conventional hypothesis test (Stock et al., 2002). The two stage least
square (2SLS) estimate, although consistent, can be biased in finite sample like ours.
Hahn and Hausman (2002) provides approximation of 2SLS bias, given as follows:
BIAS2SLS =
Kσev
n.pi
′
2Rpi2 +K.σv
(2.10)
where, K is the number of instruments,e is the error term of structural equation, v
is the error term of the first-stage equation, pi is the coefficient of the the first-stage
equation, n is sample size, R is the square root of the R2 obtained from the first-
stage regression, σev is the correlation between the error-terms of the endogenous
variable and the dependant variable, and σv is the standard deviation of the error
term of the endogenous regressor.
Therefore, among others, the bias increases with the correlation between the
error terms of the endogenous regressor and the regressand and with the number
of instruments. In particular, it decreases with the size of association between
the instrument and the endogenous regressor (i.e., with instrument strength, as
well as with the sample size). Hence, with weak instruments, 2SLS estimates are
biased in the direction of OLS estimate. Not surprisingly, in the extreme case
where the instruments are irrelevant, estimates of 2SLS is centered on the biased
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and inconsistent OLS estimate. Various options have been suggested to correct the
2SLS estimates for bias (Angrist and Pischke, 2009). Among these are the bias-
adjusted 2SLS by Donald and Newey (2001), the Jackknife IV method suggested by
Angrist et al. (1999) and the Limited Information Maximum Likelihood estimation
(LIML). A comparison between the various correction methods based on Monte-
Carlo simulation result shows that LIML performs as well with other estimates
(Flores-Lagunes, 2007). In fact, LIML is median unbiased for the case of an over-
identified equation. A further benefit of LIML is that most statistical software
packages implement it. In this paper, we report bias correction based on LIML,
Jackknife IV method and estimates using Generalised Method of Moments (GMM).
The second problem associated with weak instrument is that it distorts conven-
tional hypothesis test. Hypothesis test is based on the normal approximation of
the 2SLS estimator. For such approximation to be reasonable, among others, the
instruments need to be strong. With weak instruments, the 2SLS estimators are
non-normally distributed. In the extreme case where the instruments are irrelevant,
2SLS estimates are actually bi-modally distributed. As a result, the standard test
statistics have distorted size. This is further worsened by the fact that the standard
errors of 2SLS is downward biased with weak instruments. Hence one can not rely
on conventional test statistics for hypothesis test. Various tests have been proposed
that are robust to weak instrument (see Stock et al. (2002)) for discussion). We use a
conditional likelihood test to correct for possible size distortion of weak instruments
as is suggested in Moreira (2003).
Table 2.5 provides estimates corrected for both potential problems associated
with a weak instrument. Column two of the table gives estimates with tests robust to
weak instruments. As can be seen, access to credit retains a positive and significant
effect on innovation, and the size of the coefficient is not substantially different from
the impact effect of the instrumental variable probit estimate.18 Results reported
18Not surprisingly in view of the fact that the estimate is based on LPM, the coefficient of access
to credit is the same as that of LPM reported in column 4 of table 1.3.
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in column 2 through 4 are meant to provide bias corrected estimates of the effect
of access to credit on innovation. Apart from the Jackknife IV estimate where
the coefficient of access to credit reduced in magnitude and become insignificant,
estimates based on both LIML and the GMM IV produce results that are broadly
the same as the IV estimates without adjustment for small sample bias. This is
reassuring given that our instruments are probably not so weak as to distort the
key findings reported here. Further, the estimates of the other control variables are
roughly similar to ones reported in table 1.3.
We wrap-up this section by presenting the results of systems instrumental estima-
tion methods. Table 2.6 provides this. We use the same three variables, ‘collateral’,
‘specific name’ and ‘accounts payable’ to identify access to credit. The second and
third columns of the table gives the recursive bivariate probit estimates and the
marginal effects, respectively. We concentrate on the estimates of the marginal and
impact effects, as they lend themselves to a meaningful interpretation. As can be
seen, access to credit enters with a positive and statistically significant coefficient,
indicating the importance of access to credit for SMEs innovation in the country.
Reassuringly, the size of the coefficient is fairly similar to estimates obtained from
single equation instrumental variable method. Specifically, the estimate indicates
that firms with access to credit are about 30 percentage points more likely to inno-
vate than firms without, clearly a large economic effect. The correlation coefficient
between the error terms of access to credit and innovation, ρ, is negative and sta-
tistically significantly different from zero. The size of the correlation indicates a
fairly strong association between the two error terms. In particular, the sign of the
correlation indicates that unobservables that increases the propensity of innovation
by a firm reduces its access to credit, in line with our discussion in section 2.4. The
estimates of the coefficients of the other covariates is similar to the ones based on
single-equation IV method.
The last column of the table provides estimates of linear probability simultaneous
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Table 2.5: IV Estimate of Innovation model Corrected for Weak Instruments
The table provides estimates of instrumental variable probit model of innovation by correcting
for the potential weakness of the instruments. Access to credit is instrumented by three variables,
a measure of whether the firm has asset to be posted as a collateral, a proportion of a firm’s debt
that is overdue, and a measure of the extent to which a firm is known to the public. The
dependent variable is dummy taking a value of one if a firm undertook some form of innovation
and zero otherwise
IV-Cond IV-Jackknife IV-GMM IV-LIML
Credit 1 0.320* 0.297 0.318* 0.347*
(1.70) (1.47) (1.61) (1.60)
Motivation -0.00494 -0.00242 -0.00334 -0.00734
(-0.14) (-0.07) (-0.10) (-0.20)
Started 0.135*** 0.132*** 0.136*** 0.137***
(2.84) (3.07) (3.33) (3.30)
Male 0.112*** 0.109*** 0.113*** 0.114***
(2.78) (2.70) (2.83) (2.79)
Mixed ownership 0.0185 0.0223 0.0112 0.0193
(0.19) (0.22) (0.12) (0.20)
Business association -0.00188 0.00626 0.00157 -0.00694
(-0.03) (0.09) (0.02) (-0.09)
Vocational 0.179*** 0.178*** 0.180*** 0.181***
(3.83) (3.51) (3.67) (3.63)
License -0.00606 -0.000124 -0.00650 -0.0115
(-0.11) (-0.00) (-0.12) (-0.20)
Employment 0.0589* 0.0605* 0.0594* 0.0578*
(1.65) (1.64) (1.66) (1.60)
ln(age) 0.165*** 0.159*** 0.166*** 0.168***
(2.67) (2.68) (2.79) (2.74)
ln(age) squared -0.0306* -0.0294* -0.0310** -0.0314*
(-1.93) (-1.88) (-1.97) (-1.95)
Manufacturing -0.0619* -0.0610* -0.0570* -0.0628*
(-1.68) (-1.63) (-1.60) (-1.73)
Trading 0.0228 0.0246 0.0245 0.0215
(0.57) (0.61) (0.62) (0.54)
Addis Ababa -0.0444 -0.0500 -0.0455 -0.0397
(-0.73) (-0.78) (-0.72) (-0.60)
Southern Region 0.254*** 0.250*** 0.251*** 0.257***
(4.21) (3.84) (3.95) (3.97)
Amhara Region -0.170** -0.179** -0.171** -0.163**
(-2.17) (-2.34) (-2.24) (-2.01)
Oromia Region 0.0698 0.0684 0.0658 0.0708
(1.42) (1.32) (1.29) (1.38)
Produced by formal -0.113** -0.115** -0.113** -0.112**
(-2.44) (-2.54) (-2.55) (-2.51)
Information from customer 0.113*** 0.112*** 0.112*** 0.113***
(3.50) (3.33) (3.47) (3.48)
N 974 974 974 974
R-Square 0.0596 0.0252 0.0609 0.0438
F − val[Prob > F ] 7.93[0.00] 10.37[0.00] 10.26[0.00] 10.09[ 0.00]
Marginal effects; t statistics in parentheses
(d) for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table 2.6: Estimates Recursive Bivariate Probit and Linear Probability (LP) Simul-
taneous Equations for Innovation
The table provides estimates of a recursive Bivariate probit model (by assuming innovation is
exogenous in the access to credit equation) and a simultaneous LP model. The dependent variable
is dummy taking a value of one if a firm undertook some form of innovation and zero otherwise
Bivariate Probit(BP) Marginal effect Simultaneous LPM Model
credit 1 0.846** 0.307** 0.321*
(2.480) (2.480) (1.730)
Motivation -0.002 -0.001 -0.005
(-0.020) (-0.020) (-0.130)
Started 0.387*** 0.130*** 0.129***
(2.800) (3.120) (2.760)
Male 0.321*** 0.112*** 0.112***
(3.010) (3.130) (2.820)
Mixed ownership 0.024 0.009 0.017
(0.090) (0.090) (0.180)
Business association -0.015 -0.006 -0.002
(-0.090) (-0.090) (-0.040)
Vocational 0.495*** 0.189*** 0.180***
(4.010) (3.910) (3.890)
License 0.039 0.014 -0.004
(0.280) (0.280) (-0.070)
Employment 0.175* 0.064* 0.059*
(1.720) (1.740) (1.670)
ln(age) 0.512*** 0.185*** 0.165***
(2.980) (2.970) (2.700)
ln(age) squared -0.095** -0.035** -0.031**
(-2.140) (-2.140) (-1.960)
Manufacturing -0.194 -0.069 -0.062
(-1.860)* (-1.890)* (-1.710)*
Trading 0.059 0.022 0.023
(0.530) (0.530) (0.570)
Addis Ababa -0.127 -0.045 -0.043
(-0.780) (-0.800) (-0.720)
Southern Region 0.666*** 0.256*** 0.255***
(4.310) (4.260) (4.280)
Amhara Region -0.666*** -0.210*** -0.169***
(-2.800) (-3.550) (-2.180)
Oromia Region 0.196 0.072 0.071
(1.480) (1.460) (1.450)
Produced by formal -0.384*** -0.145*** -0.121***
(-3.000) (-2.930) (-2.650)
Information from customer 0.294*** 0.105*** 0.111***
(3.270) (3.360) (3.500)
Constant -2.034*** -0.217
(-7.010) -1.550
ρ -0.500 -0.133
χ2(1) 3.389
P-val 0.066 0.000
N 974 974 974
t statistics in parentheses
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
ρ for the LPM simultaneous equation model is the pairwise correlation between the
predicted values of the error terms after estimation.
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equation model. Interestingly, the estimate of access to credit is again of roughly
the same size as the one obtained from single equation IV models. Further, it is
significant, at least at 10%, indicating the importance of access to credit for firm
innovation. The estimates of the coefficients of the other covariate variables is similar
to the ones based on single-equation IV method. The correlation coefficient between
the error terms of access to credit and innovation, although small in magnitude,
is negative and statistically significantly different from zero, again indicating that
unobservables that increases the propensity of innovation by a firm reduces its access
to credit.
In view of the importance of innovation for firm growth 19, this results appear to
indicate that any policy aimed at relaxing credit constraints can have strong effect
on innovation and hence growth.
2.6 Summary and Conclusion
The thorny issue of causality aside, empirical studies show financial development
has a positive effect on economic growth (Levine, 2005). Various theories have been
proposed as to the possible channels through which financial development enhances
economic growth. For instance, financial development democratizes entry to busi-
ness and as a result business ownership is determined by ability and nothing else. As
business is largely owned by able individuals, overall productivity and hence econo-
mic growth increases. Levine and King (1993) argue that the key channel is through
the role of financial development on firm innovation and hence sustained economic
growth. As per this view, a well developed financial system directs resources to
promising new ideas, and as a result, genuinely innovative ideas do not die for lack
of finance. Our study provides some empirical evidence in support of this channel.
An important policy question in developing countries is the role of MSEs in the
19Using the same data, Gebreyesus (2009) shows the importance of firm innovation in their
growth.
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industrialization and growth process. Some argue that these firms are ephemeral
and therefore can not be a reliable means toward industrialization. However, em-
pirical studies show that one can not make such a generalisation as there are both
high and low growth MSEs (Nichter and Goldmark, 2009). In fact, as per our no-
tion of innovation, we have seen about 34% of the MSEs in Ethiopia engaged in
some form of innovation, indicating the extent of dynamism among these firms. In
view of the dominance of these firms in most developing countries, a policy that
enhance their innovation, therefore, has strong ramifications for the overall growth
and industrialisation of a country.
This paper informs on these two issues. First, we provide evidence that a signi-
ficant number of these firms actually engage in some form of innovation. Secondly
and importantly, we study the key determinants of innovation by these firms, with
a particular emphasis on the role of access to credit. Access to credit is found to be
one of the key determinants of product innovation by MSEs in Ethiopia, as firms
with access to credit are about 34 percentage points more likely to innovate than
those with without access to credit. On the basis of our measure, 56% of firms in
our sample are credit constrained. Hence, one can imagine the welfare consequence
of a slight reduction in the number of firms that are credit constrained.
Older firms and larger firms are more likely to innovate. MSEs whose owner
have vocational training are more likely to innovate than those whose owners do not
have such training. This is mainly because vocational training emphasises practical
training that fits well for incremental types of innovation. Firms exclusively owned
by male owners are more likely to innovate than those that are exclusively owned by
female or are jointly owned by male and female owners. The location of the firm also
plays an important role, as firms in SNNP(Amhara) regional state are more(less)
likely to engage in product innovation than those located in Tigray. Manufacturing
firms are less likely to innovate than firms that are in retail business, indicating
the manufacturing MSEs lack dynamics. Competition with large established firms
reduces a firm’s propensity to innovate.
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In view of the importance of access to credit in firm innovation, the key question
is how to improve a firm’s access to credit? Suggesting policy options obviously
requires a clear understanding as to the sources of the problem. The fact is that
financial intermediaries are not able or willing to lend to small and medium en-
terprises. Two key factors underlie this: credit market imperfections, emanating
from the problem of asymmetric information, and contract enforcement problems.
Financial intermediaries try to reduce the problem of asymmetric information by
screening, monitoring and by requiring firms to post collateral. So one needs to
understand what makes it difficult for intermediaries to use these mechanisms for
SMEs. The screening cost per loan size is generally higher for smaller firms. First,
these firms generally lack detailed information that allows intermediaries to better
assess firms creditworthiness. As this information has to be generated from scratch,
it is generally more expensive to screen these firms than those with better infor-
mation such as those with an accounting record and credit history. Secondly, these
firms generally borrow smaller loan sizes, thus making the cost per loan higher.
These, therefore, reduce the incentive of intermediaries to engage with these firms.
In addition, smaller firms are generally regarded as riskier in view of their higher
exit rate. This further depresses the interest of lenders in these types of firms. The
latter could potentially be overcome if the firms have enough resources to post as
collateral. However, they generally luck such assets.
Even assuming the main source of the problem is information asymmetry and
not contract enforcement, different policies are implied depending on whether the
problem is limited interest by intermediaries to screen these firms or their inability to
post the required collateral. The first problem my require interventions to encourage
firms to maintain better accounting information and/or encourage intermediaries
to engage with these firms. Screening subsidies or tax benefits could potentially
help to incentivise intermediaries to screen these firms. The obvious problem with
this, however, is that although it may increase the incentive to screen it may not
increase lending to these firms; intermediaries may just screen and reject all the
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loan applications by these firms.20 Therefore, the role of policy is in incentivising
firms to maintain better information. In fact, the finding in essay one shows that
maintaining accounting information is an important determinant of a firm’s access
to credit.
With regard to collateral, various ways of dealing with this has been suggested.
One option is to encourage firms to join groups of firms so that intermediaries use
joint liability to lend to member firms. Another option is to increase networking
among firms. For instance, a better known firm can serve as a guarantor for its sup-
plier. The common option by far is the partial credit guarantee scheme. Although
designing credit guarantee schemes that do not undermine the incentive effect of
lenders as well as borrowers is generally hard, there are encouraging schemes. The
often cited example is the Chilean Fodo de Grantia para Pequenos Empresarios (FO-
GAPE), which is a public funded credit guarantee scheme for loans to micro and
small enterprises (Benavente et al., 2006). The agency was provided with a seed
capital to use as a guarantee for loans to micro and small enterprises by financial
institutions. Its main source of revenue is the commission collected from financial
institutions that participate in the scheme. Apart from the concern that it substitu-
ted public for private guarantees, the scheme is generally interpreted as a successful
one. In particular, the default rate of loans backed by this guarantee is remarkably
similar to that of loans backed by conventional collateral (Benavente et al., 2006,
p.15). The design of the scheme explains its success. The agency announces the
total loan to be backed in a given year, and asks financial institutions to bid by
posting the maximum coverage and the total loan they want to extend. The bid
goes to the institution requesting the lowest coverage. This way the risk of default is
shared between the bank and the agency, and, therefore, lenders have the incentive
to screen borrowers effectively, thus reducing the default rate. It is important to use
the findings of successful schemes and adapt or improve21 them for use in Ethiopia.
20 On the other hand, conditioning the subsidy on the actual granting of loan may not change
the incentive of intermediaries to engage in screening these firms.
21For instance, by making sure that the scheme minimizes the substitution of public for private
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Although our key result is robust to various estimation methods, it is, however,
important to note some of the possible key limitations of the essay, where future
research can remedy. The importance of access to credit for innovation arises only
in the instrumental variable regression. Although the various diagnostics indicate
that the instruments are generally valid, it may be the case that some of them
are actually a manifestation of innovation. Therefore, the results of this essay and
the policy implications that follow should be interpreted with some caution. This
is so particularly given the fact that some of the firms may report as innovation
activities that constitute simple expansion. Except for the results based on LPM
simultaneous equation, and to some extent the recursive bivariate probit, model,
most of our results are based on single equation instrumental variable estimation.
This, however, entails loss of potentially enriching information. However, as noted,
employing appropriate system estimation that fully utilizes the available information
is bedeviled by the coherency issue. Employing such an estimation method requires
developing a computer routine that implements conditional likelihood estimation,
by restricting the likelihood function to the four shaded areas presented in figure
2.1. Our initial attempt did not succeed and exploring this further is beyond the
scope of the current essay. An interesting future work would examine if our key
result changes by employing such methodology. It would also be interesting to
compare the efficiency and consistency gain from employing these various ways of
dealing with coherency problem. This may involve some form of horse-race between
these approaches, using a Monte Carlo simulation types of study. This would be an
interesting future work as there is generally limited information on this.
In view of the nature of our dependent variable, measurement error and issue
of classification error applies to this essay as well. More importantly, in this case,
the key explanatory variable is also potentially susceptible to misclassification error.
There are generally limited information on the consequence for estimation and test
guarantee and that lenders do not excessively extract the surplus of such borrowers by charging a
high lending rate.
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when both the dependent and explanatory variables are misclassified. A future
interesting work, which is beyond the current essay, would explore theses issues and
see how these may affect the key findings of the essay.
It is also important to note the issue of instrument weakness. Although our key
result does not indicate a seriously weak instrument, it is important to explore this
further. A potential future work would examine this in the context of randomised
control trial (RTC) type of study, and this again is beyond the reach of the current
essay. Finally, it may also be interesting to explore the impact of access to credit
by decomposing innovation into different components, which our current data does
not allow us to do.
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Chapter 3
Opening a Stock Exchange and
Economic Growth in Sub-Saharan
Africa
3.1 Introduction
Theoretical and empirical studies reveal that a well-developed financial sector is a
key to economic development (Levine, 2005). Nevertheless, the extent of financial
development in SSA countries is considerably low. The financial system in the region
is bank-dominated, and mainly by state-owned institutions. Key aggregate proxies
for financial development show a poorly functioning financial system. As of 2005,
for instance, liquid liability to GDP is 32%, as compared to 49% for Asian economies
and 100% for OECD countries; the private credit to GDP ratio for the same region
is 18% as compared to 30% for Asian and 107% for OECD countries (WorldBank,
2006). Figure 3.1 compares the trend in financial intermediation (liquid liability and
credit to private sector both as percentage of GDP) in the SSA countries (excluding
South Africa) with other regions (excluding high income countries). As can clearly
be seen, SSA substantially lag behind lower and middle income countries in other
regions. This is particularly so for bank credit to private sector, where the figure
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for SSA countries is almost half that of other regions.
The cost of intermediation, as proxied by the interest rate margin, are higher in
Africa than in other parts of the world. Nevertheless, banking profitability is higher
in this region than in other parts of the world, both for domestic and foreign owned
banks. Perhaps more revealing is the endemic excess liquidity of banks alongside
excess demand for funds, especially from small scale enterprises, which is a typical
example of credit rationing. Lending is not only limited, but is also largely short-
term, mostly less than two or three years in duration (WorldBank, 2006, p.66).
Figure 3.1: Liquid liability and Bank credit to private sector (%GDP)
Although the SSA region has weak (but a growing number of) stock exchange
markets, proxies for stock market development indicate that it has one of the least
developed stock market systems in the world. Figure 3.2 provides trends in stock
market capitalisation and liquidity for SSA (excluding South Africa) and low and
middle income countries in other regions. SSA seems to be closing on other countries
in terms of market capitalization. However, stock market liquidity is woefully low in
SSA. Unfortunately, however, stock market liquidity is what many empirical studies
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Figure 3.2: Stock Market Capitalisation and Liquidity (%GDP)
confirm to be strongly associated with economic growth (Levine and Zervos, 1998).
The dismal state of stock market development in the region can further be seen
from figure 3.3, which depicts the trend in the number of companies listed on stock
exchange per 10,000 people. As of 2009, there are about five companies listed on
stock exchange per one million people in SSA compared to 12 for lower and middle
income countries in other regions.
Since Sub-Saharan Africa countries lag in other measures of development, the
region’s poor state of financial development is perhaps a reflection of its broader
economic underdevelopment. However, Allen et al. (2010) argue that it is more
than just a manifestation of this overall malaise as financial development in the
region is well below what it ought to be. For instance, they report that in a typical
country in the region, liquid liability (and bank credit to private sector) as a fraction
of GDP falls 13 (12) percentage points below its potential (Allen et al., 2010, p.2).
This points to a systemic underdevelopment of the financial sector in the region.
This is a cumulative effects of a host of separate factors, chief among them
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Figure 3.3: Number of firms listed on stock Exchange per 10,000 people
being policy failures. Africa has been a laboratory for various policy experiments.
Undoubtedly, this has played a key role in charting the state of financial development
in the region. Immediately after independence, many countries in the region viewed
state intervention as a key to their speedy development. In particular, financial
systems were regarded as an integral channel through which states could execute
these policies. As a result, many pursued a heavy state intervention in the financial
system to direct credit to preferential sectors, limit the level of interest rate primarily
through state ownership of the financial institutions. In line with the then generally
accepted view, governments were hostile to private ownership of key resources and
in particular to the idea of stock markets.
The policy pendulum swung in the opposite direction by the end of 1980s. The
disappointing economic performance and waning alternative sources of foreign aid
forced these countries to seek assistance from International Financial Institutions
(IFIs), particularly the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund(IMF). As
a condition for assistance, these countries were asked in return to implement a com-
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prehensive array of market oriented reforms, known as the ‘Structural Adjustment
Policy’ (SAP). Financial sector reform was among the key components of country-
specific SAPs. To a large extent, this encompassed a restructuring of the banking
sector and other existing financial institutions. To an extent, and particularly in
the initial years of the SAP, it also consisted of introducing new institutions, chief
among them being stock exchanges. Hence, mainly as part of the SAP, but also for
other reasons, many countries in the region (and also other developing country re-
gions (see for instance, Weber et al. (2009))) formed1 their national stock exchanges
or joined an existing stock exchanges. The total number of countries with at least
one (or a country member within a regional) stock exchange has steadily grown in
the SSA region, particularly since the late 1980s. The region had just six stock
exchanges before 1989, and the number has grown to 26 as of 2010. Among these
is one regional stock exchange that caters for eight countries, the only of its type
in the world, and most of these markets are formed at the behest of government
initiatives. Thus, the financial system in the region is diversifying to more than just
one type of banking system.
It is argued that stock market formation can play a key role in the region’s
financial development and hence provide a finance-growth link in the region (Senbet
and Octchere, 2008). Empirical as well as theoretical studies reveal that stock market
development can foster economic growth. It provides long-term, large size and
relatively cheap finance to firms, all of which are lacking in Africa’s banking sector; it
provides alternative and more flexible savings instruments and hence may potentially
raise savings; it exercises corporate governance through take-over disciplining; and
more importantly it may improve the efficiency of the banking sector by serving
as a competitor. Indeed, there is some evidence showing a positive link between
stock market development and economic growth in SSA countries as well (Senbet
and Octchere, 2008; Adjasi and Biekpe, 2006). Firm level anecdotal evidence also
1Throughout this chapter, forming, opening and creating a stock exchange are used interchan-
geably, all referring to the formal establishment of a country’s first stock exchange.
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points in a similar direction. For instance, the stock market in Ghana financed
about 12 percent of the total asset growth of listed companies between 1995 and
2002, 16 percent in South Africa between 1996 and 2000, and 8 percent in Zimbabwe
between 1994 and 1999 (Yartey and Adjasi, 2007, p.11). More importantly, in all
these countries, the stock markets were the single most important source of long-
term external finance for these firms (Ibid).
However, there are some researchers who are sceptical of whether it is worthw-
hile for SSA countries to promote stock market formation and development (Singh,
1999). As per this view, given the current state of institutional and economic deve-
lopment in the region, stock markets are less likely to boost access to finance, and
at worse their side-effects may outweigh their benefits. First, the access to finance
is more problematic among small scale and medium sized firms, and stock market
cater less for such firms. The type of firms that benefit from stock markets are ones
that have easy access to bank loans. In fact, most of the firms listed on African
stock exchanges are also cross-listed on the New York or London Stock Exchanges
(WorldBank, 2006). As such, stock markets are thus less likely to bring about a
larger access to finance and economic expansion. Secondly, most of the theoretical
benefits of stock market are less likely to work in Africa; they can indeed be counter-
productive. For instance, stock price fluctuation is more exaggerated in developing
countries than it is in advanced economies. Given the presence of takeover threats,
this may force managers to aim at short-term profitability to the neglect of long-term
investment. It may also force risk-averse firms to shun equity finance and decide not
to list their firm on the stock exchange. Stock markets, when coupled with capital
account liberalisation, render already weak economies more exposed and exacerbate
the economic fluctuations they are subject to and may increase financial fragility.
(Singh, 1999, p.361) thus warns: “For many of these countries such a development
would be a costly irrelevance which they can ill afford; for a number of others it is
likely to do more harm than good”.
From a policy perspective, particularly for those countries who have not ope-
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ned one yet, an important question is whether opening a stock market improves
economic performance. There are generally limited information on this and, to our
knowledge, there is no study that examines this issue for SSA countries. Most of
the received wisdom that opening a stock exchanges improves economic growth in
SSA is based on the positive association between stock market development and
economic growth. However, because of the selectivity issue, such findings cannot be
used to infer that stock market formation improves economic growth in the region.
This essay attempts to fill this gap. In particular, we seek to answer the following
two key research questions: (i)Does opening a stock exchange boost per capita in-
come growth in SSA? (ii) How does the growth impact of stock exchange formation
in SSA compare to that of other developing regions of the world? To that end, we
employ a semi-parametric Difference-in-Difference (DiD) technique, (i.e., a DiD on
set of matched countries). In addressing these two questions, we first present results
based on a set of low and middle income countries for all regions, and then provide
the results for a sample of SSA countries. To anticipate our key result, we find that
opening a stock exchange does not appear to have a significant impact on economic
growth in the SSA countries. We also show that this is not an issue specific to SSA
countries, as stock market formation does not have a significant effect on the per
capita income growth on other developing countries in our sample.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 3.2 discusses the possible
channels through which opening a stock exchange affects economic growth. Sec-
tion 3.3 provides the discussion of the estimation technique used in this chapter,
wherein we detail the DiD-cum-matching estimation method. This section also pro-
vides discussion of the equation used to estimate propensity scores. Section 3.4
provides the empirical results and discussion, where the estimation result based on
all sample countries is first presented, followed by the results for SSA sample. Sec-
tion 4.5 concludes and provides the limitations of this chapter and suggests possible
improvements that future research agenda could pursue.
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3.2 Theoretical Framework
3.2.1 Opening a Stock Exchange and Economic Growth
To have a clear idea of the channels through which stock market formation affects
economic growth, it is first important to know, at least, the proximate causes of
growth. A good framework would be growth accounting, which decomposes the
source of output growth to growth in factors of production and technological pro-
gress. Despite the methodological controversy, an important insight from this li-
terature is that technological progress is the main source of economic growth, at
least in developed countries. For many developing countries, particularly for East
Asian countries, capital deepening stands out to be the primary source of economic
growth.2 Financial development, and hence stock market formation, affects econo-
mic growth through both factor accumulation and technological progress. For coun-
tries on the technological frontier, the main channels through which finance affects
economic growth would be innovation and technological progress, while for those
within the technological frontier the main channel would be capital accumulation.
Much of the finance-growth literature, however, emphasizes the former channel. In
this section, we discuss possible ways through which stock market formation can
affect both channels.
Forming a stock exchange can affect growth through mobilizing and availing long-
term and large-scale capital for investment. Many growth enhancing projects require
long-term investment, while investors generally dislike tying their resources to such
projects due to a liquidity risk. In the absence of insurance to liquidity shocks, savers
generally prefer an investment that allows easy access to their capital. A liquid stock
market provides such a platform where investors can transfer the ownership right to
other buyers and get access to liquid assets when they need. Consequently, the firm
will have access to the capital for unlimited periods of time. Further, stock markets
2Many other studies find that capital accumulation plays key role in growth of output in deve-
loping countries.
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perform a key role in mobilizing large-scale funds through diversifying cross-sectional
risk. Many growth-enhancing projects require large-scale funds, while this may
involve a large risk for investors. Stock markets provide investors with a platform
to diversify risk, facilitating the flow of large scale funding to high-risk high-return
projects (Acemoglu and Zilibotti, 1997). Besides agglomerating and availing of long-
term and large size funding, stock market may also raise real savings by households,
as it provides an alternative and a flexible saving instrument.3
Stock markets produce information and hence facilitate the flow of resources to
productive sectors, as investors are incentivised to engage in producing information
in order to make informed investment decision. Some, however, question the extent
to which a stock market is better suited to do this. In particular, a stock market
reveals information through stock prices and hence encourages free-ridding in infor-
mation production. Allen and Gale (1999) provide a particular case where a stock
market is better suited than banks to producing information and the financing of
high-risk high-return projects. They show that markets are better suited in finan-
cing projects where investors have diversity of opinion, emanating from their priors.
This is particularly the case for innovation type projects. Stock markets allow in-
vestors with common opinions to pool themselves together and finance projects.
Hence stock markets play a key role in pushing out the frontiers of growth through
innovation and technological progress.
Not only does stock market permit the flow of resources to their most profitable
activities, it also makes sure, through the presence of a take-over threat, that existing
3Financial development, and hence stock markets formation, has theoretically ambiguous effects
on real savings. By offering a higher return to savings, it encourages individuals to substitute away
from consumption to saving and, therefore, may raise real savings. The income effects (i.e., the
increase in wealth of an investor), however, increases consumption, and hence may reduce savings.
Inspired by behavioural economics, various studies have examined the impact of providing alter-
native saving/investment instruments (e.g., simple saving accounts for people with previously no
bank account) to poor households and its impact on their saving behaviour. These studies, by and
large, show that providing these instruments raise the level of real savings by households, and so-
metimes substantially so (see, among others, Ashraf et al. (2006), Prina (2011)). Mullainathan and
Shafir (2009) provide a good summary of the possible channels through which providing alternative
forms of saving/investment and commitment devices can raise real savings by individuals, chief
among them being that it secures resources from compulsive expenditure and other temptations.
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capital is used most profitably (Singh, 1999). Hence, a stock market raises both the
productivity of existing capital as well as facilitating the process of innovation and
hence technological progress.
Finally, the stock market can affect economic growth through its complementary
(competitive) role with other forms of financial institutions. For instance, it is
widely documented that venture capital plays a key role in nurturing potentially
high-growth start-up firms (Samila and Sorensen, 2011). However, for these types
of institution to exist, there must be a mechanism that allows them to unload their
investment whenever it is time for them to exit the firm. Although venture capital
can exit a successful firm in various ways, such as Initial Public Offerings (IPOs),
selling to other companies and through buy-back by the entrepreneur him/herself,
IPO is shown to be a value maximizing approach and is the preferred mechanism
by entrepreneurs as it grants them back control over the company once the firm
goes public (Gilson and Black, 1998). Herein, therefore, comes the key role of stock
markets as it provides venture capitalist to easily exit mature firms and move on to
invest in new ventures.
So far we have concentrated on the discussion of the positive effect of stock mar-
kets on economic growth. There are, however, those who question the importance of
the stock market for economic growth, particularly in developing countries (Singh,
1999). Much of the countervailing view is based on the fact that the necessary condi-
tions for stock markets to properly function fails to hold in developing countries.
As noted above, the flow of resources to their best use requires investors obtaining
the necessary information. However, the inherent problem of free-riding means that
investors have less incentive to do so, rendering the stock market fit more to the
“beauty contest” characterization of Keynes (Keynes, 1936) than being a serious
information producer and allocator of resources to their best use.
One key mechanism through which a stock market ensures that existing capital
is put to their best use is through a take-over threat. However, a take-over may be
ineffective and can at worse be counter-productive. First, the simple asymmetric
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information between existing owners and potential buyers may make it difficult for
the later to outbid the former. Secondly, managers often collude with the boards of
the company to pass life-saving decisions to fend-off a take-over. In fact, a possible
indication of the ineffectiveness of a take-over is that it is systematically biased
against small firm since it is small firms that are often taken over and not the
other way around (Singh, 1999). Further, instead of helping the process of economic
growth, a take-over can even harm it by forcing managers to excessively concentrate
on short-term performance at the expense of long-term goals such as R&D and
innovation that could potentially have large national welfare consequences.
A liquid stock exchange can also be a double-edged sword in that it may encou-
rage a myopic investor, who can leave the market at any time and hence may not
have a long-term interest in the company. Hence, in developing countries such as
SSA, not only can a stock market fail to have a significant positive effect on growth,
it can in fact be detrimental to growth. As Singh (1999) warns, “for many coun-
tries, such a development could be a costly irrelevance which they can ill afford; for
a number of others it is likely to do more harm than good”, p343.
3.3 Empirical Strategy and Data
3.3.1 Empirical Strategy
As noted, our main objective is to estimate the causal effect of forming a stock
exchange on economic growth. Denote Y dit as the potential per capita income growth
of country i. d ∈ (0, 1) is an indicator of whether the country has opened a stock
exchange (d=1) or not (d=0). Assume t=1 indicates a period after the country has
opened a stock exchange and t=0 a period before opening of the stock exchange.
The parameter we seek to estimate is:
τ = E(Y 1i,1 − Y 0i,1|Xit, D = 1). (3.1)
The parameter, τ , is a measure of the impact of opening a stock exchange on
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economic growth of countries that have opened an exchange. In the context of causal
inference, τ captures the average treatment effect on the treated, ATT.
As is well-known, the fundamental problem in estimating τ is that Y 0i,1, in equa-
tion 3.1, is not observable. In effect, one needs an appropriate counterfactual - the
average per capita income growth of countries with a stock exchange had they not
opened a stock exchange. Various estimators of τ present themselves depending on
the restrictions and assumptions one is willing to impose.
One such option is to replace Y 0i,1 by the actual average per capita income growth
of the country prior to opening a stock exchange. For concreteness, denote the
observed average per capita income growth of country i prior to its opening a stock
exchange (i.e., t=0) by Yi0, so that Y with the superscript denotes the potential
average per capita income growth while ones without the superscript denote the
observed average per capita income growth. The impact of opening a stock exchange
on per capita income growth of a country i is then given by:
τi = Y
1
i,1 − Yi0
The average impact of opening a stock exchange, is, therefore, given by taking
the average of τi over all countries with a stock exchange. This is, of course, the
well known before-after estimator. This is one of the estimators used by Baier et al.
(2003) to study the impact of opening a stock exchange on economic growth and total
factor productivity, finding that forming a stock exchange has a positive and, albeit
weakly, significant effect on both outcome measures. Minier (2009) studies the same
issue using a related methodology, finding some evidence supporting the notion that
opening a stock exchange has a positive and significant effect on economic growth.
The demanding assumptions required for the validity of the before-after estimator is
well-known in the literature. For instance, identification of τ , among others, require
that all potential factors that affect per capita income growth remain unchanged
between t=0 and t=1 and that all the change is attributable to the formation of a
stock exchange.
The other approach to estimating τ is to employ the Difference in Difference(DiD)
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method, with the following estimable (growth) equation:
yit = τDit + αi + ηt + βXit + εit (3.2)
where, yit is (annual) growth in per capita income of country i over the year t,
αi is country specific effects while ηt is time specific effects. Dit, as noted, is a
dummy variable taking a value of 1 if the country has a stock exchange in year t
and 0 otherwise, εit is time varying and country specific error term, and Xit is other
observable covariates that affect economic growth.
The parameter τ can be estimated using a first differenced panel method, or the
fixed effect method. The fixed effect model (3.2) allows the estimation of τ even when
opening a stock exchange and country-specific-time invariant unobservables, αi, are
correlated. The identification of τ , however, rests on the assumption that opening
a stock exchange is not correlated with the country-specific transitory shock, εit.
This implies two crucial conditions (Persson and Tabellini, 2008). First, it means
that in the absence of stock exchange, all countries would have followed a parallel
growth path. Put another way, it means that conditional on observable covariates,
Xit, countries follow a common growth path. Secondly, it implies that either i)
the growth effect of opening a stock exchange is not heterogeneous, or ii) that the
heterogeneity is not correlated with the propensity to open a stock exchange, Dit.
In other words, the assumption about heterogeneity implies that opening a stock
exchange, for instance, has the same impact on growth in Tanzania as it has in
Botswana. Or, if the potential growth impact of opening a stock exchange is higher
in Botswana, then that should not translate into a higher propensity of opening a
stock exchange in Botswana than is Tanzania.
These are indeed strong assumptions. The growth dynamics of both groups of
countries can differ due to factors other than a stock exchange formation. For ins-
tance, it may be that countries that open a stock exchange are those that could have
grown anyway, say, because they had a visionary leader by that time, making the
common trend assumption less tenable. The assumption relating to heterogeneity
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is even stronger. Many studies show that stock markets start to have a significant
effect on growth only after the economy reaches some critical level of development.4
For instance, the impact of a stock market on growth is likely to be higher in coun-
tries with large corporate firms (e.g., large mining firms) by virtue of the fact that
such firms are more likely to list than smaller ones. Further, a country that suffered
a transitory negative shock to growth may be required to open a stock exchange as a
conditionality for foreign aid, or decides to do so on the assumption that opening a
stock exchange may help improve economic growth. Hence, heterogeneity is bound
to exist. Not only is stock market formation likely to have an heterogeneous impact
on growth, but it is likely that countries that expect a strong impact on growth are
the ones that open stock exchanges. 5
One approach of rendering the parallel growth path assumption more tenable is to
make the two groups of countries look as similar as is possible. On the assumption
that the growth dynamics of countries is the function of some observable set of
attributes, this can be done by including as many observable covariates in equation
(3.2) as is possible.6 A key problem with this approach, however, is dimensionality,
as controlling for a large number of covariates consumes large number of degrees of
freedom. Similarly, the problem arising from heterogeneity can potentially be dealt
with by specifying τ as a function of some of the observable covariates that are
believed to drive the heterogeneity. Practically, this is usually done by interacting
the dummy of stock exchange formation with observable covariates that are assumed
to determine the heterogeneity. However, this again raises the dimensionality issue.
4For instance Adjasi and Biekpe (2006) finds that the growth effect of stock market development
varies with the country’s level of per capita income.
5It is important to note that the heterogeneity of the impact of opening a stock exchange would
be a problem to the estimation of τ when it affects selection into stock market formation. Consider
equation (3.2) above, modified in the following way: yit = τDit+αi+ηt+βXit+(Dit(τi−τ)+εit),
where τi is a parameter that captures the heterogeneous effect of a stock exchange. τi is treated
as part of the error term in equation (3.2). Hence, as long as opening stock exchange is driven by
its expected country-specific impact, εti is correlated with Dit, making τ in equation (3.2) biased.
6Note that this is akin to selection on observables as in a matching method. It is also important
to note that time-invariant unobservables will be washed out and that the time varying unobser-
vables can be ignored as long as their impact on growth dynamics does not change or change in
the same pattern in both treated and control countries (Lechner, 2010).
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Besides, it presupposes that one knows and can observe the variables that drive the
heterogenous effect of stock market formation and the functional forms.
Herein comes the role of a semi-parametric DiD, i.e., DiD combined with pro-
pensity score matching (Heckman et al., 1998; Abadie, 2005). This methodology is
better discussed in the context of the potential and actual outcome as in the impact
evaluation literature (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983). Revisit equation (3.1) given
by:7
τ = E(Y 1i,1 − Y 0i,1|Xit, D = 1).
As noted, the problem is that the counterfactual, Y 0i,1, is not observable. Hence,
the parameter is not estimable without further assumptions. We use the identifying
assumption invoked in the literature, so the parallel growth path noted above, given
by:
E(Y 0i,1 − Y 0i,0|Xit, D = 1) = E(Y 0i,1 − Y 0i,0|Xit, D = 0) (3.3)
The right hand side of the equation (3.3) is the change in average per capita
income growth for countries with no stock exchange while the left hand side of the
equation is the same for countries with a stock exchange. The only unknown from
the equation is E(Y 0i,1|Xi, D = 1) and it can be approximated by E(Y 0i,1|Xi, D = 0).8
Since the dimension of the co-variate matrix X can be large, the use of propensity
scores become handy. This allows the comparison to be made on a single metric,
and using a theorem in Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983), equation (3.3) becomes:
E(Y 0i,1 − Y 0i,0|p(Xi), D = 1) = E(Y 0i,1 − Y 0i,0|p(Xi), D = 0) (3.4)
where p(Xi) is the estimate of the propensity score.
The implementation of the DiD-cum matching procedure is as follows. First,
a propensity score is estimated, using a cross-sectional probit regression of a stock
7We following the same denotation of variables as above.
8Appendix 4.5 provides details of required sub-assumptions for identification.
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exchange dummy on relevant variables that determine the decision to open a stock
exchange. Then countries with a stock exchange are matched to comparable coun-
tries without a stock exchange based on their similarity in the propensity score
values. For each country with a stock exchange, we then calculate the before-after
average per capita income growth. Similarly, we do the same for corresponding
control countries. Our parameter of interest is, therefore, given by the former less
the propensity score weighted value of the latter.
More specifically, consider a country that opened a stock exchange in year k.
Denote by gks the before-after average per capita income growth of this country.
9
Similarly, denote by gkc the corresponding figure for control countries that are mat-
ched with country s. Note that we can have more than one control country being
matched with country s, depending on the matching technique used. This is in fact
so in our case since we use kernel matching, where all control countries are matched
with a treated country. The DiD for country s, τs, is given by the following equation:
τs = g
k
s −
∑
c
wcg
k
c (3.5)
where wc the weight for country c, constructed using the estimated propensity
score.10
We calculate τs for all the countries with a stock exchange. Averaging this over
all the s countries gives the average impact of opening a stock exchange on economic
growth of these countries with a stock exchange, and is given by:
9That is,
gks =
1
B
∑
t>k
yst − 1
A
∑
t<k
yst,
where y is the annual per capita income growth, B is the total number of years after opening the
stock exchange while A is the total number of years before opening the stock exchange.
10More specifically, wj , the weight assigned to a country j, is given by the following equation:
wj =
exp
(
−0.5∗
(
pi−pj
h
)2)
∑
k∈c exp
(
−0.5∗
(
pi−pk
h
)2)
. p is the estimates of the propensity score, i is countries with stock exchange, c is set of countries
without stock exchange, and h is the band width parameter.
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τ¯ =
∑
s τs
S
(3.6)
where S is the total number of treated countries, i.e., total number of countries with
a stock exchange.
Abadie and Imbens (2006) provides the asymptotic properties of the matching
estimator while Heckman et al. (1998) provides asymptotic properties of DiD mat-
ching of the type used in this paper. Operationalizing the variance estimate provided
has, however, been problematic given the intricate nature of the equation. Persson
and Tabellini (2008) provides an implementable estimate of the variance for this
estimator, first derived by (Lechner, 1999). We borrow notation from Persson and
Tabellini (2008). Expanding equation (3.6) and taking its variance, we have the
following expression for the estimable variance:
V ar(τ¯) =
1
S
V ar(
∑
s
gs)− 1
S2
V ar(
∑
s
∑
c
wcgc) (3.7)
We still need to make assumptions about the variables gs and gc to provide a
specific estimable quantity. Following the literature, we assume all treated countries
have the same variance, and that control countries also have the same variance.
Since we use kernel matching, a control country can be matched with more than
one treated country. This further complicates the estimation of the standard error.
Hence, one needs to make an assumption about the correlation of these variables.
Denote the before-after average per capita income growth of country c when it is
matched with country s by gsc . Persson and Tabellini (2008) provide two versions of
the variance in equation (3.7), depending on the assumptions about the correlation
between gsc .
V ar(τ¯) =
1
S
σ2s −
1
S2
σ2c
∑
s
∑
c
(w2c ) (3.8)
V ar(τ¯) =
1
S
σ2s −
1
S2
σ2c
∑
s
(
∑
c
wc)
2 (3.9)
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Equation (3.8) gives the lower bound estimate of the variance and is based on
the assumption that the gsc terms are not correlated. Equation (3.9), on the other
hand, provides the upper bound estimate of the standard error and is based on the
assumption that the gsc terms are perfectly correlated.
It is important to reiterate issues with the estimation of the standard error, since
the above estimates of variance make strong assumptions. First, as noted, countries
with a stock exchange are assumed to possess a common variance, as are countries
without a stock exchange. Secondly, we assume that the weights, wc, are known and
hence are not estimated. However, it is possible that the two variances – variance
of control and treated countries – are heteroscedastic. As is known, the fact that we
are using an estimated value wc is also likely to bias our estimate of the sampling
variance. These are, therefore, fairly strong assumptions. Hence, the standard error
and hypothesis tests of the paper should be viewed with some caution. Interestingly,
however, bootstrap standard errors can also be estimated and are shown to work well
with matching estimates where a control country is used more than once in matching
(Abadie and Imbens, 2008). We therefore provide a bootstrapped standard error as
a robustness check.
3.3.2 Estimating the Propensity Score
An important step in estimating τ is to obtain a proper value for p(Xit). To that
end, the following probit model is estimated:
p(Xit) = βX
′
it + σit (3.10)
where i = 1, ...n, Xi is a column vector of realizations on k explanatory variables
for country i and β is a column vector of k unknown parameters. The values of the
latent variable are measured on the real line and in this case reflect the underlying
propensity of opening a stock exchange. Assuming the error term, σit, follows a
normal distribution, equation (3.10) can be estimated using conventional maximum
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likelihood estimation technique.
A key issue is the decision as to which covariates to include in equation (3.10). By
controlling for relevant covariates, we make sure that the countries are well matched.
In general, the guiding principle of which variables to include should be motivated
by economic theory, but socio-political and legal variables believed to determine
stock exchange formation are also included in the regression model.
Cross-country as well as country level historical studies show that equity market
development comes later in the process of economic development. At the early stage
of economic development, debt financing is the main source of financing for capital
formation. Boyd and Smith (1998) provides a microfoundation of the evolution
of stock markets along this particular line.11 In their model, households (lenders)
face two investment projects, one with a return observable only to the borrower
and another whose return is observable both to lenders and borrowers. The former
has higher gross return, but involves a verification cost, while the later has a lower
return but no verification cost. Although a return is paid in capital, the verification
cost, borne by lenders, is in consumption goods and services. At the early stage
of economic development, debt financing commands a comparative advantage over
equity financing.12 As the economy develops and accumulates more capital, lenders
find the unobservable return technology less interesting compared to the observable
return. Hence, the economy starts to see a growing equity market relative to debt
financing in the later stage of development.
The formation of stock exchange, however, is not determined just by economic
factors. In fact, most of the stock exchanges in SSA are formed by government
initiatives, and their early phase of operation is often subsidized by the government
(Moss, 2003). An important question is then why some governments take the ini-
tiatives to open a stock exchange and even subsidize its operation while others do
not and may even go to the extent of discouraging the private sector from taking
11Blackburn et al. (2005) provide a similar model in their study.
12They also show that debt is the optimal financing contract for unobservable return technology
while equity financing is the optimal contract for observable return technology.
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the initiative to forming such exchanges.13 Various explanations can be offered for
this. However, an appealing theory is the political economy of financial development
(Rajan and Zingales, 2003a). As per this view, financial development has distribu-
tional consequences. In particular, barriers to entry confer economic rent on certain
economic groups. Lack of access to finance is an important entry barrier. Therefore,
in so far as it eases access to entrepreneurial finance, stock exchange formation re-
duces barrier to entry and hence threatens incumbent firms’ rents. Therefore, these
incumbents are likely to oppose the formation of such exchange. Whether they suc-
ceed in blocking the formation ultimately rests on their political power. Thus, all
things remaining the same, countries where the industrial or financial elites control
the policy making are less likely to open a stock exchange. 14 Some of these variables
are hard to capture adequately in an empirical study. However, we try to proxy it
by the nature of government, i.e., whether it is democratic or otherwise on the as-
sumption that non-democratic regimes are more prone to capture than democratic
ones (Girma and Shortland, 2008).15 The importance of a political system in stock
market formation can further be justified by the fact that opening a stock exchange
may mean embracing a dominant paradigm and hence more likely to buy support
from international powers. That is, it can be regarded as a form of legitimacy, and
it is non-democratic states that often seek such legitimacy.
Another important determinant of financial development (and hence stock mar-
ket formation) is the legal system of a country (Porta et al., 1998). Financial
contracting is a trade in promises. Hence, institutions protecting and enforcing
13For instance, private sector’s initiative to open a stock exchange in Ethiopia has been met
with a negative response form the government on a number of occasions. The organizers have been
constantly discouraged from pursuing this.
14Benmelech and Moskowitz (2010) provide interesting empirical evidence from the study of
usury in the 19th century US. They show that usury inhibits financial development and access
to credit for firms. A question then is why did some states adopt usury - is it because they are
concerned for the welfare of the society or to protect the interest of the industrial elites from
competition? They provide evidence in support of the latter, in line with the political economy
of financial development. Similar empirical evidences have been provided (Rajan and Zingales,
2003a; Girma and Shortland, 2008).
15It is, important to note that democracy and private interest’s influence can coexist. That is,
democracy is not a proof of capture of the legislative process by private interest.
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these contracts are key to the development of financial systems. Therefore, the role
of the a country’s legal infrastructure assumes a key importance. The legal theory
of finance argues in particular that the protection of property rights, the rights of
investors, and of private contracting is crucial for financial development. Further,
the adaptability of the legal system to a changing contracting requirement is also
an important issue. Legal systems, however, differ in the degree to which they do
this and the degree to which they are adaptable. The conventional view in this lite-
rature is that a Common Law legal origin gives more protection to private property
and private contracting over state power as compared to Civil law. Furthermore,
Common Law is more adaptable as it gives more discretion to judges than the Civil
law. The existing view, therefore, is that countries with Common Law are more pro
financial development than countries with Civil law. Extending this to stock market
formation, we expect countries with Common Law are more likely to open a stock
exchange than those with Civil law.16
Opening a stock exchange can be regarded as adopting or adapting existing
institutional forms of financing. Hence, it is plausible to appeal to theories of insti-
tutional or policy diffusion and adoption. Weber et al. (2009) employs this approach.
One view, borrowed from the dependency theory, is that opening a stock exchange
is imposed on developing countries since it serves the interest of investors in deve-
loped countries. Stock markets enable these investors to possess existing assets in
developing countries and make a ‘quick profit’ without undertaking foreign direct
investment. As per this view, the ‘core countries use both multilateral (e.g., inter-
national financial institutions) and bilateral relations to induce the peripheries to
open the stock exchange. In particular, some argue that it was imposed directly
by Multilateral financial institutions and was part of the general reform package
16Various empirical studies show the positive impact of Common law on financial development,
and that the main mechanism is not mainly through protecting private property and private
contracting, but because Common law is more adaptable to changing contracting needs of the
economy than Civil law. This literature is marked with strong disagreements, however. For
instance, there is no consensus between legal scholars as to whether Common law is more adaptable
and better protects private contracting than Civil law. Some even argue whether the legal origin
is the fundamental determinant of financial development, as compared to, for instance, culture.
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adopted by most SSA nations during early 1990s. All things remaining the same,
therefore, countries that are more dependent on ‘core countries’ are more likely
to open a stock exchange even if it is not warranted by their prevailing economic
circumstances (Wayland, 2005; Weber et al., 2009).
3.3.3 Data and Sample Selection
Table 3.4 provides the list of variables used in the propensity score modeling, along
with their summary statistics and data sources. As noted in section 3.3.2, the stage
of economic development and the structure of the economy are among the potential
determinants of the formation of stock exchanges. We use three variables to capture
a country’s stage of economic development, viz., initial value of per capita income,
initial population size and the initial value of per capita income growth. We also
try to capture the impact of the structure of the economy on the propensity to
open a stock exchange using initial values of the share of urban population and the
share of agriculture in total value added. The efficiency of the legal system and
contract enforcement is another determinant of the formation of a stock market.
We capture this using a dummy for Common Law legal origin as well as a dummy of
Civil law legal origin. We employ the Polity2 variable from the Polity IV project to
proxy a country’s political regime. The Polity IV project provides various variables
designed to capture the level of democratic development, among them being an
index of institutionalized democracy and of autocracy. The former is an 11 point
scale index, obtained by weighting the competitiveness of political participation, the
degree of openness and competitiveness of the selection process of a country’s leader,
and the institutional constraint on the leader. Similarly, institutional autocracy is
an 11 point scale index obtained by weighting the extent of the (un)competitiveness
of political participation, the extent of lack of competition and participation in
selecting a country’s leader, and the extent of lack of institutional limit on the
country’s leader. A Polity variable is constructed by subtracting the value of the
institutionalized autocracy less democracy. The variable is a 21 point scale index
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with values ranging from 10 (strongly democratic) to -10 (strongly autocratic). The
Polity2 variable is the same as the Polity variable except that its missing values are
replaced by some imputed values (Marshall et al., 2009). To capture the impact
of external dependence on the formation of a stock exchange, we include the initial
value of the ratio of total external debt to Gross National Income (GNI). To capture
for the possible impact of exposure to other countries on stock market formation,
we also include the distance between the country’s capital city and London.
Data used in the paper come from various sources. The key independent variable,
a dummy for whether the country has a stock exchange or not, is collected from va-
rious sources. The primary source is the websites of respective stock exchanges.
Where such information is not available, we rely on published sources (e.g., Minier
(2009), Baier et al. (2003), Weber et al. (2009)) and unpublished sources and various
websites.17 Most of the other variables come from the World Bank’s World Develop-
ment Indicators. Data on per capita income growth, initial per capita, population,
share of urban population, share of agriculture in total value added, external debt
as a share of Gross National Income (GNI) are all obtained from World Bank’s
World Development Indicator 2011. The proxy for democracy, Polity2, comes from
Polity IV project18, while data on the legal origin comes from The Quality of Go-
vernment Institute at University of Gothenburg (Teorell et al., 2011).19 The data
source for distance between a country’s capital city and London is obtained from
Centre d’Etudes Prospectiveset d’Informations Internationales (CEPII).20
As noted, we first report results for a broader set of countries and then provide
the result for the SSA sub-sample. It is, therefore, important to be clear about the
justification for the sample selection. The prime determinant of countries to include
in our sample is the availability of data. The nature of some of our variables entail
imposing some restriction that impacts sample selection. First, for a meaningful
17For instance, www.MBedi.com provides a wealth of information on stock market in Africa,
including the total list of the stock exchanges in the region and the date of their formation.
18http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm
19http://www.qog.pol.gu.se
20http://www.cepii.fr/anglaisgraph/bdd/gravity.htm
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analysis, a treated country needs to have enough data span for per capita income
growth both before and after opening a stock exchange. Specifically, we require
a country with stock exchange to have at least five years of non-missing data on
per capita income growth both before and after the opening of a stock exchange to
be part of our sample. The World Bank’s WDI data on per capita income growth
is available from 1960 onwards. This means that countries that opened a stock
exchange before 1965 are dropped from our sample due to lack of data. Similarly,
we do not have sufficient span of per capita income growth data on post-stock market
formation for countries that formed their first stock exchange on or after the year
2005.21 Hence, for countries with a stock exchange, our sample is limited to those
that opened their first exchange between 1965 and 2005. Secondly, the nature of
the explanatory variables included in the propensity score equation also requires
us to impose further restrictions on the countries for inclusion in the analysis. As
noted, most of the explanatory variables are initial values, where initial refers to
the value corresponding to the first year in which the variable has a non-missing
data for the respective country. Hence, for countries with a stock exchange, initial
values of all the variables should pre-date the formation of the first stock exchange.
For instance, if a country opened a stock exchange in 1990 and its initial value of
Polity2 corresponds to the year 1991, that country is dropped from the sample.22
This leaves us with a total of 73 (51 treated and 22 untreated) countries for the
analysis. Table 3.5 provides the list of countries with stock exchanges that are
included in our sample.
21We deal with the latter category of countries by treating them as control countries, i.e., assu-
ming as if they do not have a stock exchange. Instead of including them in the control group, we
have also dropped them altogether from the analysis. Nevertheless, that omission does not alter
the reported result.
22We didn’t, however, impose such a restriction on the control countries.
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3.4 Results and Discussions
3.4.1 All Countries
We now turn to the results of the impact of opening a stock exchange on economic
growth. A before-after type of analysis would be a good place to start. Figure 3.4
gives a Box plot of the before-after growth, constructed as the average per capita
income growth after opening a stock exchange less the same before the formation
of the exchange23 for countries with a stock exchange. The first panel of the figure
gives the before-after growth by region, while the second panel provides the same
for all the countries in our sample. As can be seen, for the full sample countries, the
centre of the distribution of the before-after growth is close to zero, with a median
value of only slightly above zero. The plot for each region indicates a similar pattern.
Except for countries in Europe and Central Asia – mainly the former Soviet countries
– the median before-after growth is essentially zero. This is particularly so for SSA
countries, indicating that per capita income growth did not perhaps improve after
opening a stock exchange for countries in this region. The median value is in fact
less than zero for Latin American and Caribbean countries in our sample. Overall,
this suggests that opening a stock exchange does not appear to improve economic
growth substantively.
23Note that the number of years before and after stock exchange are not necessarily balanced.
Nevertheless, the span of years is restricted to a maximum of 10 years before and after stock
formation in calculating the before-after per capita income growth.
103
Figure 3.4: Box plot of Before-After growth (countries with stock exchange)
The figure provides a Box plot of the before-after growth, constructed as the average per capita income growth after opening a stock exchange less the same
before the formation of the exchange, for countries with a stock exchange. The left panel gives the values disaggregated by region while the right panel gives the
result for the whole sample.
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The before-after growth gives us the glimpse of some insight into what per capita
income growth looks like following the opening of a stock exchange. However, it
does not help us see if the change in per capita income growth is driven by, and
hence attributable, to the opening of a stock exchange. This is so since the before-
after analysis does not control for other variables that might have at the same time
changed. We now discuss the estimates based on our regression analysis.
We start with the key ingredient of the DiD-cum matching estimate, the esti-
mates of the propensity score. The second column of table 3.1 provides the probit
estimates of the propensity score model based on all countries in our sample. As can
be seen, most of the variables enter with the expected sign, but are not statistically
significant at a conventional level. The initial population is the only variable that
enters with a statistically significant coefficient. The positive coefficient is consistent
with theory and this may indicate the importance of the initial size of the economy
in determining the propensity to open a stock exchange. Many of the variables in
the propensity score model enter with insignificant coefficients, partly because of the
potential multicollinearity between the variables and because of the small sample
size. However, as the main aim of estimating this equation is to predict the propen-
sity score and not necessarily to study the determinants of forming a stock exchange,
the absence of many well determined effects may not be an issue of much concern.
What matters is whether the estimated propensity score achieves better balancing
between the treated and control countries. Figure 3.5 provides the histogram of the
balancing of the propensity score while figure 3.6 gives the kernel density for of the
overlaps of the propensity scores of the the two groups.24 Both figures indicate a
good, certainly by the standards of macroeconomic data, overlap in the estimated
propensity scores for the two groups, though there is a scope for an improvement of
in the balance.
Table 3.2 reports the estimation results for the full sample. As a baseline result,
24Lechner (2010) indicates that it is often suffice to look at the overlap of the two distribution
to see if balancing test is met.
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Table 3.1: Estimates of Probit Model for Propensity Score
The dependent variable is a dummy variable taking a value of one if the country has a stock
exchange and zero other wise. All explanatory variables are initial values.
All sample SSA sample
Per capita income growth 0.0232 0.0905*
(0.89) (1.73)
ln(Population) 0.306* 0.439
(1.84) (1.32)
Per capita income 0.187 -0.115
(0.50) (-0.21)
Urban population (% of total population) 0.0171 0.0167
(0.81) (0.39)
Agriculture value added as % GDP 0.00696 0.00160
(0.46) (0.09)
Polity2 -0.0233 -0.0475
(-0.73) (-0.72)
Distance from London -0.0746 0.460
(-0.20) (0.47)
External debt as % GNI 0.000717 -0.0158
(0.20) (-1.20)
Dummy for Common law legal origin (d) 0.192 1.012*
(0.25) (1.84)
Dummy for Civil law legal origin -0.693
(-1.08)
sample year 0.0253 -0.0186
(1.40) (-0.52)
N 73 35
Pseudo-R2 0.149 0.167
Marginal effects; t statistics in parentheses
(d) for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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we present and start the discussion with the Ordinary Least Square (OLS) and panel
estimation results. A key problem in economic growth empirics is the enormity of
potential regressors to include and the lack of clear theoretical justification guiding
which variables to include in a regression. We follow suggestions in the model speci-
fication searches using the Bayesian Model Averaging Approaches (see, for instance,
SalaiMartin et al. (2004)), which consistently show capital formation and primary
school enrolment as the two variables that are strongly associated with per capita
income growth. We control for these two variables in the baseline regression. We
also control for life expectancy, the share of government consumption in the total
GDP, and the ratio of external debt to Gross National Income (GNI), another set of
variables shown to be important determinants of economic growth. Finally, in order
to see if the impact of forming a stock exchange depends on the level of economic
development, we include the interaction term between the stock market dummy and
per capita income. The baseline results are given in the upper panel of the table.
The second column of the table provides the result of a pooled cross-section
estimation, controlling for time fixed effects. Standard errors are robust to unknown
misspecification and are clustered at country level. As shown, the variable of interest,
the dummy for the presence of a stock exchange, enters with positive coefficient
and is significant, indicating that countries with a stock exchange grow faster than
their counterparts without a stock exchange. Fixed capital formation enters with a
positive and statistically significant coefficient, indicating the importance of capital
accumulation for economic growth in this set of countries. Primary school enrolment,
on the other hand, enters with an insignificant coefficient. In line with existing
studies, life expectancy enters with a positive and significant coefficient. Perhaps
ironically, the interaction term between dummy of a stock exchange and a country’s
per capita income enters with a negative coefficient and is marginally significant,
indicating opening a stock exchange tend to have a lower impact on economic growth
for countries with a higher income.
The third column of the table provides the result of random effect estimation,
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controlling for time fixed effects. Standard errors are robust to unknown misspeci-
fication. The results are by and large similar to those in the OLS regression. The
variable of interest, the dummy for the presence of a stock exchange, still enters with
a positive coefficient and is significant at 10%. However, in this case, government
consumption enters with a negative and significant coefficient, indicating that exces-
sive government consumption undermines economic growth. Further, the interaction
term between dummy of a stock exchange and a country’s per capita income is not
statistically significant, signifying that the impact of opening a stock exchange on
economic growth does not depend on the country’s level of development.
The fourth column of the table provides the result of fixed effect estimation.
The standard errors are robust to unknown mis-specification and time fixed effects
are controlled for. As can be seen, the variable of interest is positive, but is not
statistically significant, indicating that there is no significant difference in per capita
income growth between countries with and without a stock exchange. Except for
fixed capital formation and government consumption as share of GDP, none of the
other control variables enter significantly. The upshot, therefore, is that stock market
formation does not appear to robustly affect per capita income growth in our sample
of countries.
Employing DiD-cum-matching, our preferred estimation method corroborates
the findings of the fixed effect estimation, as the second and third column of the
bottom panel of the table reveals. The first column of the table provides the DiD
estimate, where the t-value is based on the lower bound standard error, given by the
variance equation (3.8). As can be seen, the coefficient of our key variable is negative,
but is not significantly different from zero. As noted in section 3.3.1, a key issue with
our preferred estimation strategy is the estimation of the standard error. The third
column of the table provides results where the t-value is calculated based on upper,
instead of lower, bound standard error, given by the variance equation (3.9). As can
be seen, the coefficient of stock market variable is still not statistically significant,
indicating that stock market formation does not appear to make a difference to per
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Table 3.2: Baseline and Difference-in-Difference Estimates for whole sample Coun-
tries
For pooled and panel regression results, the dependent variable is annual per capita income
growth, and all the explanatory variables are lagged by one year. For the Difference-in-Difference
estimation results, the dependent variable is the average per capita income growth after
opening a stock exchange minus the average per capita income growth before opening the exchange.
All Sample
OLS Random Effect Fixed Effect
Stock exchange dummy 1.409** 1.033* 0.523
(2.19) (1.76) (0.81)
Primary school Enrollment -0.00594 -0.00164 0.0106
(-0.76) (-0.26) (0.81)
Fixed capital formation (%GDP) 0.119*** 0.102*** 0.0618*
(4.58) (5.27) (1.87)
Government consumption (% GDP) -0.0325 -0.0540** -0.116*
(-1.23) (-2.19) (-1.83)
External debt (%GDP) -0.00241 -0.000469 0.00105
(-1.30) (-0.28) (0.55)
Life Expectancy at birth 0.0407** 0.0404** 0.0176
(2.08) (2.22) (0.35)
Stock exchange*per capita income -0.138* -0.120 -0.0775
(-1.67) (-1.54) (-0.89)
Constant -5.290*** -4.830*** -2.741
(-4.37) (-4.04) (-0.95)
N 2525 2525 2525
Overall R2 0.161 0.134
R2 0.164 0.129
Time Fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Country Fixed effects No No Yes
Difference-in-Difference Estimates
SE1 SE2
Stock -0.52 -0.52
(-.943)[-.683] ( -.492)[-.683]
Stock5 -1.43 -1.43
(-2.85***)[-.990] ( -1.40)[-.990]
t statistics in parentheses
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Note:For OLS column, standard errors are robust and clustered at country level, while for the Random Effects (RE) and Fixed
Effects (FE) columns standard errors are just robust. In the row ‘Stock’, the DiD estimates are based on all available number of per
capita income growth, i.e., without imposing a restriction on the number of years in calculating the before-after growth. Estimates
in the row ‘Stock5’ are based on where the number of years is restricted to 5 years both before and after the formation of stock
exchange. SE1 is standard error based on variance equation 3.8, and is based on the assumption that the values of before-after per
capita income growth of a control country matched multiple times are not correlated. SE2, on the other hand, is based on the
variance equation 3.9 and assumes that these before-after growth differences are positively correlated.
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capita income growth for those countries in our sample.
Further complicating the issue with the measures of standard error used here
is the fact that it can in principle be lower than the lower bound itself. While
calculating the upper bound, we assumed that the before-after growth of a control
country is positively correlated. Denote gki and g
l
i to be the before-after per capita
income growth of country i when it is matched, respectively, with country k and
l. In calculating the upper bound standard error, we assume that gki and g
l
i are
positively correlated.25. However it is possible that the actual correlation is instead
negative, in which case the standard error is even lower than the lower bound. The
upshot, therefore, is that the standard error is itself an issue. A better option
would be, therefore, to use a bootstrap or Jackknife standard errors. We include
the t-value based on bootstrap standard error, from 1000 replications, in the square
brackets of columns 4 and 5 of table 3.2.26 As can be seen, the coefficient remains
statistically insignificant, again indicating that opening a stock exchange does not
exert a statistically significant effect on per capita income growth.
As noted, countries enter our sample at a different point in time. Hence, the
before-after growth is based on an unbalanced number of years. That is, it is possible,
in calculating the before-after per capita income growth of a given country, that the
average per capita income before the stock market formation is based on, say, 30
years while the average per capita income after the stock market formation is based
on just five or so years of observations, or vice versa. A value obtained by averaging
25Note that when calculating the lower bounds, we are assuming that gki and g
l
i are independent.
26It is, however, important to note some issues with the resampling method in our type of
dataset. The conventional bootstrapping method is to resample based on observations. However,
this may lead to cases where the entire observation is drawn from just treated or control countries,
making it impossible to estimate the parameter of interest, τ . Therefore, we impose a condition
during the resampling, by setting the bootstrapping such that a country is drawn independently
from those with and without a stock exchange. Yet, it is important to note a further issue, in that
we do not know whether the balancing test is met during every replication. It is possible that some
of the bootstrapping estimates are done without first meeting the balancing based on propensity
score. Unfortunately, a valid way of doing this is not apparent. One naive way would be to put
a condition in the replication such that a sample be dropped if the balancing test is not meet.
This, however, would amount to tampering with the integrity of the bootstrapping process and
is not attempted. Incidentally, figure 3.7 gives the kernel density of the bootstrapped estimates
overlayed with normal distribution. Not surprisingly, the distribution of the bootstrapped estimate
is indistinguishable from normal.
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over 30 years is less likely to be affected by outliers than one obtained from averaging
over, say, just five years. Consequently, the before after based on these differently
smoothed values can potentially be susceptible to the effects of outliers. Therefore,
it may be important to check if our results change by imposing a common time
span on the number of years both before and after the stock market formation.
To that end, we consider the before-after calculated as the five year average per
capita income growth immediately after the formation of stock exchange less the
five year average per capita income immediately before opening a stock exchange.
The result is given in the second row, i.e., row ‘Stock5’, of table 3.2. As can be
seen, the coefficient of our key variable remains negative. Nevertheless, it is still
insignificantly different from zero, except in the case of t-value based on lower bound
standard error, corroborating our findings that forming a stock exchange does not
appear to have a significant causal impact on per capita income growth in our sample
countries.
Although the results of the DiD estimate is broadly similar to the baseline re-
gression results, in particular to the fixed effect estimates, the two results are not
strictly comparable. The DiD result controls for a host of variables through the
propensity score equation. The baseline regression, on the other hand, is based on
four additional key explanatory variables, and most of the variables controlled for
in the propensity score regression are not included in the baseline regression since
it does not make sense to do so. Further, the baseline regression is based on annual
per capita income growth and therefore captures the short-run impacts of opening
a stock exchange on economic growth. The DiD estimate is based on average per
capita income growth over five or more years and hence captures, perhaps, a medium
to long-term impact of opening a stock exchange on economic growth.
3.4.2 SSA Sample
We have seen in the foregoing analysis that opening a stock exchange does not
appear to have a significant effect on economic growth using a broader set of sample
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countries. In this section, we explore the effect of forming a stock exchange on
economic growth using data from the SSA countries, with the view to see if the
region is different from a broader set of countries in other regions in this regard.
The third column of table 3.1 gives the estimation result of the probit equation for
the SSA sample. As in the case for the results based on the whole sample, most of
the variables in the probit equation are not statistically significant. Initial per capita
income, however, is among two of the variables that enter significantly. As can be
seen, the variable enters with a positive coefficients, indicating that countries that
start with higher per capita income growth are more likely to open a stock exchange
than their counterparts that start with lower per capita income growth. Similarly, a
dummy of Common law legal origin enters with positive and statistically significant
coefficient, indicating that countries with British legal origin are more likely to
create a stock exchange than countries with a different legal origin. This is generally
consistent with existing evidence that Common law legal origin is associated with
the better development of a stock market (Levine and Demirguc-Kunt, 2008). Figure
3.5 provides the histogram while figure 3.6 gives the kernel density of the overlaps
of the propensity scores of the two groups. Both figures indicate reasonable overlap,
by the standard of the limited number of observation, of the estimated propensity
scores of the two groups in the region.
Table 3.3 gives the estimates of our key equation for the Sub-Saharan African
sample. The upper panel of the table gives the baseline regression results. The
second column of the table gives the OLS estimate of the growth equation with a
dummy for stock exchange as one of the explanatory variables. The standard error
is clustered at country level and time fixed effects are controlled for. As can be seen,
our key variable enters with a positive coefficient, but its corresponding estimate is
not statistically significant. Most of the other control variables are not statistically
significant either, except for fixed capital formation which enters with a positive and
statistically significant coefficient, indicating the importance of capital accumulation
for per capita income growth.
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Table 3.3: Baseline and Difference-in-Difference Estimates for SSA Sample Countries
For pooled and panel regression results, the dependent variable is annual per capita income
growth, and all the explanatory variables are lagged by one year. For the Difference-in-Difference
estimation results, the dependent variable is the average per capita income growth after
opening a stock exchange minus the average per capita income growth before opening the exchange.
SSA Sample
OLS Random Effect Fixed Effect
Stock exchange dummy 0.646 0.510 -0.300
(0.96) (0.76) (-0.39)
Primary school Enrollment -0.00621 0.000281 0.0202*
(-0.69) (0.03) (1.84)
Fixed capital formation (%GDP) 0.0995*** 0.0982*** 0.0982**
(3.14) (3.41) (2.40)
Government consumption (% GDP) -0.0131 -0.0279 -0.0341
(-0.46) (-0.82) (-0.62)
External debt (%GDP) -0.00283 -0.00207 -0.00786*
(-0.64) (-0.52) (-1.81)
Life Expectancy at birth 0.0204 0.0136 -0.00253
(0.45) (0.38) (-0.04)
Stock exchange*per capita income -0.0664 -0.144 -0.218*
(-0.74) (-1.59) (-1.88)
Constant -0.523 -0.262 0.0569
(-0.26) (-0.14) (0.02)
N 946 946 946
Overall R2 0.160 0.132
R2 0.165 0.164
Time Fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Country Fixed effects No No Yes
Difference-in-Difference Estimates
SE1 SE2
Stock -1.27 -1.27
(-2.30**)[-.839] (-1.658)[-.839]
Stock5 -0.94 -0.94
(-1.063)[-.362] (-.604)[-.362]
t statistics in parentheses
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Note:For OLS column, standard errors are robust and clustered at country level, while for the Random Effects (RE) and Fixed
Effects (FE) columns standard errors are just robust. In the row ‘Stock’, the DiD estimates are based on all available number of per
capita income growth, i.e., without imposing a restriction on the number of years in calculating the before-after growth. Estimates
in the row ‘Stock5’ are based on where the number of years is restricted to 5 years both before and after the formation of stock
exchange. SE1 is standard error based on variance equation 3.8, and is based on the assumption that the values of before-after per
capita income growth of a control country matched multiple times are not correlated. SE2, on the other hand, is based on the
variance equation 3.9 and assumes that these before-after growth differences are positively correlated.
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The third column of the table reports the random effects estimation result. Stan-
dard errors are robust to unknown mis-specification, and we control for time fixed
effects. The results reveal a similar pattern as in the OLS case, in that our key
variable enters with a positive but an insignificant coefficient, again indicating that
opening a stock exchange does not significantly affect economic growth. Of the
other control variables, only the fixed capital formation enters with a significant
coefficient. The fourth column of the table reports the fixed effects estimation re-
sult. Standard errors are robust to unknown mis-specification, and we control for
both country and time fixed effects. Our key variable enters with a negative but
an insignificant coefficient, again indicating that opening a stock exchange does not
significantly affect economic growth. Fixed capital formation enters with a positive
and statistically significant coefficient, while external debt as share of GNI enters
with a negative and statistically significant coefficient. Although it does not lend
itself to a meaningful interpretation given that the stock exchange dummy is insi-
gnificant, the interaction term between the per capita income and dummy of a stock
exchange enters with negative coefficient and is significant at 10%.
Columns two and three of the bottom panel of the table provide the estimation
result of the DiD-cum-matching method. In column two, the t-value in the bracket
is based on the lower bound standard error. As can be seen, the coefficient of our key
variable is negative. Interestingly, it is also statistically significant at the 5% level
based on the lower bound standard error. However, at the value in square bracket
shows, the estimated effect is not statistically significant using the bootstrapped
standard error.27 As column 2 of the table reveals, the coefficient is still negative,
but is not statistically significant based on the upper bound standard error.
Again, the fact that the before-after growth is based on possibly unbalanced
length of years may bias our results. As we did for the whole sample, we provide
DiD estimation result where the time span for per capita income growth is restricted
27Owing to the limited number of observation for SSA results, the bootstrapped standard error
is based on about 300 replications.
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to five years both before and after the opening of the stock exchange. That is, the
DiD is applied on the before-after growth calculated as the average per capita income
growth five years after the formation of stock exchange less average per capita income
growth 5 years before the formation of stock exchange. The second row, i.e., row
‘Stock5’, of the table gives this result. As can be seen, our key variable enters with
negative coefficient, but is generally not statistically significant. This is so based
on the lower and upper bound standard error as well as based on the bootstrapped
standard error, indicating that opening a stock exchange may not have a significant
effect on short-term per capita income growth in the region.
Overall, therefore, we show that opening a stock exchange does not appear to
have a significant effect on per capita income growth in the region. Interestingly,
the result for SSA sample is not substantively different from the result for all set of
countries in our sample, except for those based on OLS and random effect models.
However, the overall result that stock market formation does not affect economic
growth provides an interesting contrast with the findings of the limited empirical
studies on this issue.
Although there has not been any study examining this issue for Sub-Saharan
Africa, our result is, to some extent, in contrast with findings of Minier (2009) and
Baier et al. (2003) who, using a broader sample of countries, find that opening a
stock exchange has a positive, although generally weakly significant, effect on per
capita income growth. Baier et al. (2003) study the effect of opening stock exchange
on GDP growth by estimating three parameters. First, they provide a before-after
estimate, comparing a country’s GDP growth after opening a stock exchange with
its GDP growth before opening of the stock exchange. Secondly, they compare the
GDP growth after opening a stock exchange with the GDP growth of the rest of the
world. Finally, they provide an estimate of non-parametric difference in difference
by comparing the before-after GDP growth of a country with a stock exchange
to the same for the rest of the world. In all the three parameters, inference is
based on comparing the estimated parameter with the standard deviation and by
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looking at the proportion of countries with higher GDP growth after opening a
stock exchange than the comparison group. The before-after estimate shows that
opening a stock exchange does not have a significant effect on economic growth,
while the estimates based on the remaining two methods show that opening a stock
exchange has a positive, albeit weakly significant, effect on growth. As discussed
in section 3.3, a key issue with using a simple DiD is that it does not control for
county specific heterogeneity of the impact of forming a stock exchange and as
such estimates may be biased. Our results are based on a Difference-in-Difference
based on matched countries and hence take care of this problem. Similarly, Minier
(2009) studies the effect of forming a stock exchange on GDP growth by comparing
the difference between the actual and predicted GDP growth after forming a stock
exchange with similar estimate for comparable 28 countries without stock exchange.
The results show that opening a stock exchange has generally no effect on GDP
growth, except for a comparison based on five year growth which is marginally
significant. In general, the methodologies employed in these papers do not control
for the possibility that other factors might have changed and that the heterogeneity
of the impacts may bias the results. Therefore, it is possible that economic growth
is wrongly ascribed to stock market formation when in fact the underlying factors
are due to the evolution of some other variable(s).
3.5 Conclusion
Theoretical as well as empirical studies reveal that stock market development has a
positive link with economic growth. Using a broad and heterogenous sample of coun-
tries, (Levine and Zervos, 1998), for instance, provide empirical evidence showing
that stock market liquidity is positively and significantly associated with economic
growth, capital accumulation and productivity growth. Similar studies have shown
28Comparable based on similarity in per capita income before the formation of the stock ex-
change.
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such a positive association between stock market development and economic growth
for SSA sample countries (Senbet and Octchere, 2008; Adjasi and Biekpe, 2006).
Interestingly, these findings are often used to draw the conclusion that opening a
stock exchange raises the aggregate welfare of any country. Partly driven by such
findings and conclusions, stock markets are mushrooming in many parts of the world,
particularly in the SSA region.
However, many caution that the suitability of stock markets in promoting econo-
mic growth is dependent on the structure and stages of development of the economy.
The nature of the institution render stock markets to better serve an economy at
certain stages of development rather than at others (Lin et al., 2009). For instance,
stock markets may play a key role in well-developed economies with comparative ad-
vantage in skill and capital intensive activities, and in particular in economies where
the engine of growth is innovation and technological progress (Allen and Gale, 1999;
Lin et al., 2009). Therefore, the positive association between stock market develop-
ment and economic development does not automatically translate to the argument
that opening a stock exchange helps promote economic growth in any particular
country.
This essay explored the impact of opening a stock exchange on economic growth
in a developing countries context, with a particular emphasis on the SSA. Using a
Difference-in-Difference methodology with a matched set of countries, we show that
opening a stock exchange in general does not appear to have a significant effect on
per capita income growth in our sample of countries. Interestingly, our estimates
show that the coefficient can even be negative, although not statistically significantly
different from zero. Our analysis adds to the limited literature examining the impact
of opening a stock exchange on economic growth. Our key findings, however, are,
to some extent, contrary to those in the limited literature on this issue that show
opening a stock exchange exerts a positive, although marginally significant, effect
on economic growth (see for instance, Minier (2009) and Baier et al. (2003)).
However, that opening a stock exchange does not appear to have a significant
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impact on economic growth in these sets of countries is perhaps not surprising,
particularly for the SSA region, given the nature of the stock market and what it
serves. As noted, a stock market is best suited to serve large firms that engage in
R&D and long-term and large scale investment activities. These types of firm are
simply absent in the SSA region, where the majority of the enterprises are small
and medium scale in size.
It is important, however, to note some possible limitations of this essay. We view
the limited sample size and the estimation of the standard error in our preferred
methodology as two key issues that warrant our findings should be carefully inter-
preted. The limited sample size is the fact of life for many cross-country studies,
and little can be done to address this constraint. Future research can possibly en-
hance this approach through use of a detailed country level study, in particular by
comparing the patterns of financing, growth and performances of firms in countries
with and without the presence of a stock exchange. The standard error of the DiD-
cum-matching estimation we employed is what is currently provided at the frontier
of the current research in this type of application. In view of the limitations with
this method, there are, therefore, research opportunities for future enhancement and
improvement. For instance, little is known about the theoretical implications for the
standard error of using a control country multiple times. Exploring this provides an
important part of the future research agenda in this area. Another potential future
improvement for our preferred methodology would be to apply the DiD-matching
on an evolving basis. For instance, consider Cote d’Ivoire which opened a stock
exchange in 1974. In this paper, the controls are countries that did not have a stock
exchange as of 2007. An interesting case, at least when using the five year span of
data to calculate the before-after per capita income growth, would be to use any
country that did not open a stock exchange until 1979 as a control country. Hence,
although Uganda has a stock exchange, which opened in 1997, it could potentially
be used as a control country for Cote d’Ivoire as long as its estimated propensity
score is comparable to that of Cote d’Ivoire. This again is an approach that could
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provide further enhancements to the methodology used in this chapter.
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Table 3.5: Countries with stock exchange that are included in the Analysis
Country Region Year Stock exchange is formed
Fiji East Asia & Pacific 1979
China East Asia & Pacific 1990
Vietnam East Asia & Pacific 2000
Mongolia East Asia & Pacific 1991
Thailand East Asia & Pacific 1975
Papua New Guinea East Asia & Pacific 1999
Albania Europe & Central Asia 1996
Armenia Europe & Central Asia 2001
Belarus Europe & Central Asia 1998
Georgia Europe & Central Asia 1999
Moldova Europe & Central Asia 1994
Romania Europe & Central Asia 1995
Bulgaria Europe & Central Asia 1991
Azerbaijan Europe & Central Asia 2001
Uzbekistan Europe & Central Asia 1994
Kyrgyz Republic Europe & Central Asia 1994
Peru Latin America & Caribbean 1971
Guyana Latin America & Caribbean 2003
Panama Latin America & Caribbean 1989
Bolivia Latin America & Caribbean 1990
Honduras Latin America & Caribbean 1990
Paraguay Latin America & Caribbean 1977
Guatemala Latin America & Caribbean 1987
Nicaragua Latin America & Caribbean 1990
Costa Rica Latin America & Caribbean 1976
El Salvador Latin America & Caribbean 1976
Dominican Republ Latin America & Caribbean 1991
Jordan Middle East & North Africa 1999
Algeria Middle East & North Africa 1997
Nepal South Asia 1993
Bhutan South Asia 1993
Sri Lanka South Asia 1985
Mali Sub-Saharan Africa 1998
Togo Sub-Saharan Africa 1998
Benin Sub-Saharan Africa 1998
Ghana Sub-Saharan Africa 1990
Niger Sub-Saharan Africa 1998
Sudan Sub-Saharan Africa 1994
Malawi Sub-Saharan Africa 1995
Uganda Sub-Saharan Africa 1997
Zambia Sub-Saharan Africa 1994
Senegal Sub-Saharan Africa 1998
Botswana Sub-Saharan Africa 1989
Cameroon Sub-Saharan Africa 2001
Tanzania Sub-Saharan Africa 1998
Mauritius Sub-Saharan Africa 1988
Swaziland Sub-Saharan Africa 1990
Mozambique Sub-Saharan Africa 1999
Burkina Faso Sub-Saharan Africa 1998
Cote d’Ivoire Sub-Saharan Africa 1974
Guinea-Bissau Sub-Saharan Africa 1998
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Figure 3.5: Balancing of Propensity Score
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Figure 3.6: Kernel Density of the Propensity Score
123
Figure 3.7: Kernel Density of Bootstrapped Estimates of the Parameter
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Chapter 4
Endowment, Economic Structure
and the Structure of Financial
Systems
4.1 Introduction
There is a growing consensus that the financial system is central to the process
of economic development. Theoretical as well as empirical studies have overwhel-
mingly shown that a well functioning financial system is crucial in providing for
and sustaining the process of economic development.1 By agglomerating savings
and exploiting funds for investment, by collecting and producing information, thus
reducing asymmetric information, and by pooling, trading and diversifying risks,
a well developed financial system ensures that resources flow to growth enhancing
activities. Not only does it exert a first order impact on growth, but it also plays
an important role in reducing the inequality of available opportunities(Levine, 2011;
Levine and Demirguc-Kunt, 2008).
A question that logically follows, therefore, is what determines financial develop-
ment? Various factors have been suggested, chief among them being political sys-
1Levine (2005) provides a thorough review of the literature.
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tem (see, among others, Rajan and Zingales (2003b); Girma and Shortland (2008)),
contract enforcement and, in particular, the efficiency of the legal system (Porta
et al. (1998)) and openness to international trade (see, for instance, (Do and Lev-
chenko, 2007)). A related, and particularly contentious issue, is how to design a
well-functioning financial system(Levine, 2005). This discussion is often couched in
terms of whether it is a market-based or a bank-based financial system that is su-
perior in delivering the key financial services. A vast literature has emerged around
this debate. The results, however, are generally inconclusive. Some of the literature
finds that financial structure does not matter for economic growth at all (see, among
others,Beck and Levine (2000); Levine et al. (2001); Ndikumana (2005)), others
show a bank-based system to be better placed in facilitating growth (Rioja and Va-
lev (2011)), and yet others find that a market-based system is superior(Weinstein
and Yafeh, 1998).
The validity of these debates and the insights they provide hinges on the implicit
assumption that financial structure is exogenously given. It is almost customary in
these debates to assume financial structures are given, and the analysis, therefore,
is on which of the two is inherently superior in promoting growth and development.
What if, however, the structure of the financial system itself evolves with the level
of economic development? Under such circumstances, it is generally misleading
to consider a given financial structure as inherently superior to the other. Lin
et al. (2009) provides this line of argument. The starting point of their theory
is that financial systems owe their existence to demand from the real sector of
the economy. Although a financial system may not automatically respond to the
demand from the real sector of the economy, they evolve to meet the financial needs
and to ameliorate specific informational frictions within an economy. Financial
systems have a comparative advantage in solving specific types of informational
friction and/or in providing financial needs to firms of differing sizes and of differing
risk distributions. Since the structure of the economy changes, it is plausible that
the optimal financial structure also evolves, primarily in line with the financial needs
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of the real sector of the economy.
Does the financial system evolve consistent with the dictates of the structure of
the real sector? A question as to what, in general, determines the structure of the
financial system is important, specifically for developing countries that often seek
information on how to design their financial systems. However, there is generally
limited information on this issue.2 IIn particular, empirical studies examining the
link between the structure of the economy and the financial system are few. This
paper aims to fill this gap, by providing an empirical examination of the impact
of economic structure on the structure of the financial system. We show that the
structure of the real sector of the economy has an important first order impact on the
structure of the financial system. Allen et al. (2007), to my knowledge, is the only
empirical study that investigates the link between economic and financial structures.
However, we use a better measure of the structure of the economy and employ an
innovative method to deal with the issue of the endogeneity of the structure of the
economy. We infer a country’s comparative advantage and hence economic structure
from its exports. Employing the Rajan and Zingales (1998) type of argument, we
then compute the financial structure embedded in a country’s exports and hence its
comparative advantage.
This essay is related to different strands of the existing literature. First, it is
related to the broader literature examining the link between financial structure and
economic growth. As noted, this literature has been contentious, often with conflic-
ting findings. The premise in the existing literature is that the financial structure
is given, and determined by something exogenous to the economic system. This pa-
per, however, poses the question as to what determines the structure of a country’s
financial system and provides empirical evidence that the financial system is itself
driven by the structure of the economy. The paper is also related to a literature
that investigates the link between financial development and international trade.
2The evolution of financial system has, however, attracted the theoretical examinations (see,
for instance, Boyd and Smith (1998), Blackburn et al. (2005), Chakraborty and Ray (2006)).
127
Do and Levchenko (2007) examine the impact of trade on financial development by
employing an innovative methodology. The paper demonstrates that countries that
have comparative advantage in external financial dependent industries are likely to
have a well developed financial system. Our paper extends this question and me-
thodology to study the importance of comparative advantage on the structure of a
country’s financial system. In particular, as noted above, we show that countries
that have a comparative advantage in equity dependent industries foster the deve-
lopment of capital markets while those with comparative advantage in bank-finance
dependent industries foster a bank based financial system. Beck (2003) studies
whether countries with a well-developed financial system develop comparative ad-
vantage in external finance dependent industries, and finds supporting evidence for
this. In this paper, however, we ask a related but a reverse question as to whether
endowment determined comparative advantage shapes the structure of the financial
system.
To anticipate our results, we show that the structure of the economy exerts
an important and significant causal effect on the evolution of the structure of the
financial system. As per our estimate, the elasticity is in fact large, ranging from
-0.9 to -1.9, depending on the model. The empirical findings withstand an array of
robustness checks. We also provide some additional results. First we are interested
to see if the impact of economic structure on financial structure in SSA differs from
its effect in other regions. We do not find any significant difference between countries
in SSA and those in other regions in terms of the impact of economic structure on the
structure of the financial system. Secondly, we investigated if there is any structural
break in its effect, in particular since 1990, but found no such pattern.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 4.2 provides a discussion of
the link between economic growth and financial structure, where we discuss how the
optimal structure of the financial system changes with the structure of the economy.
Section 4.3 discusses the econometric methodology used and introduces the data
sources. This section provides a detailed discussion of the measures of economic and
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financial structure used in the essay. The section also discusses the instrumentation
strategy used to deal with the potential endogeneity of economic structure. Section
4.4 provides and discusses the estimation results. The section starts with a base-
line result where we provide our estimation results without addressing the issue of
endogeneity of economic structure. We then present results based on instrumenting
economic structure using its two year lagged values. This is followed by our main
result, where we instrument economic structure using the instrumentation strategy
discussed in section 4.3. We also present further results in this section. First, we
examine if the impact of economic structure on the structure of financial system is
different for Sub-Saharan African countries compared to other regions. Secondly,
we see if there is structural break in the effect post 1990. The section concludes
by discussing the results of some robustness checks. Section4.5 summarizes and
concludes.
4.2 Literature Review
The role of financial systems in the process of economic development has, for a long
time, attracted the interests of economists. Some consider it integral to the process
of economic growth and structural transformation, while others view it as just a side-
show of the real sector of the economy. A vast literature has emerged examining
the link between finance and growth. Both theoretical as well as empirical studies
have now overwhelmingly shown that a well functioning financial system is crucial
to stimulating and sustaining the process of economic development.3
A well functioning financial system does so by providing the following key func-
tions(Levine, 1997). First, it mobilizes savings and provides funds for investment.
Secondly, it collects and processes information about entrepreneurs, industries and
sectors of the economy, thus facilitating the flow of resources to their best possible
uses. Thirdly, the financial system monitors investors and exerts corporate gover-
3See gain Levine (2005).
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nance, making sure that resources are put to their optimal uses. Fourth, it manages
and diversifies cross-sectional, inter-temporal and liquidity risks. By so doing, it
encourages investors to part with their resources and entrepreneurs and borrowers
to engage in high-risk and high-return activities such as innovation. Finally, a well
developed financial system facilitates payments and hence specialization and enga-
gement in trade.
Financial systems are diverse both across time and space.4 They range from
where the financial landscape is dominated by banks (and at times by just few of
them) to where it is dominated by markets. This observation, first systematically
documented by Goldsmith (1969) and expanded by subsequent studies resurrected
an old-age, but yet unresolved, issue: which type of financial system serves these
functions best and is, therefore, well equipped in facilitating the process of economic
development? The debate has evolved over the many years since then, and Levine
(2002a) identifies four strands in the literature. There are those who argue that a
bank-based financial system is better placed in enhancing growth and development.5
Others argue that it is instead a market-based system(i.e., the Anglo-Saxon type of
financial system where the stock market dominates) that does the job well. Yet there
are those who view this bifurcation as part of a wrong-headed and misplaced debate.
In particular, the financial services view underscores that it is not the structure of
the financial system that matters for growth and development. Instead it is the
level of overall financial development that one should pay attention to. Within this
latter category, there are those who argue that it is the legal system that matters
and actually also determines the financial system itself.
It is important to be clear about the arguments employed by the proponents of
each of these views.6 The proponents of a bank-based financial system argue that
4Beck and Demirguc-Kunt (2010) provides up-todate evidence on this issue.
5Greschenkron (1962) is often mentioned as the pioneers of this view. Nevertheless, Greschen-
kron was not comparing a bank-based financial system with a market-based. Rather, he examined
the key role of universal banking in facilitating the process of industrialization in Germany, and
how it was superior to the UK type of banking system.
6It is interesting to note, in passing, that the bank-based versus market-based approach is
mainly based on the discussion of the comparative advantage of one system over the other. The
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banks are well-suited to undertaking the above mentioned key financial services.
Information production, as noted above, is one of the key mechanisms through which
financial systems aid the process of economic development. However, information
is largely a public good and hence its production is vulnerable to the free-rider
problem. Consequently it is likely to be underproduced, with serious consequences
for the efficient allocation of resources.
The proponents of a bank-based view, however, argue that this problem is par-
ticularly acute in a market based system since private information will quickly be
disseminated through changes in stock prices (Grossman and Stiglitz, 1980). Speci-
fically, when individuals who have (positive) private information about a company
start to buy its stock, prices will rise, sending a signal to other market participants
that the company is probably doing well and worth investing in. Hence, market
participants can just observe the price movement and get the necessary information
without incurring any explicit costs in its production. In the extreme, all market
participants may decide to sit and wait for others to generate such information,
resulting in no information being produced. In a bank based system, however, in-
formation obtained about, say a firm, remains more or less an exclusive property of
the bank that generates it.7 As such, a bank-based financial system is better placed
to overcome this problem and hence incentivize information production.
Corporate control and governance provide another key mechanism through which
financial systems facilitate economic growth. Financial systems monitor managers
and investors to make sure that the capital raised is put to their best use and that
managers exert the necessary effort towards ensuring the success of the project.
Concentrated ownership is an important pre-requisite for effective corporate gover-
nance and control (cite reference). Proponents of a bank-based view note that banks,
financial services view, however, appears to have been driven by the empirical studies that find a
lack of importance of financial structure for economic growth.
7Note that there is an informational spill-over issue here too to some degree. For instance, when
a bank offers a loan contract to a firm, other banks can infer that the company is worth investing.
They, therefore, can offer a more competitive price, thus poaching firms away from the first mover
bank. This may cultivate a culture where banks are reluctant to be first movers.
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as major debt holders, have an incentive to do this much more aggressively than
stock market investors. This is so for a number of reasons. Diffuse shareholders are
likely to find it difficult to co-ordinate the task of monitoring and ensure adequate
corporate governance. In fact, in view of the public good nature of monitoring, there
is a high inventive to free-ride on others. Further, shareholders have generally less
interest in paying close attention to the firm as they can sell and move away from the
firm at any time. That is, shareholders have a weaker attachment to their company
than a bank does to its borrower. Hence, the proponents of this view note that a
bank-based system has an edge over a market-based one in exercising monitoring
and corporate control.
The advocates of a market based view, however, counteract these arguments.
They note that individual investors may not have to exert too much effort to monitor
firms/borrowers since a stock market has a powerful mechanism to do this. Through
take-over threat, stock markets ensure that managers are kept on their toes to make
sure the firm performs well. Hence, this will force them to undertake actions that
are consistent with that of shareholders, and ensuring that resources are put to
their best uses.8 The proponents of this view go further and note that a bank based
system is, in fact, ineffective in undertaking this task, since banks and managers
of a firm often collude to protect the firm from take-over and restructuring, thus
obstructing the flow of resources to where they should optimally be.
Finally, the proponents of the two views also disagree on which type of financial
system performs a better job of trading and diversifying risk. Stock market vests the
responsibility of managing risk directly on to the individual. Further, a liquid stock
market provides individuals with a large pool of assets to choose from and hence
a better chance of diversifying cross-sectional risks. On the contrary, in a bank
based system, individuals generally have access to a limited range of assets and
8However, many argue that it is ineffective. Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) cites the incentive
issue. Further, Singh (1999) also provides empirical evidence that take over is systematically biased
against small firm. Hence, it is just the large firms that survive, not necessarily the most efficient
ones.
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instruments, typically demand, time and savings deposits, and hence limited ability
to diversify cross-sectional risks. In fact, as a consequence of their limited ability
to diversify such risks, banks generally tend to be very cautious in their investment
decisions. As a result, firms are less likely to invest in high-risk high-return activities
such as R&D in a bank-based financial system than in a market based one. On
the other hand, Allen and Gale (1997) argue that financial intermediaries (i.e., a
bank based system) are superior in regard to intertemporal risk diversifications as
compared to a market based system. Indeed, they note that the presence of a
market based system may prohibit the emergence of such an institution and hence
intertemporal risk diversifications.
The financial service view, on the other hand, argues that the market-based ver-
sus the bank-based debate neglects an important point. That it is the functioning of
the financial system that matters for economic growth, and its structure is of mar-
ginal importance. The legal theory of finance further sharpens this view by arguing
that it is the efficiency of the legal system and its enforcement that matters for
financial development as well as for its effectiveness in promoting economic growth.
Hence, as per this view, again the market based versus bank-based debate represents
a futile discussion.
These debates have generated a vast empirical literature examining which finan-
cial system performs best. Thus, providing a summary of it is worthwhile.9 Beck
and Levine (2000) employ industry as well as firm level data to examine this issue,
and find that financial structure does not matter at all. Remarkably, they find that
this is so regardless of a country’s level of economic development. One would have
expected a bank-based (market-based) financial system to enhance creation of new
and the expansion of existing firms in low(high) income economies, but they find no
such evidence. Similarly, Levine (2002b) employs cross-country regression analysis
to determine whether financial structure matters for growth, and, if so, which struc-
9This literature is vast and we do not do it justice in covering only a fraction of the existing
studies. In the interests of brevity, I will discuss only those most germane to the current analysis.
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ture is best. The paper shows not only that financial structure does not matter for
per capita income growth, but also that it does not matter for countries at different
stages of economic development. That is, essentially the same financial structure
can serve countries at different stages of development. Levine et al. (2001) reach
similar conclusions using country, industry and firm level data. Employing data on
about 100 countries over the years 1965-1997, Ndikumana (2005) shows that while
financial development has a positive and significant effect on domestic investments,
its structure does not have a significant effect.
Interestingly, empirical evidence in favor of the importance of financial structure
also abounds in the literature. For instance, using a firm level study, Tadesse (2006)
shows that financial structure matters for innovation and hence the growth of firms.
In particular, he finds that a market-based financial system is better suited in en-
hancing innovation by firms in informationly intensive sectors. This is consistent
with Allen and Gale (1999) who argue that a market based system is well-suited to
financing activities where there is a diversity of opinion. Rioja and Valev (2011) em-
ploy a system Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) on a cross-country data to
see if financial structure matters for capital accumulation and productivity growth.
They find that, for developing countries, banking sector development has a positive
and significant effect on both capital and productivity growth while stock market
development do not affect either of these two variables. In developed countries,
on the other hand, stock market development affects both productivity and capital
growth, while banking sector development affects capital growth alone. Hence, they
show that the importance of financial structure for economic growth depends on the
stages of development. Interestingly, this is in sharp contrast with the findings of
Ndikumana (2005). Carlin and Mayer (2003) provides firm level evidence in support
of the view that the importance of financial structure depends on the level of deve-
lopment. Whereas a bank-based system is better suited for countries at a lower level
of economic development, it is the market based system that does a better job in
countries at higher stages of economic development. Recently, Cull and Xu (2011)
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report similar results. Employing firm level data they find that a bank-based finan-
cial system facilitates firm growth in low income countries while a stock market is
well suited to facilitating firm growth in high income countries. Interestingly, again,
this is in contrast to the findings reported in Levine et al. (2001).
Weinstein and Yafeh (1998) provide a detailed study of Japanese firms which
are customers of the main banks. They find that these firms are less profitable, do
not grow faster and in general pay higher interest rates than firms without a main
bank. They argued that not only do banks extract large rents from these firms,
they also encourage prudence and are likely to reduce the flow of resources to high-
risk and high return activities such as R&D and innovation. They made a forceful
observation that “[i]n the absence of contestable capital markets, large banks with
close ties to industry siphon profits and restrict investment, and thus may inhibit
rather than encourage growth” (Ibid:p666).10
From the above discussion, it is fair to say that the empirical as well as the
theoretical evidence on the link between financial structure and economic growth is
at best inconclusive. This is perhaps not surprising in view of the way the argu-
ments are often framed. Most of these studies investigate whether a given financial
structure is inherently superior to the other. Various theoretical studies, however,
show that the importance of one financial system relative to the other changes with
a country’s level of development. For instance, Blackburn et al. (2005) provide
a theoretical model describing the evolution of the structure of financial systems.
They model households that face both adverse selection, in that they do not know
the project selected by the borrower, and moral hazard, in that they do not know
the effort exerted. They show how the optimal contract to deal with these problems
depends on the stages of a country’s economic development. In particular, debt
dominated finance is an optimal contract at a low level of economic development
while equity dominated financing is an optimal contractual arrangement for econo-
10 Similarly, Yafeh and Yosha (2003), using Japanese chemical firms, provides some evidence
that firms with main bank reduces expenditure on research and development.
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mies at a higher stage of development. Consequently, the size of the equity market
increases as the economy develops. Boyd and Smith (1998) and Greenwood and
Smith (1997), in a similar fashion, provide theoretical models that demonstrate how
specific financial structures evolve to solve specific problems at different stages of
economic development.
In addition to the theoretical studies, country experience reveals that the evolu-
tion of financial structure occurs with the level of economic development. A fruitful
research question to investigate, therefore, is whether the optimal structure of the
financial system changes with the stages of economic development. Lin et al. (2009)
provides a synthesis of this line of argument. Unlike the existing studies on finance
and growth wherein the financial system, and in particular its structure, is often
assumed to be exogenously determined, this paper proposes a demand side theory
of the development of financial systems. With some risk of simplification, the thesis
is based on three key arguments. Firstly, and an important point of departure of
the paper, is that financial systems owe their existence primarily to the demand
from the real sector of the economy. Secondly, the nature of the financial needs and
informational friction changes with the structure of the economy. Thirdly, different
financial institutions have differing comparative advantages in providing different
types of financial services and dealing with different types of financial frictions. As
a result, the optimal structure of the financial system changes depending on the
stages of the country’s economic development.
Although Lin et al. (2009) provides an excellent synthesis of these arguments, it
is worthwhile to elaborate further on each of the lines of arguments. The idea that
the financial sector of the economy owes its existence to the demand from the real
sector of the economy is perhaps plain enough to warrant further discussion.11 The
nature of the financial needs of an economy changes with the level of its develop-
ment. The size and risk distributions of firms are among the key determinants of the
nature of financial demand. Interestingly, these distributions change with the stages
11Boyd and Prescott (1986) provide a formalization of this theory.
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of economic development(Lin et al., 2009). Countries with abundant unskilled labor
and limited capital have a comparative advantage and, all else the same, likely to
specialize in labor intensive industries. These types of industries are often in techno-
logically mature sectors. That is, most of the production involves adopting and, to a
lesser extent adapting, technologies that have been tried and tested in other parts of
the world. Hence, there are relatively limited product and technological innovation
risks (Lin et al., 2009; Acemoglu and Zilibotti, 1997). As Lin et al. (2009) notes, the
main risk faced by these types of firms is entrepreneurial risk. Further, the size (in
terms of capital stock) distribution of firms in these economies are in general posi-
tively skewed. Financial structure, therefore, evolves to serve the financial needs of
these types of industries. In particular, the nature of the risk distribution of firms in
such economies implies that debt financing and entrepreneurial screening is the main
task of financial systems. Hence, the appropriate (optimal) financial structure for
these types of economies is likely to be bank, and in general, debt finance dominated
ones, with financial systems that best serve small sized enterprises.
The size and risk distribution of firms change with the comparative advantage
of countries. In particular, as economies develop, they become abundant in capital
stock and skilled labor force. They, therefore, have comparative advantage and
hence specialize in capital and skill intensive types of activities. These activities
are generally in industries that are at the frontiers of their technologies. Such firms
are constantly engaged in pushing frontiers of these technologies. Hence they are
often in Research and Development (R&D) activities, and therefore face substantial
innovation and product risks. Contrary to the size distribution of firms in labour
intensive industries, these industries tend to require capital wise large firms. The
size distribution of these firms, therefore, is largely negatively skewed. Hence, they
need a financial system with a large degree of risk taking and with a large size of
loan. Large banks and a well developed financial markets are likely to be suited to
economies at this stage of development (Allen and Gale, 1999). In a nutshell, the
structure of the financial system evolves with the structure of the economy.
137
It is important to note that a demand-side theory of financial systems evolution
does not necessarily imply that the financial system automatically responds to the
demand of the real sector of the economy. Financial systems may fail to evolve
with the structure of the real sector for various reasons. Chief among them is the
action and/or inaction of government. As is well known from the financial repression
literature, governments, particularly those in developing countries, often intervene
in the financial sector to direct credit to favored sectors. This have the potential
to weaken the alignment of the financial structure with the structure of the real
sector, except in special cases where the intervention channels credit to the sectors
in which the country has a comparative advantage. 12 At the same time, inaction
of government can also block financial systems from evolving in response to the
dictates of the real sector of the economy. For instance, the emergence of a given
financial system may require specific legal infrastructure to be in place. Such activity,
however, generally falls within the realm of the task of the governments. A failure
of the government to respond to fill this legal vacuum may hinder the emergence of
the appropriate financial system. Nevertheless, conditioning on these obstacles, an
economy’s financial structure is likely to be driven by the needs of its real sector.
4.3 Empirical Strategy and Data
4.3.1 Empirical Strategy
Equation (4.1) gives the empirical model we seek to estimate.
FSct = β1 + β2 ∗ EXPFSct + β3 ∗ Zct + εct (4.1)
FSct, which is discussed in more detail below, is a measure of the financial
12Lin et al. (2009) also note how policies aimed to remedy financial repression often have had
distortive effects. In reforming the financial systems, most developing countries are often advised
to look at and learn from the financial systems in developed countries, such as the US, with a
market based system. This, however, is unlikely to lead to the development of financial structure
that is compatible with the needs of these economies.
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structure of country c in year t. We discuss the concept and measurement of the
financial structure in section 4.3.1. EXPFSct, also discussed below, is a measure
of the structure of the economy of country c in year t. The parameter of interest
is β2, which measures the impact of the structure of the real sector of the economy
on the structure of the financial system. If a comparative advantage determines the
financial structure, as argued by Lin et al. (2009), β2 is different from zero. For
instance, countries with comparative advantage in industries that are bank finance
dependent (as compared to equity finance dependent) are more likely to develop a
bank-based financial system, and vice versa.
Zct comprises other control variables believed to determine the financial struc-
ture, and εct is the error term for which standard assumptions are made. We follow
suggestions in the theoretical literature to guide us on which variables to include
in Z. First, Blackburn et al. (2005) and Boyd and Smith (1998) provide a model
showing how equity market activity increases only after certain level of economic
development. We include per capita income to control for the income level and GDP
to control for the size of the economy. We also include a measure of urbanization,
captured by the ratio of urban population in total population. Secondly, consistent
with the legal theory of finance (see, for instance, Porta et al. (1998)), we include
a dummy for the origin of a country’s legal system. Thirdly, we include a measure
of political freedom, the Polity2 variable, as discussed in essay three of this thesis.
Finally, we include other proxies for the structure of the economy, in particular the
shares of industry and agriculture in total GDP.
Measures of Economic and Financial Structures
The above discussion raises a key question of how to measure the structure of the
economy and of the financial system. This sub-section provides a discussion of these
measures. We start with the measure of economic structure. Since our aim is to see
the impact of economic structure on the evolution of the structure of the financial
system, the ideal measure of economic structure should be something that captures
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the size and risk distribution of enterprises in the economy. Nevertheless, such a
measure is difficult to compute or obtain, and a simple sectoral composition of the
GDP is most definitely not an option. We rely on the following three premises to
get a proxy for this. First, the structure of a country’s economy at a given point
in time is determined by its comparative advantage. Following the Heckscher-Ohiln
theory, countries specialize in and export goods and services in which they have a
comparative advantage. Hence, all else the same, a country’s comparative advantage
can be inferred from its export structure. Secondly, economic sectors and activities
have differing needs for different mixes of finance. For instance, as noted inAllen and
Gale (1997), economic activities that engage in high risk and high return projects,
one of the key attributes of innovating firms, are better served by a market-based
financial system. Hence, countries with comparative advantage in such activities
have stronger demand for and are better served with stock markets. Conversely,
activities and sectors that engage in the production of goods and services using
mature technologies are likely to be better served by the banking sector. Therefore,
we capture the structure of the economy by the implied financial structure embedded
within its profile of exports.
In particular, in estimating EXPFS we follow the approach taken by Do and
Levchenko (2007). Do and Levchenko (2007) study the impact of trade on financial
development, with the specific objective to determine if countries that have com-
parative advantage in goods that are dependent on external finance are more likely
to have a well developed financial sector. To that end, they estimate the external
financial dependence of a country’s export by appealing to the notion of financial
dependence developed and used in Rajan and Zingales (1998). Rajan and Zingales
(1998) argue that different sectors have a different technologically determined degree
of dependence on external finance. Furthermore, this technologically determined le-
vel of dependence on external finance is assumed to be country invariant, in the
sense that a technology that is external financial dependent in the U.S. is likely to
be so in, say, South Sudan. Since U.S. has a well developed financial sector, Rajan
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and Zingales (1998) argue that the external finance dependence of industries in the
U.S. may represent this technologically determined optimal level of external finan-
cial dependence, in particular taking the 1980s as the optimal years. The approach,
therefore, is to use the 1980s values of external financial dependence of U.S firms
and apply it to the same industry in other countries.
We follow a similar approach, but estimate the financial structure of the exports
instead of its external financial dependence. More specifically, the following equation
gives our estimate of EXPFSct:
EXPFSct =
∑
i
wit ∗ FSIi (4.2)
where wit is the share of the industry
13 i in country c’s total export for year t. FSIi
is the financial structure of industry i in the U.S. More specifically, it is the equity
finance dependence of industry i (again, with industry being defined at the three
digit SIC) in the U.S., measured as the fraction of capital expenditure financed
through issuance of new equity. Following Rajan and Zingales (1998), we take the
median value of this variable during the 1980s, and only firms that have at least
four years of non-missing data are included in constructing this variable.14
It is important to be clear about the measure of economic structure, in particular
that it is the product of a constant indicator (i.e., the average equity ratio for each
industry–FSIi) and the changing product composition of a country’s export. A
specific example may help to clarify this. Consider a country that exports three (at
the three digit levels Standard Industrial Classification) products, viz., X, Y and Z.
Corresponding to each of these products is three different levels of equity dependence
given, respectively, by FSIX , FSIY , and FSIZ . Calculating the measure of a
country’s economic structure involves two steps. The first step is to gauge each
product’s dependence on equity, obtained by multiplying the share of a product in
13Note that industry is here defined at three digit Standard Industrial Classification (SIC).
14The other option to explore in the future would be to use the ratio of equity dependence of
industry i in the US to the same industry’s bank dependence in Germany/Japan.
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a country’s total export by the product’s equity dependence. Hence, for product X,
this is given by:
FSIX ∗
(
X
X + Y + Z
)
15
.Call this PFSXt, where X is the product (at three digit SIC) and t is year. In the
second step, for each country, we take the sum of PFSkt across all products, k, and
that gives our measure of economic structure, EXPFSct.
To examine the behavior of EXPFSct both across time and space, it is important
to closely look at PFSkt. In particular, consider a specific product, X. As noted,
the equity dependence measure for this product does not change across time and
space, as it is the average of X’s equity dependence in the US during the 1980s.
Yet, the composite indicator, PFSXt, varies across time and countries. It varies
across countries because the share of X in a country’s total export may differ from
its share in that of another country. It varies over time because the importance of
X in a country’s export may change overtime. Since our final measure of economic
structure, EXPFSct, is the sum of the index over all individual products, it too
varies across space and time for these two reasons. However, EXPFSct also changes
because of the possible overtime change in the composition of goods a country
exports. That is, for instance, country A’s comparative advantage may shift and, as
a result, a less equity dependent product may drop out of its export and be replaced
by a new and more equity dependent product, thereby increasing the aggregate
measure of its economic structure.
An important upshot of the above discussion is that the equity dependence data
from the US just serve as a scaling factor, indicating the degree of implied financial
structure embedded in a country’s comparative advantage in each year. The varia-
tion of the measure of our economic structure is primarily because of the change
in the composition of export product and the share in total exports of a particular
product over time.
15Note that the expression in bracket corresponds to wt, in equation (4.4), for product X.
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Some of the potential drawbacks of our measure of economic structure may
be evident from the above discussion. Firstly, by relying on a country’s export
as an indicator of its comparative advantage, the measure assumes away the fact
that exports could possibly reflect policy distortion and not exclusively comparative
advantage. Secondly, by concentrating on the exports of goods, our measure not
only ignores the non-exporting sectors but also the increasingly important service
sector exports. Finally, another key potential weakness is the use of a particular
country’s equity dependence over a particular decade in calculating the measure
of economic structure. Although this methodology has been used in many studies
examining the impact of financial development on various outcome measures, this
is admittedly open to both criticism and improvements. Nevertheless, with all its
limitations, we believe that this measure better captures the economic structure of
a country for the specific issue at hand. In particular, it reflects better the structure
of the economy than using the shares of different sectors of the economy in total
GDP. The fact that it offers a better instrumentation strategy is another added
advantage of this measure. One potential problem with using some measure of
sectoral composition of GDP is that there is an issue of endogeneity, emanating,
for instance, from a possible reverse causality running from financial structure to
the sectoral composition of GDP. Hence, causal inference requires using appropriate
instruments, which are often hard to come by, as discussed in Allen et al. (2007).
Our measure, however, allows us to exploit an innovative instrumentation strategy,
as discussed below.
The other measurement issue is our dependent variable. Financial structure is
an all inclusive concept and can mean various things.16 It may mean the mix of
the different financial institutions (i.e., intermediaries and markets). It may also
mean the distribution within a particular type of institution with respect to certain
variables; for instance, the size or age distribution of banks. In the bulk of existing
studies, financial structure is often taken to mean the relative importance of bank
16Lin et al. (2009) provides an interesting discussion of the concept of financial structure.
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and market in a country’s financial system. We follow the same concept of financial
structure. Various measures have been proposed to capture this (see, (Levine, 2002b)
for a discussion of these measures). We use three of the measures commonly used
in the literature. First, we use a measure designed to capture the relative size of a
country’s banking sector to the size of its stock market. This measure is given by
the ratio of bank credit to the private sector as a fraction of GDP to the market
capitalization of the stock market as a fraction of GDP, where market capitalization
is defined as the total value of shares listed in the stock exchange.17 Following the
literature, we call this measure the size structure, and it measures the extent to
which a country’s financial system is bank based. A higher value of this measure,
therefore, indicates a more bank based financial system, and vice versa. Second, we
use a measure constructed to capture the relative activity of a country’s banking
sector to its stock market. This measure is given by the ratio of bank credit to the
private sector as a fraction of GDP to stock market value traded as a fraction of
GDP, stock market value traded being the annual turnover of the stock market in
the country. Again following the literature, we call this the activity structure of the
financial system, and again, a higher value indicates a financial system with more
active banking sector relative to the stock market. Finally, we construct a combined
measure of financial structure, given by the first principal component18 of the size
structure and activity structure of the financial systems.
17GDP cancels out since both the numerator and denominator are as a fraction of GDP.
18This is essentially a weighted average of the size structure and size activity where the weights
are the eigan vectors of the covariance matrix of the two variables. More formally, consider n
observations on p variables X = (x1, x2, ...xp), with a covariance matrix of Θ. Define the first
principal component of the variables as a weighted linear combinations, given by:
PC1 = a
T
i X =
p∑
i=1
ai1xi
The weight, a, is chosen such that it maximizes the variance of PC1 = a
TΘa, subject to aTa = 1
(see Shlens (2009) for a detailed description of principal component analysis).
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Endogeneity of Economic Structure and Instrumentation Strategy
As it is, EXPFSct can be a good measure of a country’s economic structure for the
issue at hand. An important question, however, is if the coefficient of β lends itself to
a causal interpretation. This may not be the case since EXPFSct is potentially cor-
related with εct in equation 4.1. First, there is a possibility of reverse causation from
financial structure to the structure of a country’s export. That is, it is possible that
countries with a bank-based financial system may develop a comparative advantage
in sectors that are debt finance dependent.19 Second, EXPFS is not a perfect mea-
sure of the structure of the economy. Hence there is an issue of measurement error,
leading to a possible correlation between the error term and EXPFS. Finally, it is
possible that both financial structure and the structure of the economy are driven
by unobservable variables that are in some way correlated.20 Do and Levchenko
(2007) provide an innovative instrumentation strategy, by exploiting a strategy first
used in Frankel and Romer (1999).We follow similar strategy here. More specifically,
this involves instrumenting EXPFS by a measure constructed using the values of
export predicted from an estimated gravity model. The procedure therefore is as
follows. First, the predicted values of export are obtained from equation 4.3. wit is
then constructed based on these predicted values.
We estimate the following gravity type model to obtain the predicted values of
exports:
EXPxodt = lnareao + lnaread + lndist+ contig + comlangoff + lngdpdt (4.3)
+lnpopdt + contig ∗ lngdpdt + lndist ∗ comlangoff + lndist ∗ lngdpdt
+comlangoff ∗ lngdpdt + comlangoff ∗ lnpopdt + lndist ∗ lnpopdt + εit
19Although not specifically about financial structure, Beck (2003) finds that countries with well
developed financial system are likely to develop comparative advantage in external financial de-
pendent sectors.
20Of course, in so far as these unobservables are time-invariant and country specific, fixed effect
estimator of β is still consistent. The problem, however, is that some of the unobservable could
possible be time variant.
145
where EXPxodt is country o’s export of commodity x, at three digit Standard Indus-
trial Classification (SIC), to country d in year t, deflated by the exporting country’s
GDP; lnareao and lnaread are the natural log of the area of the exporting and
importing countries, respectively; lndist is the natural log of the distance between
the major cities of the importing and exporting countries; contig is a dummy taking
the value of 1 if the importing and exporting countries are contiguous, and zero
otherwise; comlangoff is a dummy taking the value of 1 if the two trading coun-
tries have a common official language, and zero otherwise; lngdpdt is the natural log
of importing country’s GDP; contig ∗ lngdpdt is the interaction term between the
dummy of contiguity between the two countries and the GDP of the importing coun-
try; lndist ∗ comlangoff is the interaction term between distance between the two
countries and dummy of common official language between them; lndist ∗ lngdpdt
is the interaction term of distance between the two countries and the GDP of the
importing country; lngdpdt + comlangoff is the interaction term of dummy of com-
mon official language and the GDP of the importing country; comlangoff ∗ lnpopdt
is the interaction term of dummy of common official language and the population
of the importing country; lndist ∗ lnpopdt is the interaction term between the dis-
tance between the major cities of the two countries and the size of the population
of the importing country; and εit is the error term. We estimate equation (4.3) at
three digit Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) and use the estimated model
to predicted the value of export, ÊXP xeit.
21 We then use these predicted values to
calculate the new measure of the financial structure embedded in a country’s export,
given as follows:
̂EXPFSct =
∑
i
ŵit ∗ FSIi (4.4)
21One issue in the gravity type of analysis is dealing with observations with zero values, i.e.,
country pair-year observations for which there are no exports. Since our dependent variable is in
natural logarithm, this observations are not part of the estimation of the gravity equation. However,
we use the estimated equation to predict the implied trade for these countries. In short, although
these observations are not part of the estimation of the gravity equation, they are part of the
estimation of ÊXP xeit. This is a conventional strategy followed in the gravity literature(Anderson
and Wincoop, 2003). However, we also estimate the gravity equation replacing zero exports by
one. That is, we estimate ln(1 + EXPxeit), and our result does not change materially.
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where ŵit =
ÊXPxeit∑I
i ÊXPxeit
; I is the total number of commodities exported by country
c in year t, and FSI is as defined earlier.
Therefore, we instrument EXPFSct by ̂EXPFSct. It is important to note
that selection of variables to include in the gravity equation is guided primarily
by the issue of reverse causality. More specifically, since our aim is to construct an
appropriate instrument for our measure of economic structure based on the predicted
values of trade, the validity of the instrument requires that variables that enter the
gravity equation should not directly effect (and be affected by) the structure of the
financial system. Table 4.7 reports estimate of the gravity equation for selected
industries. Most of the coefficients are in line with existing studies (Anderson and
Wincoop, 2001). For instance, the size of the destination country, captured by
population, has a positive effect on bilateral trade; the distance between the two
trading countries has a negative effect on bilateral trade; and contiguity of the two
countries positively affect the bilateral trade flows.
Figure 4.1 provides a scatter plot of our measure of economic structure construc-
ted using actual values of exports against the measure constructed using the predic-
ted values of exports. As can be seen, the two are strongly correlated, hinting that
̂EXPFSct is a relevant instrument for EXPFSct. Figure 4.2 provides the trend in
the measure of economic structure, EXPFSct, and its instrument, i.e., ̂EXPFSct,
indicating that the two variables vary over time.
The instrumentation strategy follows mainly the approach used in (Do and Lev-
chenko, 2007). However, it is important to note the main difference of our strategy.
Do and Levchenko (2007) study the impact of trade on overall financial development,
instrumenting trade using a measure of financial dependence predicted from gravity
type equation. In our case, the objective is to examine the impact of the structure
of the economy on the structure of financial system, and not on the overall financial
financial development. Further, unlike them, our constructed instrument is not the
overall external finance (which includes both equity and debt finance) dependence
of exports, but the equity finance dependence of exports. Therefore, our instrument
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is meant to capture the financial structure embedded in a country’s export rather
than the external finance dependence of it.
Figure 4.1: Scatter plot of Measures of financial dependence of Export based on
actual and predicted trade
4.3.2 Data and Sample Selection
The data used in this chapter come from various sources. The export data comes
from the National Bureau of Economic Research-UN World trade database (Feens-
tra et al., 2005). This database contains bilateral trade data from 1962 to 2000 for
a large set of countries on commodities disaggregated at four digit Standard Inter-
national Trade Classification (SITC) revision 2.22 Per capita income, GDP and its
sectoral composition, and population data come from World Bank sources. Data on
distance between trading countries, area and contiguity of trading countries come
22Since we estimate the equation at three digit SIC code, to estimate the gravity equation,
we convert the trade data to three digit SIC using concordance data provided by Feenstra on
http://cid.econ.ucdavis.edu/data/sasstata/usxss.html.
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from the Centre d’Etudes Prospectives et d’Informations Internationales (CEPII)
databse (Head et al., 2010), while data on the legal origin and a measure of po-
litical freedom come from Quality of Government Data (QoG) at the University
of Gothenburg (Samanni et al., 2010). The data used to calculate the equity de-
pendence are obtained from Datastream. Data on variables used to construct the
measures of financial structure come from the dataset compiled by Thorsten Beck,
Asli Demirg-Kunt and Ross Levine(Beck et al., 2010a).
The selection of countries included in the analysis is determined by data avai-
lability.23 As such, all countries with non-missing data for all of our variables are
included in the analysis. After combining the relevant dataset, we are left with a
total of 86 countries, with the year ranging from 1975 to 2000. Hence, although
the bilateral trade data are available from 1962 to 2000, we use data from 1975
to 2000 to estimate equation 4.3. Table 4.8 provides the list of countries in our
sample. Table 4.1 reports the description of the variables used in the analysis and
also contains some selected summary statistics. The countries in our sample are
diverse in terms of their level of development, with per capita income ranging from
$700 to $48,000, as well as the structure of the financial system, with size structure
of financial system ranging from .17 (stock market dominated) to 500 (bank domi-
nated). The diversity is particularly stark in terms of the activity of the banking
sector relative to the stock market. The activity structure of the financial system
ranges from as low as 0.2 (more active stock market relative banking system) to
67,000 (more active banking system relative to stock market).
4.4 Results and Discussion
This section presents and discusses estimation results of equation 4.1. In section
4.4.1, we present the baseline results where we use estimates of EXPFSct without
23This is with the exception of the U.S. Since we use US equity dependence as a benchmark, the
country is dropped from our sample so that it does not bias our result.
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Figure 4.2: Trend in economic structure- actual and predicted trade
addressing the endogeneity issue. Section 4.4.2 provide the main results, where we
first present estimation result by instrumenting EXPFSct by its two years lagged
values and then discuss the results based on instrumenting the key explanatory
variable for our analysis, EXPFSct, by ̂EXPFSct. We end this section by providing
some further results and robustness check in section 4.4.3.
4.4.1 Baseline Results
Table 4.2 provides fixed effect estimate of equation 4.1 using EXPFS without
dealing with its potential endogeneity. Standard errors are robust to unknown miss-
specification and time and country fixed effects are controlled for in all the models.
Columns (1) through (3) provide results where the dependent variable is size struc-
ture. Column (1) gives result of regressing size structure on just EXPFS. As
can be seen, economic structure enters with a negative and statistically significant
coefficient, indicating that, controlling for country and time fixed effects, countries
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with comparative advantage in equity dependant activities are more likely to have a
market based financial system, all else remaining the same. In fact, since both the
regressor and regressand are in natural logarithm, the point estimates can be inter-
preted as the partial elasticity of financial structure with respect to the structure of
real economy. The point estimate -0.7, therefore, indicates that financial structure
is inelastic with respect to the structure of the economy.
Column (2) of the table gives estimates for the coefficient after controlling for
per capita income, to see if economic structure still remains relevant determinant of
financial structure after controlling of the level of income, in addition to the country
and time fixed effects. As can be seen, the coefficient of our key variable is still
negative and statistically significant at the 10% level. Per capita income also enters
with a negative coefficient, although not significantly different from zero. In column
(3) we control for additional variables, viz., the size of the economy, as captured by
GDP24, urbanization, sectoral compositions of GDP and a measure for democracy.
Our variable of interest enters with negative coefficient, but is not now statistically
significant.
Columns (4) through to (6) of the table provide estimates using activity structure
as the dependent variable. As in the case of the size structure of the financial
system, this measure also captures the importance (but in terms of activity) of the
banking sector relative to that of the stock market. As column (4) shows, where the
regression includes just EXPFS, our variable of interest enters with a negative and
statistically significant coefficient, indicating again a strong association between the
structure of the economy and that of the financial system. The result remains the
same after controlling for per capita income (see column (5)). As column (6) shows,
EXPFS still enters with a negative and significant coefficient after controlling for
a host of variables in addition to country and time fixed effects.
The result is largely similar for combined structure of the financial system as
24We control for GDP since the structure of a country’s financial system potentially depends on
the size of the economy. In particular, forming a stock exchange and the growth of equity market
is viable primarily in a larger economies.
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column (7) to (9) of the table reveals. Again, the coefficient of our variable of
interest is negative and statistically significant, indicating the importance of the
structure of the real sector of the economy in shaping the structure of the financial
sector. Interestingly, the coefficient still remains significant, at least at the 10%
level, after controlling for additional explanatory variables.
One of the drawbacks of fixed effect estimation is that it eliminates time inva-
riant variables. Random effect estimation is handy when one is interested in the
coefficients of such variables. Nevertheless, it comes at a cost in terms of the appro-
priateness and the potential validity of the estimated results. First, random effect
estimation assumes no correlation between unobservable country fixed effects and
the covariates included in the regression. Second and importantly, it assumes that
the panel units are a random draw from a large population, an assumption unlikely
to be met by macroeconomic panel datasets. Nevertheless, we report the results of
the random effects estimation mainly for the sake of completeness, and warning that
the results be interpreted with extreme caution.25
Table 4.3 provides the random effect estimate of equation 4.1. Columns (1) to
(3) gives estimates using the size structure of the financial system as the dependant
variable. Column (1) provides the results where the regression includes only our
variable of interest. As can be seen, economic structure enters with a negative and
statistically significant coefficient. The coefficient of the variable remains effectively
the same after controlling for per capita income, as column (2) shows. Column
(3) provides estimates controlling for the legal origin dummy, and other variables.
As can be seen, the result of our key variable does not change. Interestingly, the
dummy for the Common/British legal origin enters with a negative and statistically
significant coefficient, indicating that countries with a Common/British legal system
are likely to foster larger size of stock markets relative to the banking sector.
Although the point estimate is higher than for the size structure, the result of
25As a matter of fact, as given in table 4.3, Hausman type of test indicates that the Random
Effect Model is not appropriate in this case. Hence, the random effect result is just provided for
the purpose of comparison.
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our key variable is the same for the activity structure of the financial system, as
reported in columns (4) to (6). In all of the three models, the coefficient of the
measure of economic structure is negative and is well determined. Columns (7) to
(9) provide results using combined structure as the dependant variable. As can be
seen, the results are broadly comparable to the estimates obtained using the size and
activity structures. In particular, our variable of interest is negative and significant
in all of the four models.
4.4.2 Results of Instrumental Variable Estimation
The previous sub-section shows that the structure of the real economy has a statisti-
cally significant association with the structure of the financial system. Interestingly,
it remains so even after controlling for a host of important variables believed to de-
termine the structure of the financial system. However, tables 4.2 and 4.3 are based
on a contemporaneous measure of economic structure. As noted in section 4.3.1, a
potential problem with this estimation is the endogeneity of EXPFS. Therefore,
the estimates of the elasticity based on EXPFS may be biased. In this section, we
present results that try to circumvent this problem. First, we instrument EXPFS
by its value lagged by two years. We then present our main result, i.e., instrumen-
ting EXPFS by ̂EXPFSct, a variable constructed using values of exports predicted
from a gravity model.
Estimation Result using Internal Instruments
One of the attractive features of using panel data, in particular one with fairly large
T as in our case, is that it enables one to potentially deal with endogenous variables
by using internal instruments. Revisit our estimable equation (4.1), which, with
some modification can be given by:
FSct = β1 + β2 ∗ EXPFSct + β3 ∗ Zct + µi + εct
All the variables are as defined in equation 4.1, except we have now included µi,
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which is a country fixed effect. In first difference form, and focusing the discussion
on our key variable, EXPFS, this equation is given by:
∆FSct = β1 + β2 ∗∆EXPFSct + ∆εct (4.5)
were ∆yit = yit − yit−1, y being all the variables in the equation.
Consistent estimation of β2 requires that E(∆EXPFSct∆εct) = 0. Hence,
consistent estimation requires obtaining variables that are correlated with ∆EXPFSct
but not with εct. Under the mild assumption of sequential exogeneity,
26 lagged va-
lues of EXPFS present themselves as potential internal instruments. One option is
to use a specific lag, say, a two years lags, of it as an instrument. Anderson and Hsiao
(1982) follow a similar strategy, but in the context of panel models with a lagged
dependant variable among the regressors. Table 4.4 provides the fixed effect esti-
mate of the model, instrumenting EXPFS by its value lagged two years. Columns
(1) to (3) give the estimates using size structure as the dependant variable. From
column (1), our key variable enters with a negative and statistically significant co-
efficient, indicating a marginally inelastic relationship between the size structure of
financial system and the structure of the economy. The coefficient remains negative
and significant even after controlling for additional variables including the size of the
economy, urbanization, sectoral composition of GDP and a measure of democracy.
The table reports roughly similar result for size activity, as column (4) to (6) shows.
Without controlling for other variables, the measure of economic structure enters
with a negative coefficient but is not significant as column (4) shows. However, as
columns (5) and (6) show, our key variable becomes significant when we control for
other variables. Columns (7) to (9) give the result for the combined structure of the
financial system. As can be seen, the measure of economic structure enters with
26Note the difference between sequential and strict exogeneity. Strict exogeneity requires that
E(εit|EXPFSit) = 0∀t. This in effect means that ε at time t is not correlated with EXPFS
at any time t, both lagged and future time. Sequential exogeneity, however, requires that εit be
uncorrelated with the current and past values of EXPFS, but can be correlated with its furture
value. Hence, sequential exogeneity requires that E(εit|EXPFSi1, EXPFSi2...EXPFSis = 0)
where t = s+ 1)
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a negative and statistically significant coefficient, both when it enters the equation
alone as well as with additional control variables.
These results may go some distance in providing reassurance of the fact that the
structure of the real sector of the economy has an important effect on the structure of
the financial system. Consistency of βit, in table 4.4 requires that the instrument be
valid. The instruments need to be relevant, which means that the lag(s) of EXPFS
should be correlated with EXPFS. They should also be exogenous, which in this
case requires that εit is not serially autocorrelated.
27 Test statistics are provided at
the bottom of both tables. The results indicate that the instruments are relevant in
both cases. However, the null of serial autocorrelation of ε is not rejected, except for
few of the models, which means the instruments may not be exogenous and hence
not valid.
Estimation results using External Instrument
We now present our main result, where EXPFS is instrumented by a measure
constructed using a value of export predicted from estimated equation (4.3). Table
4.4 provides the results of a two stage fixed effect estimation method.28 Standard
errors are robust to unknown mis-specification and the model is estimated with Ge-
neralized Method of Moments (GMM). Time fixed effects are also controlled for.
Columns (1) to (3) give the estimation results for the size structure of the financial
system. As column (1) shows, without controlling for other variables apart from the
country and time fixed effects, our variable of interest enters with a negative and
statistically significant coefficient. The elasticity estimate is roughly minus 1, indi-
cating a unitary elastic response of the size structure of the financial system to the
structure of the economy.29 As column (2) shows, controlling for per capita income
27For instance, if ε is an AR(1) process given by, say, εit = αεit−1, it means that εit = α2εit−2.
The E(EXPFSit−2∆εit) = 0 holds only if there is no correlation between contemporaneous values
of EXPF and ε, in which case we shouldn’t have gone for instrumentation in the first place.
28We concentrate on the discussion of the fixed effect estimate for the reason stated in footnote
25
29The size of the coefficient is broadly comparable to some of the estimates provided by (Allen
et al., 2007).
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does not change the result substantially. In column (3) we control for the size of
the economy, the sectoral composition of GDP, urbanization and a measure of de-
mocracy. The coefficient of our key variable essentially remains the same – negative
and well determined. Columns (4) to (6) give the estimation results with activity
structure as the dependent variable. Economic structure enters with a negative and
significant (albeit at 10%) coefficient. Although it ceases to be significant when we
control for per capita income, as column (7) of the table shows, our variable of inter-
est remains significant when we control for an array of other variables. Columns (7)
to (9) give estimate for the combined structure of the financial system. Interestingly
again, our key variable enters with a negative and statistically significant coefficient,
clearly indicating that the structure of the economy exerts a first order effect on the
structure of the financial system.
How valid is the instrument? Identification of β rests on the assumption that
explanatory variables in (4.3) do not belong to equation (4.1). In fact, there is no a
priori reason why the variables included in the gravity equation belong to equation
(4.1). For instance, we do not expect area and population of the importing countries
to directly affect the financial structure of their trading partner. The same holds for
the size of importing country as measured by its GDP. Again, we do not see how
this affects financial structure of the exporting country apart through its effect on
the country’s GDP, which we have already controlled for. Although it is not possible
to formally test given the nature of our instrument, we are fairly confident of the
exclusion restrictions.
The remaining issue, therefore, is the relevance of the instrument. We report a
battery of tests to check for the relevance of the instruments. Results are given at the
bottom of table 4.5. First, we provide the result of underidentification test. Since we
control for unknown misspecification, the appropriate test statistic to report would
be the Kleibergen-Paap F statistic. Under the null hypothesis that our instrument is
weak, this statistic follows a χ2(1). As can be seen, the size of this statistic is fairly
high in all of our models, ranging from 38 to 75. And the corresponding P-values
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indicate that the null of underidentification is decisively rejected in all the models,
indicating that ̂EXPFS is a relevant instrument for EXPFS.
Another key concern is the strength of the instrument. It may be the case that
̂EXPFS is a relevant instrument for EXPFS, but just marginally so. That is, it
may just well be weakly relevant. One interesting observation, however, is that weak
instruments can be a cure worse than the disease (Stock and Yogo, 2005). One of the
problems with weak instruments is that it biases the size of tests. Based on a test
statistic reported, one may think that it is safe to reject or accept a hypothesis at,
say, 5% level of significance. In fact, with weak instruments, the 5% is usually not
the relevant critical value; the actual critical value is often higher than the nominal
value of 5%. Naturally, therefore, one would want to know how far-off the actual
size of the test is from the 5%. The Stock-Yogo critical values enable one to see
this. The Stock-Yogo statistic for a 10% maximal size bias is about 16.4 in our case,
substantially lower than the Kilebergen-Paap statistic reported at the bottom of
the table. The null hypothesis of a weak instrument is, therefore, rejected in all the
cases. Overall, we are confident that our instrument is exogenous as well as relevant.
β, therefore, lends itself to a causal interpretation in the current application.
4.4.3 Further results and Robustness
The previous discussion clearly shows that a country’s economic structure is an
important determinant of the structure of its financial system. In this section, we
provide some further results and conduct some robustness checks. First, we want
to see if there is a regional variation in the importance of comparative advantage
in shaping the structure of the financial system. In particular we are interested in
the case of Sub-Saharan Africa. The number of stock exchange in the region has
increased dramatically over just two decades. By 1989 only seven countries of the
region had a stock exchange. As of 2008, about 26 countries have formed their own
exchanges or joined an existing common stock exchange. Most of these exchanges
are formed primarily through government initiatives so much so that their operation
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is often financed by the state. This led some to question the appropriateness of these
policies and the relevance of encouraging the formation of such exchanges. Singh
(1999), in particular, was vocal and went as far as labeling such venture as a “costly
irrelevance”. On the other hand, there are countries in the region where governments
are vehemently opposed to the formation of stock exchanges and have gone as far
as discouraging the private sector form forming one(Moss, 2003)30. Hence, it is fair
to say that there is significant state interventions designed to shape the structure
of the financial system in the region. It is, however, not clear if these interventions
shaped the structure of the financial system with the needs of the economy, or led to
the emergence of financial enclaves that is not consistent with the structural needs
of the broader economy. It is, therefore, interesting to see if these interventions
have aligned the structure of the financial system with the countries’ comparative
advantage or weakened the role of the country’s real sector in shaping the structure
of the financial system. If the interventions have led to the development of the
financial structure that is not compatible with the needs of the real sector, we
expect the coefficient of EXPFS to be systematically lower in SSA as compared to
its result for other regions.
Secondly, we check if the role of economic structure as the determinant of the
structure of the financial system has declined since the 1990. Some have argued
that one of the key packages of Structural Adjustment Programm (SAP), imposed
on many developing countries in the late 1980s, was the reform of the financial
system(Lin et al., 2009). An integral part of this reform is the formation of stock
exchange even where the economic structure does not necessarily warrant one. If
this indeed is the case, the importance of economic structure in shaping the financial
structure must have declined since 1990s. In addition to these two further results, we
30Ethiopia is a case in point. Inspite of a booming equity market, manifested in the in-
creasing number of companies, ranging from financial to large manufacturing, being formed
through sales of equity issued in unorganized markets, the government often explicitly warns
the private sector from any initiative to form organised stock exchanges, the argument being
that the country does not have the necessary legal and physical infrastructures to do so.
http://www.addisfortune.com/Vol%2010%20No%20486%20Archive/fortune editors note.htm
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also provide some robustness check. In particular, we control for time fixed effects.
We also control for some additional variables that determine financial structure and
see if the results still hold.
We deal with the first issue by including an interaction term between EXPFS
and a dummy for Sub-Saharan Africa. Similarly, for the second issue, we include an
interaction between our key variable and a dummy for post 1990 years. We do two
things as a robustness check. First, to see if the results are driven by outliers, we
remove the top and bottom 1% of the distribution from the measures of economic
and financial structures. Secondly, instead of using Polity2 variable, we use the
Polity variable.31 Table 4.6 provides these results. Columns (1) to (3) provide
the estimation result using size structure as the dependent variable. Removing
the outliers does not appear to make a substantive change to the coefficient of our
key variable. A similar result holds for combined structure, as column (7) shows.
However, the size of the coefficient of our key variable increases for the size activity,
as column (5) of the table shows.
Columns (3), (6) and (9) of the table give the estimates for our model by including
the interaction term of our key variable with a dummy indicating post 1990 period
and SSA region. As can be seen, the coefficient of the interaction term between
economic structure and dummy of post 1990 is positive and is statistically significant,
except for size structure. This again hints to the fact that comparative advantage has
been somehow sidelined in the post 1990s as determinant of the financial structure.
The interaction term between our key variable and the dummy of Sub-Saharan
Africa is not significantly different from zero, indicating that being in Sub-Saharan
Africa does not substantially weaken the importance a country’s economic structure
in shaping the structure of its financial system. This indicates that the interventions
perhaps did not move the structure of the financial system in the region a way from
what is implied by comparative advantage. As can be seen, in all these cases, our
variable of interest enters with a negative and statistically significant coefficient,
31See table 4.1 for the difference between the two variables.
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with a measure of elasticity ranging between 1.5 to 2.4 in absolute terms. As given
in the bottom of the table, our instrument is still strong and valid. All in all, this
reassures us that the structure of the economy is a key determinant of a country’s
financial structure.
4.5 Conclusions
There is a large volume of theoretical and empirical evidence showing that the
financial system is integral to the process of economic development. One of the
key outstanding issues is how to put in place a well-functioning financial system.
Particularly contentious in this debate is how to design a financial system; should
countries design their financial system along a bank-based or a market-based system?
This issue has generated a large body of literature, examining the links between
financial structure and growth, at firm, industry and country level. The results,
however, are generally inconclusive. An implicit assumption in this literature is that
financial structure is given, probably determined by factors outside the economy.
Lin et al. (2009) have recently argued that it is misleading to state that one
financial system is inherently superior to another. The relative importance of a
specific financial system depends on the structure of the economy. For a country at
its early stage of development, often dominated by subsistence agriculture and with
small firms, a market based financial system is less likely to serve the financial needs
of firms in these types of economies. This, however, changes, as the country develops
and its endowments and hence comparative advantages change. More specifically, as
capital accumulates and the size distribution of firms increase, the financial market
grows to become important. In effect, therefore, they provide a theory that shows
the structure of the financial system is itself determined by the structure of the
economy.
This essay sets out to provide a systematic empirical examination of this theory.
We employ an innovative measure of structure of the economy. In particular, we
rely on three premises to construct the measure of economic structure. First, the
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structure of a country’s economy at a given point in time is determined by its com-
parative advantage. Second, countries specialize in and export goods and services
in which they have a comparative advantage. Hence, all else the same, a country’s
comparative advantage, and therefore economic structure, can be inferred from its
export structure. Third, economic activities have differing needs for different mixes
of finance. As noted in Allen and Gale (1997), for instance, economic activities
that involve high risk and high return projects are better served by a market-based
financial system. Consequently, countries with comparative advantage in such ac-
tivities have stronger demand for and better served by stock markets. Conversely,
activities and sectors that engage in the production of goods and services using ma-
ture technologies are likely to be better served by the banking sector. Therefore, we
construct a financial structure that is embedded in a country’s structure. Employing
this measure and dealing with the endogeneity issue, we show that the structure of
the real sector of the economy exerts a first order causal impact on the evolution of
the structure of the financial system. The result of the essay is in line with the view
that countries with a comparative advantage in labour intensive industries are likely
to foster the development of a bank based financial system, while countries with a
comparative advantage in skill and capital intensive industries are likely to foster
the development of a market based system. The findings of this paper, therefore,
caution against an active engineering of the structure of the financial system.
Although the results are largely invariant across various estimation models and
robust to some additional checks, it is important to note some of the potential limita-
tions of this essay and possible future improvements. Firstly, the analysis is limited
to sample of countries that have stock exchanges. Therefore, there is a potential
selection issue due to exclusion of countries without stock exchanges. The excluded
are mostly low income countries, who tend to have comparative advantages in labour
intensive activities. Given that these activities are mainly debt finance dependent,
we conjecture that the exclusion of these countries from the analysis might wea-
ken the impact of economic structure on the structure of the financial system. An
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important future research would be to explore this by controlling for the selection
issue. Secondly, the measure of economic structure used requires further enhance-
ment. By relying on a country’s export as an indicator of its comparative advantage,
the measure ignores the fact that exports could also reflect policy distortion and not
just comparative advantage. Since the measure is based on the export of goods, it
ignores the non-exportable sectors and in particular service sector exports.
Thirdly, the use of a particular country’s equity dependence over a particular
decade in calculating the measure of economic structure is also an important issue.
Although this methodology has been used in many studies to date that examine the
impact of financial development on various measures of outcome, this is admittedly
open to improvement. Equity dependence of an industry could potentially vary
across countries. However, as argued by Rajan and Zingales (1998), since the U.S has
the most well developed financial system, an industry’s level of equity dependence
in the U.S may be an optimal level for that specific industry. Hence, we believe
that using the U.S as a frame of reference for equity dependence may not bias our
analysis. Using an average value of equity dependence over a decade assumes that
equity dependence is time invariant. It is possible, however, that an industry’s equity
dependence changes over time, which we could not capture for lack of data.32 An
important future enhancement, which is not attempted in this essay due to lack of
data, would be to use the ratio of a given industry’s equity dependence in the US to
the industry’s bank dependence in Germany/Japan. Finally, the existing indicators
of financial development, on which our measure of the size as well as the activity
structures are based, are just crude indicators. An ideal measure would capture the
key functions of the financial system, such as ameliorating informational frictions,
pooling and trading risk, etc. Nevertheless, to my knowledge, such a measure does
not exist.
32This assumption in fact limits the time variability of our key explanatory variable, potentially
reducing its explanatory power.
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Conclusion and Agenda for Future
Research
This thesis explored financial systems and economic development using firm-level as
well as aggregate country-level data. The first two essays explored the key deter-
minants and consequences of credit constraints on micro and small-scale enterprises
in Ethiopia, using a unique dataset collected on about 1000 SMEs. This first es-
say identifies the key determinants of access to credit for MSEs in Ethiopia, with a
particular emphasis on the role of informality. We use a measure of access to credit
constructed based on a series of questions that ask firms about their demand for
external finance so as to elicit their access to credit. Controlling for its possible en-
dogeneity, we show that informality has a negative and significant effect on a firm’s
access to credit. Apart from informality, this essay shows that firms that maintain
better accounting information, that are owned by females and members of business
associations are less likely to be credit constrained, while firms owned by individuals
with a vocational training are more likely to be credit constrained. Although the
regression models used in the essay passed various diagnostic tests and yield fairly
robust results, it is important to reiterate some of the potential limitations of the es-
say. First, the dependant variable is defined on the basis of demand-side responses
alone and reflects only the view of firms and not that of lenders. An improved
measure could exploit a firm’s return on capital, generated, for instance, through a
randomized control trial studies. Secondly, some of the explanatory variables, such
as those aimed at capturing entrepreneurial motivation, are crude proxies and can
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be enhanced through using superior measures of entrepreneurial ability. Thirdly,
there is a potential for measurement error in the measure of access to credit used
in the essay. As noted, our key measure of access to credit is generated based on
responses to series of questions. One key drawback with such approach is that the
classification of the dependent variable depends, among others, on the accuracy of
the answers given to each of the series of questions used to generate the variable. A
recall error in one of the questions, for instance, would result in outcomes for the
dependent variable to be wrongly classified. With non-linear estimation techniques
such as the one used in this essay, however, the misclassification of the dependent va-
riable produces a biased, inconsistent and inefficient estimate. Various options have
been suggested to deal with such an issue. However, our efforts to model theses
effects proved difficult as the likelihood function specified failed to converge. This is
clearly an issue requiring further investigation, but currently lies beyond the scope
of this thesis.
The second essay provides an empirical study of the effects of access to credit
on firm innovation among SMEs in Ethiopia. We use a measure of innovation
based on a question in the survey that asks whether a firm has ‘made important
improvements/changes to its product or services’. As such, we use a measure of
innovation broadly defined and perhaps well suited to these types of firm. Employing
various estimation techniques aimed to correct for possible endogeneity of access
to credit, we show that access to credit has a significant and positive effect on
a firm’s innovation. In particular, we use single equation instrumental variable
estimation methods and show that access to credit has a positive and statistically
significant effect on firm innovation. Estimation results based on a recursive bivariate
probit model and Linear Probability (LP) simultaneous equations model provide
similar result, indicating that access to credit has a significant and positive effect
on innovation. Although our key result is robust to various estimation methods,
it is, however, important to note some of the possible limitations of the empirical
work reported in this essay which future research could possibly address. First,
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except for the results based on LP simultaneous equation model, and to some extent
for the recursive bivariate probit model, most of our results are based on findings
using single equation instrumental variable estimation techniques. This, however,
entails some loss of potentially important information. Employing an appropriate
system estimation method is complicated by the inherent issue of coherency for non-
linear simultaneous equation models and our initial attempt to address this issue
did not succeed. Exploring this further is beyond the scope of the current essay.
Secondly, in view of the nature of our dependent variable and key explanatory
variable, measurement errors and the issue of classification error again apply to this
essay as well. There are generally limited information on the consequence for non-
linear estimation and test when both the dependent and explanatory variables are
misclassified. Future research, which is beyond the scope of the current essay, would
be to explore theses issues and see how these may affect the key findings of this
second essay. Thirdly, it is also important to note the potential weakness of the
instrument set. Although the empirical evidence reported does not suggest a weak
instrument set, it may be important to explore this further in the future. A potential
exercise for the future would examine this in the context of randomised control trial
(RTC), but this again is beyond the reach of the current essay. Finally, it may also
be interesting to explore the impact of access to credit by decomposing innovation
into its different component parts, which our current data does not permit. It maty
well be the case that access to credit affects different types of innovation in a different
manner and knowing this would provide useful policy information.
The third and fourth essays explore aspects of designing appropriate financial
systems, using cross-country data. In particular, the third essay explores whether
opening a stock exchange boosts per capita income growth in a set of SSA countries
and how the growth impact of stock exchange formation in SSA compares to that
of a set of developing countries from other regions of the world. Employing a semi-
parametric Difference-in-Difference (DiD), (i.e., a DiD) on set of matched countries,
we show that opening a stock exchange does not appear to have a significant impact
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on economic growth in SSA. We also show that this is not an issue specific to SSA, as
stock market formation also does not exert a significant effect on per capita income
growth on the set of other developing countries in our sample. Although we provide
some robustness check, we view the limited sample size and the estimation of stan-
dard errors in our preferred methodology as two key issues that warrant caution in
the interpretation of our results. Little can be done about the limited sample size in
cross-country studies. Future work can improve on this through a detailed country-
level study, for instance, by comparing the patterns of financing and performances
of firms in countries with and without stock exchanges. The estimated standard
error computed using the DiD-cum-matching estimation technique we employed is
what is currently used in the existing literature. In view of the limitations with this
calculation as denoted in the essay, there are research avenues for its improvement.
For instance, little is known about the theoretical implications for the standard error
of using one control country multiple times. Exploring this issue is consigned to the
agenda for future research. Another interesting proposal for future research in this
area would be to apply the DiD-matching on an evolving basis. For instance, consi-
der Cote d’Ivoire which opened a stock exchange in 1974. In this essay, the controls
are countries that did not have a stock exchange as of 2007. An interesting case, at
least when using the five years span to calculate the before-after per capita income
growth, would be to use instead any country that did not open a stock exchange
until 1979 as a control country. Such an approach is clearly worthy of investigation
in the future when more relevant data become available.
The fourth essay explores the role of economic structure in shaping the struc-
ture of a country’s financial system. We employ a measure of economic structure
constructed using information on a country’s comparative advantage. Employing an
innovative instrumentation strategy to deal with possible endogeneity of economic
structure, this essay shows that the structure of the economy exerts an important
and significant causal effect on the evolution of the structure of the financial sys-
tem. In particular, we show that countries dominated by equity dependent sectors
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of the economy are more likely to foster larger and active stock market relative to
their banking sectors. We check for the robustness of the result, and show that the
results by and large hold. Although the results are largely consistent across various
estimation models and robust to some additional checks, it is important to note
some of the potential limitations of this essay and possible future improvements.
First, by relying on a country’s export as an indicator of its comparative advan-
tage, the measure of economic structure ignores the fact that exports could also
reflect the effects of policy distortion, and not only comparative advantage, and also
ignores the non-exportable sectors and in particular the service export. Secondly,
the use of a particular country’s equity dependence over a particular decade in cal-
culating the measure of economic structure is also an important issue. Although
this methodology has been used in many studies examining the impact of financial
development on various measures of outcome, this concept is admittedly open to
further development. An important future improvement, which is not attempted in
this essay because of lack of data, would be to use the ratio of a given industry’s
equity dependence in the US to the industry’s bank dependence in, say, Germany
or Japan. Finally, the measure of the financial structure used in the essay is just
a proxy. The existing indicators of financial development, on which our measure
of the size as well as the activity structures are based, are just crude indicators.
An ideal measure would capture the key functions of the financial system, such as
ameliorating information friction, pooling and trading risk, etc. Nevertheless, to my
knowledge, such a measure does not exist but its construction clearly provides the
basis for future research in this particular research area.
A couple of issues comprising part of an agenda for future research suggest them-
selves from the research undertaken in this thesis. The research reveals the impor-
tance of access to external finance for innovation purposes by MSEs in Ethiopia and
the key role of informality in their access to credit. Examining the key determi-
nants of informality will provide, therefore, an interesting theme for future research.
Conceptually, two views suggest themselves as to why firms decide to become in-
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formal, or do not want to be formal. One view, associated with DeSoto (1989), is
that firms are excluded by burdensome and costly registration procedures. In other
words, firms know the benefits and costs of being formal, but they are deterred by
excessive entry regulations. Hence, simplifying and reducing the cost of registration
may encourage more firms to become formal. The other view is that firms rationally
choose to be informal. As per this view, being formal has both benefits and costs.
Included in the costs are the cost to register a firm, tax payments, compliance with
labour regulation, health and safety considerations, and other product standards.
Among the benefits are that formality enables firms to develop contracts with large
firms, do business with government, enter into contracts with banks, thereby impro-
ving their access to external finance and the associated benefits that this provides.
When deciding to become formal, therefore, firms weigh the costs and benefits and
register if the benefit outweighs the cost. A policy implication that logically follows
from this view is that easing the cost of registration alone may not be sufficient to
persuade firms to become formal. As long as there is no benefit to being formal,
firms would just want to remain informal. There are few empirical studies that
attempt to disentangle these competing views, though de Mel et al. (2012) provide
an exception. The study undertaken by de Mel et al. (2012) conducts a field expe-
riment on informal firms in Sri Lanka to encourage them to register. They find that
reducing the direct cost of registration (through reimbursing firms their registration
costs) and providing information about the potential benefits of formality does not
appear to have a significant effect on the demand for formality. They show that
it takes a payment of about two months profit of a median firm to encourage half
of them to register. It would be interesting, therefore, to implement this type of
approach in Ethiopia through, for instance, a randomized control trial on informal
firms. In addition, given the findings reported in essay one,, it would also be in-
teresting to explore if the results of essay one are robust to explicitly addressing
econometrically the potential misclassification error. This did not prove feasible, as
noted earlier, given problems encountered with non-convergence in the likelihood
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function. However, more effort and the use of alternative econometric procedures
may enhance matters in this regard.
Essay two emphasizes the importance of access to external finance on firms’ in-
novation and hence their growth. This highlights an interesting but yet unsettled
issue as to whether these firms are the bedrock for future medium and large enter-
prises. There is generally limited information regarding the extent to which small
firms grow to become a significant source of employment generation in developing
countries. This evidence is particularly lacking in the case of Ethiopia. Sutton and
Kellow (2010),through an historical and descriptive study of 50 large manufacturing
firms in Ethiopia, provide some support for the view that large firms tend to start
start large. However, it is not clear if firms in this study are randomly sampled and
hence their findings can be generalised to the current application. A systematic exa-
mination of this issue would, therefore, be an interesting avenue for future research.
If SMEs grow to become important sources of employment generation, one objec-
tive of subsequent research would be to examine what, apart from factors we already
know such as access to credit, determines the growth of these firms and how and
what policy interventions can help in facilitating the transition of these firms from
subsistence to medium-sized firms. On the other hand, if these firms do not grow
beyond subsistence level, as Sutton and Kellow (2010) show, an interesting issue to
examine would be what factors constrain the formation of medium-sized firms; is
it lack of access to credit, lack of insurance against failure, or is it attributable to
the fact that the high ability individuals are discouraged from starting their own
businesses?
It is well documented that access to credit is important for firm’s growth. A
lot remains to be done, however, as to how to improve firm access to external
finance, in particular as it relates to the role of direct government intervention. One
approach is a credit guarantee scheme. Partial credit guarantee, in particular, has
become a popular means of intervention to facilitate access to credit for collateral
constrained firms, particularly SMEs (Honohan (2010); Beck et al. (2010b)). Despite
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its popularity, this scheme is often based on tricky assumptions and information
about the impact of these schemes is generally lacking. Exploring the design of an
efficient credit guarantee scheme that minimizes the moral hazard issue but enhances
firm access to credit would be an interesting area for future research. Particularly
interesting since one of the goals of a partial credit guarantee is to encourage learning
by financial intermediaries to lend to MSEs, would be to examine if credit guarantee
schemes sustain lending to these firms once the credit guarantee stops. This could
be a fertile area for future research employing a randomized trial type of programme
evaluation.
The ultimate goal of policy aimed at expanding access to credit, however, should
be to put in place policies that facilitate the development of the financial system.
The results reported in essays three and four of the thesis indicate that interventions
to change the structure of the financial system are not included among such policies.
The essays also flag interesting future research areas. One such is a firm level his-
torical study, for instance, comparing the patterns of financing and performances of
firms in countries with and without stock exchanges. Some of the empirical metho-
dological limitations of essay three also reveal other areas for research. In particular,
these include issues relating to the estimation of the standard error using the DiD-
cum-matching estimation technique. For instance, it would be interesting to explore
the theoretical implications for the standard error of using one control country mul-
tiple times, and hence the efficiency gains from applying the DiD-matching on an
evolving basis.
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Appendix for Chapter-III
This appendix describes the concept and key assumptions underlying DiD. Denote
the treatment by D. D takes a value of 1 if the country has a stock exchange and
0 otherwise. Denote the potential per capita real income growth by Y Dt where t
is time. t takes 0 for years before opening a stock exchange and 1 for years after
post-opening stock exchange. Among the parameters of interest are estimates of
the impact of opening stock exchange on countries with stock exchange. More
specifically, assuming the coefficient is given by θ(x), where the x denotes observable
covariates, we have:
θ(x) = E(Y
1
1 − Y 01 |X = x,D = 1) (4.6)
The fundamental problem is that Y 01 is not observable. Hence one has to look
for a proxy. Such proxy can be obtained from the observable outcomes with two key
assumptions.
• Assumption-1 No spill-over and anticipation effects. The idea, soon be clear
below, is that the pre-as well as post-treatment outcome of the control groups
be unaffected by the treatment. This assumption also rules out the possibility
of anticipation effect, where the pre-treatment effect of the treated group is
affected by the treatment.
• Assumption-2 Common trend. This assumption states that, absent treatment,
the two groups would have followed parallel path. More formally, this assump-
tion can be given by : E(Y 01 −Y 00 |X = x,D = 1) = E(Y 01 −Y 00 |X = x,D = 0).
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With these two key assumption the parameter, θ(x), can be identified, as follows:
• Note that we can denote E(Y 11 |X = x,D = 1) by its observable counterpart.
Hence, we have θ(x) = E(Y1 − Y 01 |X = x,D = 1)
• The only missing value is, therefore, Y 01 |X = x,D = 1).
• From the Common trend assumption and Assumption-2, we have the following:
E(Y 01 |X = x,D = 1) = E(Y1 − Y0|X = x,D = 0) + E(Y0|X = x,D = 1).
• Therefore, θ(x) = E(Y1 − Y0|X = x,D = 1)− (E(Y1 − Y0|X = x,D = 0))
Hence, θ(x) is now identified since it is the function of all observable variables.
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Table 4.8: List of countries in the sample
Country Region Year
From To
Australia East Asia & Pacific 1988 2000
Fiji East Asia & Pacific 1997 1999
HongKong SA East Asia & Pacific 1991 2000
Indonesia East Asia & Pacific 1981 2000
Japan East Asia & Pacific 1988 2000
South Korea East Asia & Pacific 1975 2000
Malaysia East Asia & Pacific 1976 2000
Mongolia East Asia & Pacific 1995 2000
New Zealand East Asia & Pacific 1988 2000
Philippines East Asia & Pacific 1976 2000
Singapore East Asia & Pacific 1988 2000
Thailand East Asia & Pacific 1976 2000
Austria Europe & Central Asia 1988 2000
Belgium Europe & Central Asia 1988 2000
Bulgaria Europe & Central Asia 1995 2000
Croatia Europe & Central Asia 1994 2000
Cyprus Europe & Central Asia 1991 2000
Czech Republic Europe & Central Asia 1994 2000
Denmark Europe & Central Asia 1988 2000
Estonia Europe & Central Asia 1997 2000
Finland Europe & Central Asia 1988 2000
France Europe & Central Asia 1988 2000
Georgia Europe & Central Asia 2000 2000
Germany Europe & Central Asia 1989 2000
Greece Europe & Central Asia 1975 2000
Hungary Europe & Central Asia 1991 2000
Iceland Europe & Central Asia 1994 2000
Ireland Europe & Central Asia 1994 2000
Italy Europe & Central Asia 1988 2000
Kazakhstan Europe & Central Asia 1997 2000
Kyrgyz Repub Europe & Central Asia 1999 2000
Latvia Europe & Central Asia 1996 2000
Lithuania Europe & Central Asia 1995 2000
Macedonia Europe & Central Asia 1996 2000
Moldova Europe & Central Asia 1996 2000
Netherlands Europe & Central Asia 1988 2000
Norway Europe & Central Asia 1988 2000
Poland Europe & Central Asia 1991 2000
Portugal Europe & Central Asia 1977 2000
Russian Fede Europe & Central Asia 1994 2000
Slovak Repub Europe & Central Asia 1994 2000
Slovenia Europe & Central Asia 1995 2000
Spain Europe & Central Asia 1988 2000
Sweden Europe & Central Asia 1988 2000
Switzerland Europe & Central Asia 1991 2000
Turkey Europe & Central Asia 1983 2000
United Kingd Europe & Central Asia 1988 2000
Argentina Latin America & Caribbean 1988 2000
Barbados Latin America & Caribbean 1990 2000
Bolivia Latin America & Caribbean 1995 2000
Brazil Latin America & Caribbean 1992 2000
Chile Latin America & Caribbean 1976 2000
Colombia Latin America & Caribbean 1976 2000
Costa Rica Latin America & Caribbean 1995 1999
Ecuador Latin America & Caribbean 1993 2000
El Salvador Latin America & Caribbean 1996 2000
Guatemala Latin America & Caribbean 1995 2000
Jamaica Latin America & Caribbean 1988 2000
Mexico Latin America & Caribbean 1975 2000
Paraguay Latin America & Caribbean 1995 1999
Peru Latin America & Caribbean 1989 2000
Trinidad and Latin America & Caribbean 1988 2000
Uruguay Latin America & Caribbean 1993 1999
Venezuela, Latin America & Caribbean 1975 2000
Bahrain Middle East & North Africa 1998 2000
Egypt Middle East & North Africa 1988 2000
Iran Middle East & North Africa 1993 2000
Israel Middle East & North Africa 1988 2000
Jordan Middle East & North Africa 1978 2000
Kuwait Middle East & North Africa 1988 2000
Malta Middle East & North Africa 1994 2000
Morocco Middle East & North Africa 1988 2000
Saudi Arabia Middle East & North Africa 1991 2000
Tunisia Middle East & North Africa 1988 2000
Canada North America 1988 2000
Bangladesh South Asia 1994 2000
India South Asia 1976 2000
Nepal South Asia 1994 2000
Pakistan South Asia 1984 2000
Sri Lanka South Asia 1985 2000
Cote d’Ivoir Sub-saharan Africa 1988 2000
Ghana Sub-saharan Africa 1993 2000
Kenya Sub-saharan Africa 1990 2000
Mauritius Sub-saharan Africa 1990 2000
Nigeria Sub-saharan Africa 1976 2000
South Africa Sub-saharan Africa 1988 2000
Tanzania Sub-saharan Africa 1998 2000
Zambia Sub-saharan Africa 1996 2000
